Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB
[ocr errors]

"tion may be ask'd about the End, as about "the Means, viz. Whether God can chufe an "End, that is not the best? and whether he can "prefer one End to another without a good " reafon for it. If you deny it, you must come "over to our Opinion, and confefs, that to "know what is beft, the End and Means fhould "be confidered together. But if you affirm the "Question, you must maintain, for inftance, "that God can determine, without reason, to "damn a Man eternally, and then chufe the "best Means to compafs that End. In my opi"nion, God's Wifdom confifts in this, that the "End he chufes, he chufes it for the best reafon poffible, and the Means he imploys are the moft fit, that can be imagined: fo that the "whole is altogether perfect in all refpects, and "not to a certain determinate End only.".

But it

FINALLY, it is objected, fays our Author, "that we fuppofe the Sins of Men are condu"cive to the Perfection of the World. " is not our Opinion; we don't say, this World "is the best, because of the Sins of Men; but "we maintain that upon the whole, God found, "this prefent World was the best, notwith"standing the Sins and Miseries of Men."

[ocr errors]

THE fourth Chapter, intitled De homine, of Man, treats of the Immateriality of the Soul, its Nature, Free-will, and Immortality. The first Argument, our Author makes ufe of to prove the Soul is immaterial, is taken from a little Treatife of Leibniz, where he examines the philofophical Principles of F. Malbranche a that Treatife being common enough, we refer our Readers to it.

a In Rec. de Diverf. Pieces, Tom. II. p. 232.

THE

THE fecond Argument is borrow'd from Leibniz's Monadology, and is to this purpose. "It cannot be denied, (fays that celebrated Au

thor) that the Perceptions of the Mind, and "whatever relates to them, are not to be ex"plained by any mechanical Caufes, that is, by Figures and Motions: for let us fuppofe an Engine framed in such a manner, that it could "think, feel and perceive: it will be poffible, the fame Proportions being kept, to conceive that fame Engine fo large, that the Infide of "it be open to our View: we will find nothing "in it, but the feveral Parts acting upon and "moving one another, but we shall not be able "to discover any thing in it, by which the Faculty of Thinking can be explain'd: this then

[ocr errors]

cannot be found in any Engine or Machine "made up of feveral Parts, but only in a fimple "Subftance." Extenfion fuppofes a Substance with feveral Parts; whereas Perception or Thought requires Unity, that is to fay, a Substance not compounded; therefore the Soul differs intirely from the Body, which is extended.

[ocr errors]

THE third Argument offer'd by our Author, from Wolfius is this: "If Matter could think, Thought would be nothing elfe, but the de"terminate Motions of fome Parts with fuch or "fuch a Figure, Situation, &c. Now when the "felf-fame Thought is prefent to the Mind du

[ocr errors]

ring fome time, the Motion of those parts "muft either be stop'd, or other parts must con"tinually fucceed in their place; in the first case, "we would cease to think in the fecond, we "would have no longer the fame Thought." Thus far our Author; and here we beg leave to ob

Actor. Erudit. Supplem. Tom. VII. p. 500.
In Metaph. p. 407. §. 738.

C

obfervé, that he takes it for granted, that we can have the fame Thought for fome Moments following: but in this I cannot agree with him: let any body but try whether it be poffible for him, to keep for two Inftants only the fame Thought prefent to his Mind, without finding it variously modify'd. When we fit in a manner thoughtless, without fixing our Attention particularly upon any thing, it is not to be expreffed, how swiftly our Minds run from one Subject to another: and as to Attention, what is it, but the confidering of the fame Subject on every fide? And does not this imply a Variety of Thoughts?

THE Author comes next to explain the Nature of the Soul, of which he gives us the following Definition; Anima eft fubftantia vi prædita mundum repræfentandi pro Situ corporis organici cui praeft." The Soul is a Subftance endowed

with an active Power of exhibiting the World, "according to the Situation of the organized

Body over which it prefides.". This Definition wants to be explained, tho' our Author has not done it, because he supposes his Readers understand Mr. Leibniz's Philofophy. By this vis repræfentandi mundum," this Power of exhibi"ting the World," is meant the Power, which the Soul has, according to Leibniz, of forming Ideas, of what paffes not only in its own Body, but in the whole Univerfe, because of the Connexion there is between all the Parts of the World. Mr. Leibniz's Hypothefis is, that the Soul, having actually all the Perceptions, which it is to have for ever, does not know them dif tinctly, but apprehends them only in a confufed manner: he fays, there are in every Substance Traces

Hift. des Ouvr. des Savans, Juillet. 1698. p. 349.

Traces of what has happened and what will happen to it; but this infinite Multitude of Perceptions, is the Reason why we don't diftinguish them: And he adds, that the prefent Situation of every Subftance is a natural Confequence of its former ftate. So that according to him, the Soul is a fort of a fpiritual Automaton, in which the Ideas, it has at one moment, are occafion'd by those it had the moment before, and become the occafion of those it fhall have the moment after, and so on during the whole Extent of its Being. How this isconfiftent with Liberty and Free-will, and with the Power of acting, which Leibniz and his Followers fuppofe the Soul enjoys, I don't understand: For these are the Words of Leibniz, "We do not form our Ideas, "becaufe we will do it; they are form'd in us, "and by us, not through the effect of our Will, "but according to our Nature, and to the Na"ture of things. And as the Embryo is form'd "in the Womb, and a thousand other Wonders "of Nature are produced by a certain Instinct, "that comes from God, that is to fay, by a divine Præformation, which made those won

е

See Bayle's Diction. Art. Rorarius, in the Notes, f Hift des Oeuvres des Sav. Juil. 1698. p.338.

derful

Theodicée, §. 403. Nous ne formons pas nos Idées, parce que nous le voulons, elles fe forment en nous, elles fe forment par nous, non pas en confequence de notre volonté, mais fuivant notre nature, & celle des chofes. Et comme le foetus fe forme dans l'animal, comme mille autres merveilles de la nature font produites par un certain inftinc, que Dieu y a mis, c'est à dire, en vertu de la préformation divine, qui a fait ces admirables Automates, propres à produire méchaniquement de Si beaux effets; il est aisé de juger de même, qui l'Ame eft un Automate Spirituel encor plus admirable; et que c'est par la préformation divine, qu'elle produit ces belles idées, ou notre volonté n'a point de part, on notre art ne fauroit atteindre.

[ocr errors]

"derful Automatons, capable of fuch astonishing "Effects; fo it is eafy to think, that the Soul is a "Spiritual Automaton, ftill more wonderful, and

that by a divine Præformation it produces "these beautiful Ideas, in which our Will has no fhare, and to which our Skill cannot reach." Thus it appears, that the Power of acting, fo much talked of by Leibniz and his Followers, refolves at laft into a mere fpiritual Mechanifm, if I may use that Expreffion, the Soul being really neceffitated to have fucceffively the Chain of Ideas allotted to it, without being able to alter them; juft as a Clock is neceffitated to fhew and to ftrike fucceffively all the Hours of the Day; fince, according to Leibniz, the Will has no fhare in the Ideas we have h. Notwithstanding all this, our Author endeavours to shew that the Soul is really free. Five things, fays he, "are requifite to make the Soul free; 1. It muft "have the Power of acting. 2. It must not be "under any metaphyfical Neceffity, which takes "place, where the contrary of what is true is "abfolutely impoffible, (as, that the Whole "should be less than a Part). 3. It must not be "under a natural or phyfical Neceffity, which "happens where naturalCaufes have their course; "fo Fire is under a physical Neceffity to burn, "tho' that Effect may be fufpended by the Dei

ty's interpofing miraculously. 4. We must "not fuppofe the Soul is under a moral Neceffity, "as to be not inclined, but forced to do fome "things, by certain Motives; fo that, tho' it

fees what is beft, it takes the worft." Here the Author fays exprefsly, that with regard to Life everlasting, Men are destitute of Free-will, and

See Recueil de div. Pieces de Mrs. Leibniz & Clarke: Tom. I. Append. pag. 213.

« ZurückWeiter »