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A second Abstract of the Uses of the Leib-
nitian and Wolfian Philofophy in Din
vinity. (The first is in No. 20. Art. 9.)

ITE were obliged to break off our former
W Abstract, that there might be room

for the Litterary News. We have
given an Account of part of the fourth Chapter,
intitled de Homine, of Man; and we have laid
before the Reader, what the Author offers about
the Immateriality, Nature, and Free-will of the
Soul ; he undertakes next to prove the Soul's
Immortality. Three things, says he, are re-
quisite to make the Soul immortal. First, ic
must continue to be by its own Nature for e-
ver after Death. 2dly, It must have distinct
Ideas, with the power of refecting upon them.
3dly, There muit be such a Connexion between
the State of the Soul after Death, and that in
which it was before, that Man may apprehend
he is the same he was in this Life. "This being
premised, the Author goes on to prove these three
Positions: he owns however beforehand, that
every Argument he is to alledge, consider'd
singly, may be eluded; but he says, that joined
together, they have a great strength.
No. XXI. 1933. e. As

Vol. IV.

As to the first Position, he says, that the Soub being á fimple Substance, without Parts, it is not liable to Destruction. To prove the second Position, the Author makes use of this Argument. When no Reason can be imagined why a thing should be, that thing shall not be ; now there can be no Reafon why the Soul should not be conscious of its Being, that is, have Ideas and reflect upon them, after Death: Therefore it must have them. For as the Soul cannot be af. fected by the Body, there can be no Reason, why the Soul after Death should lose its power of acting, and especially its Consciousness. The third Position is prov'd thus ; the Condition of the Soul in any given Moment depends upon the Condition it was in the Moment before : but in the Moment preceding Death immediately, the Soul was in a State of Conscioufness, why then should that Conscioufness vanish all of a sudden ? The Rules of Reminiscency require, that when an Idea, that has something analogous to some other Ideas, which we have had before, is present to the Mind, the whole State, in which we were before, be called again to our Memory: Now as the Soul, separated from the Body, must have several Ideas connected with those it had when 'united to the Body, it cannot but apprehend that it is still the same individual Being.

**; * But here the Author himself starts an Ob

jection, which indeed seems very strong: What must we think, says he, of the Souls of Brutes? Shall we also allow them Immortality? If no Reason can be given why the Soul of Man should cease to think after Death, there is no Reason neither why the Souls of Brutes should cease to bave Sensations : Nay, the Arguments alledged

the mit cannot but had when Tal Ideas con.

in favour of the Immortality of human Souls, hold good also for the Immortality of the Souls' of Brutes • It must not be said, that theirs is , material; for if Matter can be so far exalted as to feel, and to be conscious of its Being in Brutes, why could it not be made capable of reflecting, and of having abstract Ideas? Shall we. say, that the Soul of Brutes differs from that of Men only in the Degree of Knowledge, Men being able to know more than Brutes ? But this is not an essential Difference, for the same Arguments, which prove that the higher Degree of Knowledge remains in Man after Death, will prove also that the lower Degree remains in Brutes, ;It will be said, may be, that they are quite different Substances; this cannot be proved, but by the immense Difference we observe between the Faculties of the Souls of Men, and those of Brutes ; but from this Argument ic. will follow also, that the Soul of a new-born Infant is not of the same nature with that of a full-grown Man, because Infants have hardly the Sentations, which Brutes seem to have,

The Author's Answer is this: “We grant, " says be, that Brutes are not mere Machines 66 like Clock-work : We grant, that their " Souls are immaterial, and that they don't 66 perish by Death; but it does not follow from 6 thence, thar they are immortal, for tớ be im. “ mortal, it is not enough barely to exist after cs Death; this is' but the first Requisite of the 66 three we have mention'd: If it be said, that Ćs no Reason can be assign'd, why the Thread cc of Sensations, which the Souls of Brutes had Še before Death, should be broke of; that in << them, as well as in' Men, their present Coni38 dition is linked with that in which they were is


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“ before; and that if this proves the Immot

tality of human Souls, it must hold good 66 also with regard to the Souls of Brutes : We “6 answer, this is not enough to make them © immortal, they want still the third Requisite, “ viz. the Consciousness that they are the same “ individual Being they were before. Suppose is then that the Souls of Brutes have some Sen• fations after Death: it does not follow from " thence that they also understand, but the Fa“ culty of Understanding or Reasoning is 66 another Requisite of Immortality. Besides, « it is impossible, that the Souls of Brutes should “ have any Consciousness of their former Being; " because the Sensations they have,after they left " the Body, are quite different from those they « had before.” But how does this agree with the Notion our Author has of the Soul ? For according to him the Ideas and Sensations of the Soul, in Brutes as well as in Men, do not depend upon, and are not occasioned by the Body, but are in the Soul from the Moment of its Creation, and are only unfolded and display'd in time: What can then be the Reason why the Souls of Brutes should, after the Destruction of the Body, have Sensations different from those they had before? And why should they not be conscious of their former Being, since, according to our Author, the condition they are in at the Moment of Death depends upon, and is linked with the condition they were in the moment. before? And let the Reader take notice, that this is the very fame Argument, by which the Author has prov'd the Consciousness of the Soul of Man after Death, which is his third Requisite of Immortality ; it seems then; that Brutes hould be immortal as well as Men; However,


our Author will not. grant it, and he endeavours next to shew, there is an essential Dif-. ference between the Souls of Men and those of Brutes. It might be objected, says he, that tho' the Souls of Brutes have only Sensations, it does not follow from thence, that they differ. essentially from human Souls ; for Infants have at first only Sensations, and their Soul nevertheless is not different from that of a full-grown Man, This Difficulty, says our Author, is very pressing against those Philosophers, who maintain there is a reciprocal Influence between the Soul and the Body. According to their opinion, the Soul is capable to receive all manner of Ideas and Sensations ; so that if the Soul of a Brute does not come to a greater degree of Knowledge, it is owing to the Defect of the Body which that Soul is united with; whereas the Soul of an Infant has a Body capable of furnishing it with more sublime Ideas. But according to Leibniz and his Followers, every individual Soul. is provided from the Beginning of its Being, with the Stock (if I may so call it) of all the Ideas and Sensation it is to have for ever. So that the Soul of an Infant differs intirely from that of a Brute; the former enjoying in the most tender Age the obscure Perceptions of all the sublime Ideas, which are to be display'd in tract of cimé : whereas the latter has nothing like it, but only the dark Perceptions of all the Sensations, which it is to have in the following: part of its Life: So that it is impossible, that The Soul of a Brute should ever come to the Degree of Knowledge, to which the Soul of an Infant may arrive, And here I will say by the way, that this Notion of Mr. Leibniz, that the Soul is a spiritual Automaton, endowed at firit

Q: 3. i .with

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