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fome Propofitions of Archimedes without their Demonftrations; this being the cafe, as we fhould want all the intermediate Ideas and Propofitions between Euclid's first Book, and Archimedes's Propofitions, we could not be able to tell how thefe laft Propofitions are connected with those of Euclid: but could any one in his Senfes affirm, that for that reafon Archimedes's Propofitions are contradictory. Let us form the fame Judgment about Myfteries; and tho' we don't perceive how they are connected with the Principles of Reafon, let us not infer from thence, that they are contrary to Reason. Thus far our Author; and here I beg leave to obferve, that this fuppofes the Words, or Terms in which the Myfteries are expreffed, convey at leaft fome Ideas or Notions to our Minds, tho' we cannot understand how the Subject and the Attribute are connected together. The better to explain myself, I will make ufe of a Comparifon like that of our Author. Suppose a Man, who having begun to read Euclid's Elements knows what is an Angle, a Right Angle, a Triangle but is not gone farther yet than the 17th Propofition of the firft Book, where he has learned, that any two Angles of a Triangle are lefs than two Right Angles; he is told by a Mathematician, that the three Angles of any Triangle are equal together to two Right Angles; he can believe that Propofition to be true, because he understands what is meant by it, tho' he does not perceive how that Propofi tion is connected with thofe he is already perfuaded of. But if the fame Propofition fhould be offer'd to a Man who had no Notions of Geometry, who does not know what is an Angle, a Triangle, a Right Angle, he could be

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lieve indeed, that the Person who spoke to him, did tell him the Truth, but he could not believe the Propofition itself, of which he is fuppofed not to have the leaft Notion. In the fame manner, if we understand all the Words in which a revealed Mystery is expreffed; and we do not perceive that those Words form a Propofition oppofite to any Truth, we know already, we must believe, upon the Authority of God, that fuch a Myftery is true, tho' we cannot connect it with any known Propofition: but if we do not understand the Words, we cannot properly believe thofe Myfteries, because to believe, is to think that there is a Connexion between two or more Ideas, which we have in our Mind, tho' we don't perceive that Connexion: as to know, is to perceive that fame Connexion; and as Knowledge is more or lefs certain, as our Perception is more or lefs clear, fo Faith is ftronger or weaker according to the greater or leffer Veracity and Authority of the Perfon on whom. we rely. But this only by the way, we return now to our Author.

He makes after Mr. Leibniz a very just 'Obfervation; to fhew that there cannot be any invincible Argument against Truth: but what he fays upon this Subject, having been explained in a very clear manner by Leibniz himself, we chufe to refer our Readers to that celebrated Author.c.

AFTER having endeavour'd to confute Bayle's Arguments against the Distinction of what is above and against Reason, our Author argues against the late Bp. Huet, who in his Book of the Weakness of Human Understanding, undertook to prove, that we cannot truft to our Senfes. One

• Theodicée Difcours Prelim. §. 25.&c.

One of his Arguments, which indeed feems the ftrangeft, is, that we cannot conclude from the Senfations we have, that there is fomething without us analogous to them. Our Author's Answer is founded upon that Principle of Leibniz, that nothing exists, without a fufficient Reafon for its exifting. God, who refolved that to fuch or fuch Motion arifing in the Body from the Objects of the Senfes, fuch or fuch Idea fhould correfpond in the Mind, did not decree that this fhould happen without Reason, else the Axioma juft now mentioned would be falfe. Now, if there be a Reason, why fuch a Motion fhould answer to fuch an Idea, or fuch an Idea to fuch a Motion, it follows, fays our Author, that there must be fomething analogous between the Idea in our Mind, and the Object of it without us: Another Anfwer of his, which ftudying to be fhort, he expreffes in very 'few words, is this: It is agreed, that God created the World; now, God cannot but chuse what is most perfect, there is more Harmony or Perfection in the World, if the Motions of the Body answer exactly to the Ideas of the Mind, than in the contrary Suppofition; therefore there must be Bodies, and we may fafely truft to our Senfes, who represent to us the Being of Bodies. Whether thefe two Arguments will filence the Idealifts, and convince them, that God would not frame our Minds in fuch a manner, as that we could have all the Notions we have at present, tho' there were no Bodies in the World, we must leave to our Readers to judge; onlywe may venture to fay, that if Mr.Leibniz's Notion of the human Souls be true, there feems to be little occafion for any Bodies at all,

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as we shall make it appear in the following Part of this Abftract.

In the fecond Chapter our Author endeavours to fhew, what is the proper Ufe of Reafon in Matters of revealed Religion. As Reason in Men is the Power they have of perceiving the Concatenation of Truths, the first Queftion is whether Men can naturally, and without the Affiftance of Grace, perceive how revealed Truths are linked together, give their Affent to them, and draw from them new Truths by way of confequence? To folve this Question, our Author obferves, that the Operation of the Holy Ghoft never takes away the Powers of Nature, but only mends them, and renders them more perfect. In human Reason, fays he, two things must be observed; first, the Power itfelf of perceiving Truth; fecondly, the Limitation of that Power, which extends only to certain Objects; that Limitation is a Defect, which is fupplied by Grace. Man's natural Power of perceiving Truths is thereby inlarged and improved to fuch a degree, as to make Man able to know the Mysteries of Faith. This being premifed,the Author inquires more diftinctly which are the Defects of Reason, and how they are fupplied by Grace. What is faid upon that Subject is fummed up by the Author in thefe Words.

"THE firft Defect of Reafon is, that being

ignorant of revealed Truths, it perceives "only thofe, that are naturally known: This "Defect is fupplied by the Word of God being "preached to Man. 2dly, Tho' revealed "Truths be offer'd to Reafon, Man cannot "however be cafily brought to give his Affent to them: here his Weakness is fupported by the

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"Holy Ghoft, who confirms by his Teftimo"ny the revealed Truths. Thirdly, Truths, "tho' known, are very feldom powerful enough "to make Man virtuous; in this cafe the "Grace of God ftirs Man up inwardly to the "Practice of Virtue. Finally, Reafon left to "itself is not only ignorant of the revealed "Truths, but, what is worfe, does not know "the inward Operations of the Spirit in other "Men; it is made confcious of them by its "own Experience, which is called a Spiritual "Experience." In all thefe Cafes our Author pretends Reason is not deftroyed, but only fupported, and improved by the medicinal Grace.

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ALL this relates to Reafon confidered as 'the power Man has of perceiving Truth; the Author proceeds next to explain the ufe of Reafon, as it fignifies the Chain, or Connexion of Truths. Where there is a Connexion or Chain of feveral things, there must be fomething first, fecond, &c. and last and that, which in a Chain of Truths is first, and to which the following are linked, or from which they are drawn, is called a Principle. Now the Question is, Whether, and how far the Principles of Reafon may be admitted in Religion? Here the Author obferves, that the Principles of Reason, and all Truths in the general, are either neceffary or mutable: he calls neceffary thofe whose contrary are abfolutely impoffible; fuch are the mathematical, logical, metaphy fical Truths. He calls mutable those whofe contrary are not impoffible, fuch are the phyfical and moral Truths, as well as thofe that belong to fome other Art or Science. Now the Question is, Whether both or either, or neither of thefe forts of Truths

may

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