66 "when I use fuch or the like Expreffions, I "don't pretend to affirm the Truth of what I fay, though I feem to talk pofitively, and by way of Affirmation." Though the Scep ticks never affert the Truth of any thing, yet in the ordinary Courfe of Life they act according to what feems probable to them; they conform to the Cuftoms and Fashions of the Countries where they live, and also follow their own Paffions and Defires. THE Scepticks faid, that there is no Criterium, no Mark by which Truth may be with certainty diftinguifhed from Falfhood; therefore they followed the Instinct of Nature, the Laws and Customs of their Country, and those Rules and Maxims which are established in every Art by the Profeffors of it: They alledged ten principal Reafons for thus abftaining from paffing a pofitive Judgment. The firft is, that there is fuch a vast difference between all kinds of Animals, and their different Senfes, that we cannot be fure whether or not they are affected in the fame manner, by the fame Objects: how then fhall we Men be fure that we perceive things as they are in reality? For intance, an Object appears red to our Eyes; but who fhall tell us whether it does not appear blue or green to another Animal? 2dly, THERE is as much difference between one Man and another, as there is between Men and the other living Creatures. Demophon was cold in the Sun, and warm out of it, and the Emperor Tiberius could fee in the Dark: How wide do the Dogmatifs differ among themselves? Muft we believe all Men? But that is impoffible, fince their Opinions are inconfiftent with one another. Muft we prefer one to all the reft? reft? But whom fhall we chufe? Does not every body think his Opinions only are true, and thofe of every body elfe falfe? Muft we follow the greateft Number? But not to fay that this is childish, how fhall we know on which fide of a Question the greatest Number is? And does it not happen very often, that what is the Opinion of but a few Perfons in one Country, is in another Country believed by a vaft number of People? 3dly, WE can judge of things only according to what they appear to us; but the different Senfes give us not only various, but also oppofite Ideas of things. When we look on a Picture, if we believe our Eyes, fome Objects are very near to us, and others at a great diftance: Whereas, if we pass our Hand over the Picture, the Senfe of Feeling does not convey any fuch Idea to our Minds. Bodies have perhaps but one Quality, which in a manner multiplies itfelf, and appears under different Forms, according to the different Senfes, which are affected by it: Or perhaps Bodies have a great many Qualities, which are unknown to us, because we want the proper Senfes on which thefe Qualites might make their Impreffions. What Man will be able to determine these Questions? 4thly, THE fame thing appears different to the fame Senfe, according as we are differently difpofed the fame thing pleases or vexes us according to the different Humour we are in: and when we pretend to judge of things, our Mind is biaffed by the Condition and Circumftances in which we are; an old Man blames what a young Man praises, and both pretend to be in the right. If there are any Marks by which CC 4 which we may know the Truth of the Matter; if you fay there is fuch a Mark or Criterium, by which I may diftinguish what is certain, from what is doubtful; I will defire you to let me know it, and to lay your Proofs before me: but then I will ask again, have these Proofs the infallible Mark or Criterium; and whatever reafon you may alledge, I will put again the fame Queftion to you. Here we beg leave to obferve, that when a Man denies that there is a Criterium or certain Mark of Truth, it is in vain we undertake to prove to him, fince every Argument we may alledge against him, is a mere begging of the Queftion; for, in order to argue, we muft fuppofe beforehand that there is a Criterium or Mark by which we may diftinguish a good Argument from a bad one: But then every Man that will be fincere, muft confefs, that there are fome Propofitions, which are fo evident, that it is impoffible for him to doubt of them; hence it will follow, that EVIDENCE is the Criterium or characteristick Mark of Truth? 5thly, OBJECTS appear very different to us, according to the different Situation we are in, when we view them: Who fhall tell us in what Situation we muft be, to fee thefe Objects as they are in reality? 6thly, THE impreffions which the Objects without us make upon our Senfes, have always fome Mixture, which alters them. Thus the Image, which comes from an Object, and enters the Eye, paffes through the Air, and through the Tunicks and Humours of the Eye. How fhall we know that thefe Mediums, through which it paffes, don't alter it in fuch a manner, that the Object is not reprefented as it really really is? The fame may be faid in proportion of the other Senfes. 7thly,THINGS appear very different from what they were, if the Situation or the Quantity be altered. If you fcrape Horn, the fame Bits, which before appeared black, will now appear white; a Remedy, which taken in a certain Quantity, is falutary, will become a Poifon if you take a greater Quantity of it. What can be affirmed of a thing that feems fo different from itself? In what Situation, or in what Quantity must we confider it, to know certainly what it is? 8bly, How attentively foever we confider things, we can perceive only how they are related to one another; but no Senfe, no Perception can make us know what they are in themfelves. 9thly, WE admire what is rare and uncommon, 'and despise what is ufual; whence it appears that we have no fixed Rule, whereby to judge of the real Worth of Things. Iothly, THE Laws and Cuftoms of one Nation, are not only different, but quite oppofite to thofe of another; what is by fome accounted Virtuous and Praife-worthy, is by others accounted Vicious and Abominable; what fome allow, others forbid: the Dogmatists themselves are not agreed concerning the Principles of Morality, and the Confequences which may be drawn from them. Thefe are the ten Motives of Reafons upon which the Scepticks ground their famous my, Epocha, or abstaining from judging, this made them fay, that there is nothing certain, at leaft with regard to Men, and that every thing is incomprehenfible. MR. De Croufaz having given us this Account of the Scepticks, from Sextus's Pyrrhonian Hypotypofes, Hypotypofes, or Representation of the Pyrrbonians, he offers in the next Section fome Obfervations on the Scepticks, and undertakes to fhew how inconfiftent they were with them- . felves; and he makes it appear, that although they pretended not to affirm or deny any thing pofitively, they were nevertheless as pofitive as the moft peremptory Dogmatifts. For the Scepticks, in order to prove, that nothing is certain, were obliged to fuppofe fome Principles, as the foundation of their Reasonings, and to draw Confequences from them; but what was this, but a mere begging of the Queftions? For they could be stopped at their first fetting out, by being told, that to prove that there is nothing certain, they supposed that fomething is certain, viz. the ten Affertions or Principles we have mentioned. Our Author alfo fhews at large, that in the Courfe of their Lives, and in civil Affairs, the Scepticks acted and reafoned like other Men: but all what our Author fays on this head is nothing to the Purpofe, fince the Scepticks maintained, that, though nothing was certain, yet they acted on every occafion according to what appeared to them. IN the third Section Mr. De Croufaz gives us an Account of Sextus's fecond Book of the Pyrrhonian Hypotypofes, and confutes him in the mean time; and as Sextus in his fecond Book only enlarges upon what he has faid in the first, Mr. De Croufax's Obfervations are levelled against both. But here we must beg leave to fay, that Mr. De Croufaz writes in fuch a loofe and incoherent manner, his Stile is fo diffufe, and he repeats fo often the fame thing, that it is very difficult to bring his Obfervations and Argu |