Arguments into the Compafs of a few Words, He feems indeed to make fome Apology for thefe Defects, because Sextus, whom he intended to follow closely, and to confute as he went along, is alfo guilty of them; but he might have reduced Sextus's Pyrrhonian Scheme to fome particular Heads, and thus have confuted him methodically, and in much fhorter manner: but by this means he would not have made a large Volume in Folio. However, we will endeavour to make our Abstract as coherent as is poffible, and to reduce Mr. De Croufaz's Reflections to two particular Heads, viz. The inconfiftency of the Scepticks, and the Mark by which Truth may be certainly diftinguished from Fafhood.

FIRST, then, with regard to the Inconfiftency of the Scepticks; we have faid already, that they lay down fome Principles, from which they draw Confequences; which feems inconfiftent with the Character of thofe who pretend that every thing is doubtful and uncertain: for if that be, how can they depend upon the Confequences they draw from their own Principles? They alfo explain with great Accuracy the Words which they ufe in their Reasoning; but how can this be done, if every thing be dark and. unintelligible? Do they pretend to clear up what was obfcure before? If fo, they must confefs that fomething at leaft is clear, after they have defined it. If the Scepticks anfwer, that they don't know whether any thing can be cleared up by Definitions; to what purpose then do they give themselves the trouble of defining and explaining Words? They pretended to confute the Dogmatifts; but this fuppofes that they un

derstood

derstood their Writings and Opinions? When they were asked, fays Mr. De Crousaz, do you know that this was the Opinion of Zeno or of Epicurus, or is that dark and unknown to you? "If you think you apprehend the meaning of "those you pretend to confute, you must "confefs that you are fure of fomething, "which is renouncing your Scepticifm. If

you fay, that you don't understand the "Books you read, or the Perfons with whom

you difpute, why do you contradict them, "and pretend to argue against what you "don't understand?" Mr. De Croufaz, to fhew how ridiculous the Scepticks are, brings in one of them talking after this manner: I don't know whether I have well understood Socrates's meaning, but I will confute him for all that: His Opinion was perhaps quite different from what I fuppofe it to be; be bad perhaps very good reasons for what be afferted, and my Arguments may have no Strength; perhaps I don't know what I fay when I talk upon this Subject: but no matter for that, I will put in order what appears to me; and read afterwards over again, and polish it; and it feems to me, that to make the Reader underftand what I have wrote, I will take all the pains which a Man would take, who is perfuaded he has Truth on his fide. Thus our Author thinks a Sceptick would talk, if he was fincere; but to tell the truth, fays he, the Scepticks were fenfible that they had not miftook the Senfe of the Authors they pretended to confute; they oppofed against them the best Arguments they could invent, they put them in the strongest light; they thought thofe Arguments were good, and did not doubt but they would convince their Readers: but

they

they did not care to own it, being perfuaded that if they once own'd fo much, their Antagonists would foon get an entire Victory over

them.

2dly, With regard to the Characteristick of Truth, by which it may be certainly diftinguifh'd from Falfhood; Mr. De Croufaz maintains, that this Mark or Characteristick is nothing else but the Evidence and Perfpicuity of Things and he fhews that the Scepticks themfelves are oblig'd to admit this, fince it is upon that very fame Principle they argue. Sextus's Argument was this, Truth is either entirely evident, or entirely dark, or partly evident and partly dark. If fome dark Propofitions are true, and fome of thofe which appear evident to us are also true, how fhall we diftinguish those which only appear evident, from those that are really fo? And to know that a Propofition is certain, we must know before-hand, that things are in reality what they appear to be; and fince we cannot acquire that Knowledge, we must be content to doubt of every thing. Here Mr. De Croufaz afks the following Queftions. Does a Man, who uses fuch Expreffions, understand what he fays; or are his Words bare Sounds without any Senfe? Is the Sense of the Propofitions he utters clear to him, or not? Does he not feel within himself that he reafons juftly? If fo, he perceives then that Evidence, to which we muft yield whether we will or not, without any further Proof; he fees that Light, which does not want another Light to make it appear: Therefore wherever the fame Light ftrikes us, we may be equally certain, that we have Truth on our fide: Hence it follows,that EVIDENCE is that Characteristick

of

of Truth, which we wanted to find out. Our Author answers afterwards to fome other Cavils of Sextus, but we think it needless to enter into thofe particulars.

In the fourth Section Mr. De Croufaz examines the third Book of Sextus's Hypotypofes. Sextus begins the firft Chapter of that Book, by telling us, that as a true Sceptick, he will worfhip the fame Gods which his Country-men adore; this, I fuppofe, he did for fear of being profecuted for Non-Conformity. He then argues against the Being of a God, and concludes in thefe Words: A Man must be impious, who believes a Deity, for it is impious to think, that God cannot do that, which is beft; or if he can, that he will not do it: but whoever believes a God, must admit one of these Propofitions; fince the Evils, of which this World is full, fhew, that God either will not or cannot prevent them. As Mr. Bayle has alfo urg'd that fame Objection; our Author does not anfwer it in this place, but refers us to what he offers against Mr. Bayle in the third part of this Work; fo that we muft differ to lay before the Reader our Author's Obfervations, 'till we come to that part of his Book, where he anfwers Mr. Bayle's Objections.

MR. De Croufaz next endeavours to confute the Arguments by which Sextus undertook to prove that there are no Caufes at all; but as thefe Arguments are mere cavils, founded only upon Equivocations, we don't think it proper to give an Account of them; nor of our Author's Anfwers, which rnay eafily be gueffed. We may fay the fame, with regard to the Arguments, by which Sextus pretends to fhew,

that

that it is impoffible there fhould be Bodies in the World.

BUT as Mr. Bayle has in a manner maintain'd the fame Opinion by Arguments grounded on the Obfervations of the modern Philofophers, we think it will be proper to lay these Arguments before the Reader, with Mr. De Croufaz's Answer.

THE Scepticks, fays Mr. Bayle, were in the right to maintain, that the Qualities of "the Bodies, which make Impreffions on our

Senfes were mere Appearances; we may "very well fay, that we feel the Heat when "we approach the Fire, but we cannot affirm "that the Fire really is, what it appears to be. "Thus the antient Scepticks talked. But now "the modern Philofophers are more pofitive;

they fay roundly, that Heat, Odours, Co"lours, &c. are not in the Objects of our "Senfes, but are mere Modifications of our "Souls; and that Bodies are not what they ap

66

pear to be. Indeed thefe Philofophers would "fain have excluded Space and Motion from the Lift of mere Appearances, but they "could not; for if the Objects of our Senfes appear to us warm,cold, colour'd,&c. tho' they be not fo,why should they not alfo appear to "us extended, figured, in Reft or in Motion, tho' there be no fuch thing? Farther, the Objects of our Senfes cannot be the Causes of the Senfations we have: we could therefore feel Heat or Cold, fee Colours, Figures, Motion, Reft, Extenfion, tho' there were no Bodies in the World; we have then no good Arguments of the Being of Bodies. "The only good Argument that could be alledged is this; God would impofe upon us,

if