LITTERARIA.

ARTICLE XI.

A fecond Abstract of the Uses of the Leibnitian and Wolfian Philofophy in Divinity. (The firft is in N°. 20. Art. 9.)

P.

WE

E were obliged to break off our former Abstract, that there might be room for the Litterary News. We have given an Account of part of the fourth Chapter, intitled de Homine, of Man; and we have laid before the Reader, what the Author offers about the Immateriality, Nature, and Free-will of the Soul; he undertakes next to prove the Soul's Immortality. Three things, fays he, are requifite to make the Soul immortal. First, it muft continue to be by its own Nature for ever after Death. 2dly, It must have diftinct Ideas, with the power of reflecting upon them. 3dly, There must be fuch a Connexion between the State of the Soul after Death, and that in which it was before, that Man may apprehend he is the fame he was in this Life. This being premifed, the Author goes on to prove these three Pofitions: he owns however beforehand, that every Argument he is to alledge, confider'd fingly, may be eluded; but he fays, that joined together, they have a great strength,

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As to the first Pofition, he fays, that the Soub being a fimple Subftance, without Parts, it is not liable to Deftruction. To prove the fecond Pofition, the Author makes ufe of this Argument. When no Reafon can be imagined why a thing should be, that thing fhall not be; now there can be no Reafon why the Soul should not be conscious of its Being, that is, have Ideas and reflect upon them, after Death: Therefore it must have them. For as the Soul cannot be affected by the Body, there can be no Reason, why the Soul after Death fhould lofe its power of acting, and efpecially its Confcioufnefs. The third Pofition is prov'd thus; the Condition of the Soul in any given Moment depends upon the Condition it was in the Moment before: but in the Moment preceding Death immediately, the Soul was in a State of Confcioufnefs, why then should that Confcioufness vanish all of a fudden? The Rules of Reminifcéncy require, that when an Idea, that has something analogous to fome other Ideas, which we have had before, is prefent to the Mind, the whole State, in which we were before, be called again to our Memory: Now as the Soul, feparated from the Body, must have feveral Ideas connected with thofe it had when united to the Body, it cannot but apprehend that it is ftill the fame individual Being.

BUT here the Author himfelf starts an Objection, which indeed feems very strong: What muft we think, fays he, of the Souls of Brutes? Shall we alfo allow them Immortality? If no Reafon can be given why the Soul of Man fhould cease to think after Death, there is no Reason neither why the Souls of Brutes fhould ceafe to have Senfations: Nay, the Arguments alledged

in favour of the Immortality of human Souls, hold good alfo for the Immortality of the Souls of Brutes It must not be faid, that theirs is material; for if Matter can be fo far exalted as to feel, and to be confcious of its Being in Brutes, why could it not be made capable of reflecting, and of having abstract Ideas? Shall we fay, that the Soul of Brutes differs from that of Men only in the Degree of Knowledge, Men being able to know more than Brutes? But this is not an effential Difference, for the fame Arguments, which prove that the higher Degree of Knowledge remains in Man after Death, will prove also that the lower Degree remains in Brutes. It will be faid, may be, that they are quite different Substances; this cannot be proved, but by the immenfe Difference we observe between the Faculties of the Souls of Men, and thofe of Brutes; but from this Argument it will follow alfo, that the Soul of a new-born Infant is not of the fame nature with that of a full-grown Man, becaufe Infants have hardly the Senfations, which Brutes feem to have..

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The Author's Anfwer is this: "We grant, Jays be, that Brutes are not mere Machines like Clock-work: We grant, that their "Souls are immaterial, and that they don't

perifh by Death; but it does not follow from έσ thence, that they are immortal, for to be im"mortal, it is not enough barely to exift after "Death; this is but the firft Requifite of the

three we have mention'd: If it be faid, that ઠંડ no Reafon can be affign'd, why the Thread of Senfations, which the Souls of Brutes had before Death, fhould be broke of; that in them, as well as in Men, their prefent Condition is linked with that in which they were

" bef

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"before; and that if this proves the Immortality of human Souls, it must hold good "alfo with regard to the Souls of Brutes: We "anfwer, this is not enough to make them

immortal, they want ftill the third Requifite, "viz. the Consciousness that they are the fame "individual Being they were before. Suppose "then that the Souls of Brutes have fome Sen"fations after Death: it does not follow from "thence that they also understand, but the Faculty of Understanding or Reasoning is "another Requifite of Immortality. Besides, "it is impoffible, that the Souls of Brutes fhould

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have any Consciousness of their former Being; "because the Senfations they have,after they left "the Body, are quite different from those they "had before." But how does this agree with the Notion our Author has of the Soul? For according to him the Ideas and Senfations of the Soul, in Brutes as well as in Men, do not depend upon, and are not occafioned by the Body, but are in the Soul from the Moment of its Creation, and are only unfolded and display'd in time: What can then be the Reason why the Souls of Brutes fhould, after the Destruction of the Body, have Senfations different from those they had before? And why should they not be conscious of their former Being, fince, according to our Author, the condition they are in at the Moment of Death depends upon, and is linked with the condition they were in the moment before? And let the Reader take notice, that this is the very fame Argument, by which the Author has prov'd the Consciousness of the Soul of Man after Death, which is his third Requifite of Immortality; it feems then, that Brutes fhould be immortal as well as Men: However,

our Author will not grant it, and he en-. deavours next to fhew, there is an effential Difference between the Souls of Men and thofe of Brutes. It might be objected, fays he, that tho' the Souls of Brutes have only Senfations, it does not follow from thence, that they differ effentially from human Souls, for Infants have at first only Senfations, and their Soul nevertheless is not different from that of a full-grown Man, This Difficulty, fays our Author, is very preffing against thofe Philofophers, who maintain there is a reciprocal Influence between the Soul and the Body. According to their opinion, the Soul is capable to receive all manner of Ideas and Senfations; fo that if the Soul of a Brute does not come to a greater degree of Knowledge, it is owing to the Defect of the Body which that Soul is united with; whereas the Soul of an Infant has a Body capable of furnishing it with more fublime Ideas. But according to Leibniz and his Followers, every individual Soul is provided from the Beginning of its Being, with the Stock (if I may fo call it) of all the Ideas and Senfation it is to have for ever. So that the Soul of an Infant differs intirely from that of a Brute; the former enjoying in the most tender Age the obfcure Perceptions of all the fublime Ideas, which are to be display'd in tract of time whereas the latter has nothing like it, but only the dark Perceptions of all the Senfations, which it is to have in the following part of its Life: So that it is impoffible, that the Soul of a Brute fhould ever come to the Degree of Knowledge, to which the Soul of an Infant may arrive, And here I will fay by the way, that this Notion of Mr. Leibniz, that the Soul is a fpiritual Automaton, endowed at first Q. 3

with