with all the Perceptions it is to have for ever, which Perceptions are difplayed fucceffively in time, and anfwer exactly to the Motions of a Mechanical Automaton, which is the organized Body, is what that famous Philofopher calls the pre-established Harmony, Harmonia præftabilita, because there is a perfect Harmony and Agreement between the Ideas and Senfations of the Soul, and the Motions of the Body, which Agreement, according to him, was fixed and determined by God, even before the Creation of the World,

THE Author offers another Argument to prove the Immortality of the Soul; but we will lay nothing of it at prefent, because we shall have another Opportunity of laying that Argument before the Reader, when we come to the Chapter where the Author treats of the Eternity of Hell-Torments.

IN the Vth Chapter, the Author treats of Original Sin; and here he is as Orthodox as can be defired; but for that Reafon we need not give a large account of this Chapter: however, we must take notice of what our Author offers to explain, how the Sin of our first Parents could be tranfmitted to their whole Pofterity. He thinks, with Leibniz ?, that the Souls of all Men have been created at once, and from the Moment of their Creation united to an organized Body, and were all in the Loins of Adam; by this Suppofition, fays he, it is an eafy thing to underftand how Men not yet born could be perfonated by one moral Head. Very well, but this does not explain yet how the Bodies and Souls of all Men could be defiled by the Sin of Adam; this is what we would be glad to fee

Theodicée, § 90, 91*

fee explained, but our Author has not thought fit to do it.

He enquires next, whether the virtuous Actions of Heathens were any thing else but bining Sins. To folve this Queftion he observes, that Sins are nothing else but the Absence of Perfection; and that the Rule of Perfection (with regard to moral Actions) is the Law, either natural or revealed. Some Heathens have lived in fuch a manner, that their Actions were agreeable to the Law of Nature; now moral Goodness confifts in that Agreement, therefore in this Refpect, at leaft, the Actions of the Heathens were really good but being not perform'd according to the revealed Law, nor by the Impulfe of the Holy Ghoft, they were defective upon that account, But how

could they be otherwife, fince the Heathens had no Revelation, and fince it was not in their power to be affifted by the Holy Ghoft, of which they had not the leaft Notion: And indeed our Author owns, that the Virtues of the Heathens were really good Actions, tho' he fays they were tainted with Defects".

THE Sixth Chapter treats of God's Providence, and his Permiffion of Evil. It must be own'd this Subject is one of the most intricate, and the most difficult to explain in fuch a manner, as not to make it liable to unanswer able Objections; which appears by the many Schemes, which have been held by the Philofophers and Divines of all Ages. Our Author in this Chapter quotes feveral Paffages from the Fathers, to fhew how far they agree with M. Leibniz's Syftem; and he pretends to make Q4

4 Splendida Peccata.

it

Virtutes Gentium non funt mera Peccata, fed Actiones bone, Defectibus tamen contaminatæ.

it appear, that where they differ from him, they either speak Nonfenfe, or charge God with being the Author of Sin. He afterwards explains more diftin&tly the Opinion of Leibniz ; which is, that God being infinitely perfect, could not but create the best World poffible, which happened to be interwoven with Sin and Misery. Here the Author repeats what he has faid in Chapter the Third, where he speaks of the Creation of the World: as we have given a large account of that Chapter, in our laft Journal, we refer our Readers to it. We muft obferve however, that our Author fuppofes Sin could not be avoided in this present World but by a conftant Intercourfe of Miracles; and he says, it is blafphemous to fuppofe, that it became God Almighty to prevent Sin with his infinite Power, How this Affertion will filence Mr. Bayle's Followers, I own, I cannot apprehend; for they fay, that the Notion we have of God's Wifdom and Goodness is inconfiftent with his permitting Men to fin, efpecially if they are to be punished for it with eternal Mifery; and that Free-will is a poisonous Gift, if attended with fuch fatal Confequences: befides, we don't fee, fay they, that to prevent Sin, Men must be bereft of Free-will, or God interpofe miraculously; fince the glorified Saints and Angels never fin, tho' they be free, and God does not perform any Miracles to prevent their Sinning. Therefore to affert, with Leibniz, that God could not but chuse the best World, which happen'd to be defiled with Sin, is not to folve the Difficulty, but meerly to beg the Question: Our Author feems nevertheless mightily pleas'd with this Solution, and challenges his Adverfaries to find out a better Scheme to answer all Bayle's Objections

No. XX. Art. 9. p. 190, &c.

jections against the Wisdom and Goodness of God.

In the Seventh Chapter the Author endeavours to apply the Leibnitian Philofophy to the Omniprefence of Chrift. Being a Lutheran, he believes that the Body of our Saviour is prefent every where. To explain this Myftery, fays he very piously, we must begin with fervent Prayers, that our Understanding darken'd by Nature, may be enlighten'd with heavenly Rays from God. He afterwards enters upon his Subject, and to make it appear that it is not impoffible that the fame Body be prefent every where, he explains what it is to exift, and to be present: and by the way he endeavours to confute, what our famous Newton has proved about the mutual Attraction of Bodies at a distance. He next enumerates the different ways in which feveral things can be prefent to one another: He afterwards confiders the Body, enquires into its Unity, and afferts that the Body of Chrift can be omniprefent, which Affertion is illustrated and supported with several Arguments; finally, he explains what he calls the Sacramental Prefence of Chrift. Tho' this Chapter be very long, we cannot give a larger account of it, because we freely own it, we don't understand our Author's Meaning, and we are of opinion our Readers would not be much pleafed with his fubtle and metaphyfical Notions.

The Subject of the Eighth Chapter is the Satisfaction of Chrift, which being connected with, and depending upon the Juftice of God, the Author explains what is Juftice, which he defines thus, " Juftice is Goodness managed with Wisdom." Juftitia definitur per Bonitatem, quæ adminiftratur Sapientia. Here he starts an Ob.

jection;

jection; how can Punishments, fays he, be the effect of Goodnefs? Does Evil proceed from Benevolence? That the Reader may be able to judge of our Author's Anfwer, we'll fet down his own Words, which we'll endeavour to tranflate faithfully. Sapientia, fays he, benignitatis fuperpondium aufert, ut bonum capacitati refpondeat fubjecti, ne diffenfus oriatur inter collatum bonum, & illum, cui bonum debebat conferri. Quin pæna damni in fufflaminato per Sapientiam benignitatis ulterioris exercitio ponatur, dubium eft nullum. De pæna fenfus videtur quæftio difficilior. -Ex recentiorum mente dolor omnis, in quò pæna fenfus vertitur, vel in corpore fpectatur, vel in animo. Illinc eft divifio continui, binc repræsentatio illius imperfectionis. Itaque pœna nihil eft quam perfectionis abfentia, feu fructus fufpenfe, fapientia fuadente, benignitatis. That is, "Wif"dom takes away the Overplus of Goodness,

that the Benefit conferred may be proportio"ned to the Subject on whom it is conferred,

and that there be no Difagreement between "the Benefit beftowed, and the Perfon upon "whom it was to be bestowed. The Pain of

Want, (that is, the Privation of Happiness) "confifts, no doubt, in this, that the further "Exercife of Goodness is fufpended by Wif"dom. But the Queftion is not fo eafily "folved with regard to fenfible Punishments.

According to the Opinion of the Moderns *, "all the Pain, in which the fenfible Punish"ment/confifts, may be confider'd either in the

66

Body or in the Soul: In the Body there is a "Solution of Continuity, and in the Soul the Reprefentation (or Idea) of that Imperfection: Sa "that, Punishment is nothing else but the Ab"" fence

The Author means by them, Leibniz and his Followers