contrary to them; that is, he must be holy. From this reafoning the Author draws the fol lowing Inference; as God is effentially holy, it is his Holiness that is the Rule of bis Will, not bis Will the Rule of bis Holiness. This is, in other Words, what has been maintained, by the Ad-, vocate of Dr. Clarke, who fays, that when "God exifted antecedent to all Creatures, he "had the Ideas of all things prefent to his. "Mind; he faw their Relations and Habi"tudes; and he always did, and always will. "act according to them; in this confifts the "Rectitude of his Nature. There is a certain

66

Agreement of Ideas, which does not depend "upon the Will or Command of God, but "is the Ground of his Command." And here we beg leave to offer to the confideration of Dr. Clarke's Critick a Paffage quoted by our Author from a very Orthodox Divine. To Singson εἶναι καὶ τὸ αισχρόν ου φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ eft vetus Archelai paradoxum, cui fuccinit Ariftippus, & Theodorus ille äeos appellatus. Quâ fententia nibil poteft excogitari peftilentius, & ad omne fundamentum religionis tollendum, ipfamque rationem fuftitiæ Dei, & neceffitatem Servatoris interimendam, & pietatem exfcindendam efficacius. That what is right or wrong is not fo by Nature, but only by Law, is an old Paradox of Archelaus, with whom agreed Ariftippus and Theodorus called the Atheist: "but it is the most horrid Doctrine that can be "devised; the most proper to overthrow all "the

N3:

A Defence of the Anfwer to the Remarks upon Dr.

Clarke's Expofition, p. 11, 12,

P. 13.

The true Foundat. of Nat. and Reveal. Rel. afferted,

Coccejusin Sum. Theol. Cap. 24. §. 6.

"the Grounds of Religion, to deftroy the Rea"fon of God's Juftice, and the Neceffity of a Redeemer, and to eradicate Piety out of "the Hearts of Men."

In the fecond Chapter the Author treats of the holy Scripture, which he vindicates against the Cavils of the Church of Rome, fhewing that there are very goodReafons for the Authority of the Scripture, but none for the pretended Neceffity of a vifible Judge to determine the Controverfies in Matters of Religion. He comes next to the Method of interpreting the Holy Writ, and here he fets down several good Rules of Interpretation; but they being commonly known, we think it needlefs to tranfcribe them. He speaks afterwards of the feveral Difficulties to be met with in explaining the Scriptures, and fhews how they may be overcome. The greatest Difficulty is, that every Sect explains the Scripture according to their particular Notions; they, that maintain an Opinion, never think they are obliged to prove it, provided they can find out fome Diftinction, grounded upon their own Principles, to answer all Objections, that can be made against them: if you argue against those Distinctions, they will be fure to form fome new ones; and as it is an eafy thing to go from one Subject to another, they will fo enlarge the Field of Controversy, that you will think, a great length must be run, before it can be found where the Error lies. In order to get rid of this difficulty, our Author fays, in the first place, we need not care how artfully a Doctrine may be objected againft, but we must examine how ftrongly it can be proved. When a Perfon pretends to ground an Opinion upon fome Paffage out of the holy

Scripture, we muft inquire whether or not he can give good Reasons, for the Sense, he puts upon that Paffage. Secondly, when any Objections are made against the Sense we put upon fome Paffage of the Scripture; we must examine whether they are grounded upon the particular Hypothefis of our Adverfary, or not: if they are, we need not be troubled with them, provided we be fure that our Adverfary's Hypothefis is not better proved than our own: But if his Objections are grounded upon fome Principle, we admit with him, we must not despise them, but with care examine, and endeavour to folve them. Thirdly, we muft compare the Reasons by which one Opinion is proved, with the Reasons upon which the contrary Opinion is grounded; and not the Reasons of one fide, with the Answers of the oppofite fide: for the Answers always depend upon and relate to the Hypothefis, whether true or false, in fupport of which they are made.

IN the third Chapter the Author treats of the Creation of the World; he first examines the Arguments, by which the ancient and modern Philofophers and Divines have endeavour'd to

prove, that the Univerfe has been made out of nothing, and fhows in what they are defective; next, he endeavours to fupply their Defect, by making ufe of that Principle, fo often mentioned, that nothing exifts without a fufficient Reafon for its exifting in fuch or fuch a manner. Suppose, fays he, that Matter be eternal; it existed in a determinate Manner, with fuch or fuch Bounds, Circumftances, and Figures. Now thefe Bounds, Figures, and Circumstances are either neceffary and effential to Matter, or they are not. In the firft cafe, God himself could N 4

not

not alter them, for what is neceffary and effential, is unchangeable; if they be not effential and neceffary, there must be some determinate Reason, why Matter was eternally in fuch Circumftances, &c. rather than in any other. We may not yet recur to the Action of God, for the Queftion is about theState of Matter before God meddled with it: if there can be no fuch Reafon, Matter could not be eternal, that is, it must have been created out of nothing.

THE Author fuppofes all along with Leibniz, that God could not but create the beft: World, that was poffible; and that Opinion having been very much objected against, he endeavours to folve all the Difficulties of his Adverfaries. "1. To suppose, say they, that God could not "but chufe the beft World, is to introduce a

Fatality. 2. There may be feveral Worlds "equally good, and the Creator could chuse "freely, which he pleafed. 3. It is by the End, "for which a thing is defigned, that we must "judge of what is beft; a thing may be the

beft with regard to one end, and not fo with "regard to another. Finally, it is dangerous "to fay, that the Sins of Men add any thing to "the Perfections of the World." Thefe are the Objections our Author undertakes to folve.

First, fays he, it is becaufe of God's infinite Wisdom, that he could not but create the best World; is a Man neceffitated, when upon mature Deliberation he chufes to do what feems beft in his Judgment? If chufing the beft is to be neceffitated, the more an intelligent Being will be wife, the lefs free hé fhall be. If that was the cafe, Men would be more free than Angels, because they are lefs knowing; Angels would be more free than God, and he alone would be intirely neceffitated, because of his confummate

Wisdom :

Wisdom but we must diftinguish between Certainty and Neceffity; it is certain that a wife Man will chufe what feems best to him, tho' he chufes it freely, and without being forced to it; the fame must be faid of God".

SECONDLY, it was objected, that there may be several Worlds equally good, between which God can chufe, which he pleases,being in a perfect Equilibrium, without having any reafon to prefer one before the, reft. But, fays our Author, it is impoffible, there fhould be two Worlds fo equally good or perfect, but the divine Intellect can find fome difference between their Goodness or Perfection. This indeed is only faying the reverfe of what is objected; but the Author, perhaps, had no mind to enlarge upon that Subject, for he refers us to Bulfingerus, who in his Treatife of the Origin of Evil has confuted that Opinion, That there can be feveral things, all of them beft. The Author fays next, that if there were feveral Worlds equally good, God could chufe none; for being infinitely perfect, all his Attributes must agree amongst them; but there fhould be a Difagreement between God's Understanding and his Will, if things, which to the Understanding feem equal, and alike, fhould by the Will's chufing one before the other be treated as unequal.

"I wonder, fays our Author, at what is ob"jected in the third place, namely, that the

fame thing may be the best in relation to one "end,and not fo in relation to another: I fuppofe "the meaning is, that this World may be the beft with regard to the end God intended, but "that it would not have been the best, if God "had had another Defign: but the fame Quef

t

a Leibniz.Theod. §. 318, &c.

❝tion

Bulfinger. in Tract. de Orig. mali, p. 342. hanc Sententiam, dari plura optima poffe, evertit