HAPPY, however, the Author, notwithftanding his Cautiousness, that his Letter was not written in a Place where a tremendous, &c. Tribunal, which is an Enemy to all Learning, is not yet established by Law, as we wish it may never be.

We hope he will fhortly favour the Public, with the Sequel of his ufeful Labours 3 and we do not at all question, but, when this is publifhed in our own Tongue, as it will speedily be, it will meet here with the fame Succefs, as it has had abroad.

ARTICLE IX.

Philofophiæ Leibnitiana & Wolphiana Ufus in Theologia, per præcipua Fidei capita Præmittitur Differtatio de Ratione & Revelatione, de Natura & Gratia. Auctore J. T H. C. Wirtemb.

That is,

The Ufes of the Leibnitian and Wolfian Philofophy in Divinity: With a preliminary Differtation upon Reafon and Revelation, and upon Nature and Grace. By J.TH. C. of Wirtembergh. 2 Vol, 8vo. 1 Vol. pp. 525. 2 Val. pp. 634. Francfort. 1728.

T

HE Defign of this Author, as he informs us in a fhort Preface, is to fhew, that the Syftem of Philofophy, invented by the famous Mr. Leibniz, and explained by Mr. Wolfius, is both inoffenfive in itfelf, and of a very great

Use

Ufe in Divinity; how this is made out, our Readers will be able to judge by the account we intend to give of this Book. And altho' Mr. Leibniz's Notions, and his very Terms be new, yet we don't think it proper to prefent our Englib Readers with a Latin Abftract. We are of opinion, it is not impoffible to find in our own Language fome Words, which will anfwer exactly to thofe in Latin or French, which Mr. Leibniz and his Followers make ufe of; or if that be fometimes impoffible, there is no harm, we think, in borrowing a Word from a Foreign Language, or in ufing a Word in a Sense different from that in which it is ufually taken, provided the Notion or Idea to be fixed to that Word be exactly defined. This is what Cicero did, when he undertook to explain in Latin the Notions of the Greek Philofophers; his Authority is a fufficient Apology for us. We come now to our Author.

IN his preliminary Differtation he undertakes to fhew, 1. That right Reason does not clash with any reveale dDoctrine. 2. What is the proper Ufe of Reafon in Matters of revealed Religion. 3. What difference there is between Nature and Grace, and the divers Operations of both.

FIRST, As to the Agreement between Reafon and Revelation, it is not an eafy thing, fays our Author, to find out Truth, between two Errors directly oppofite. Some People would extend the Prerogative of Reafon fo far, as to make it the fole Rule, by which the Holy Scripture fhould be explained, refufing to admit any thing, that does not agree with the Axioms and Principles of Philofophy. Others,,

See the prefent State of the Repub.of Let, Vol. IV.p.273:

on the contrary, rail against human Reason, and would have it entirely difcarded and banished out of Divinity, as always difagreeing with the Mysteries of revealed Religion. Our Author thinks we muft take a Medium between these two oppofite Schemes: and the better to explain his Syftem, he begins with giving us the Definition of Reafon, which, according to him, and to Mr. Leibniz, is a Chain or Concatenation of Truths.

BUT as Reafon may be confidered either in an abstract manner, as it fignifies the Agreement or Difagreement of certain Ideas, whether perceived or not by any intelligent Being, or, as it fignifies the Power Man has, of perceiving that Agreement; our Author fays, that in the firft fenfe, Reafon may be defined as Leibniz has done; but in the fecond it must be defined thus, Reafon is the Perception of the Concatenation of Truths. Ratio perfpicientia eft Nexus Veritatum. In this fenfe Reafon is never corrupted; they, that fay, it is, must take the word in quite another Sense.

THIS being premifed, the Author ftates the Question, which is not, fays he, whether the fupreme Reafon of God does perceive the Connexion there is between the Truths, which we know naturally, and the Theological Doctrines; this is what every body must allow : nor, whether Men, by the help of Reafon only, can perceive that Connexion, or clearly explain how the revealed Myfteries agree with philofophical Truths; if that was the cafe, Mysteries could be explained, that is, they would be no longer Mysteries: but the Question is, Whether Philofophy or right Reafon teaches Men any Propofitions, founded on strong Demonftrations, which Propofitions be directly

oppo

oppofite to fome Doctrines revealed in the HolyScripture. It is further asked, Whether one, who maintains the Mysteries of Religion, be not able to expofe the Fallacy of any Argument, made in oppofition to them, and to fhew, they do not clafb with Reafon? Our Author takes the affirmative fide of this laft Question, and consequently the negative of the former 2.

HIS Reafons are, firft, that if Faith was oppofite to Reafon, it would follow, that two contrary Propofitions fhould be true, which is a flat Abfurdity, and would overthrow all human Knowledgeb. 2dly, All Truths, either natural or revealed, come from God, who perceives the Connexion there is between them; fo that it is impoffible the former fhould clafh with the latter. 3dly, The things which are faid in the Scripture of the Meffiah, depend for the most part upon the Teftimony of the Senses; and every body muft confefs that the Faculty of Reasoning owes its beginning to them: for things being reprefented to the Mind, Reafon obferves their likenefs, difcovers theirConnexion, judges of them, and draws from them new Truths, as fo many Confequences. If then all thefe Acts of the Mind could be intirely or partly contrary to Revelation, we could no longer truft to our Senfes, which would be deftructive both of Reafon and Religion.

HOWEVER, as Reason can never be opposite to any revealed Doctrine, it happens neverthelefs fometimes, that Reason cannot perceive the Connection there is between natural and revealed Truths. This is what Divines mean, when they diftinguish between what is above and what

See Leibntz, Theodic. Difc. Prelim. §. 73.
Idem. Ibid. §. 3.

is

is against Reason. Whatever we perceive to be connected with Propofitions obvious to every Capacity, or known by a Chain of Reafoning, is agreeable to Reafon: Whatever we perceive to be really inconfiftent with fuch Propofitions, is contrary to Reafon. But when fome Propofitions cannot by us be connected with other Truths already known, and do not however clash with any of them, we say these Propofitions are above Reason.

THE famous Mr. Bayle would not admit of his Diftinction: "It is founded, faid bed, in the Ambiguity of the word Reafon; for if by * that is understood Reafon in general, the fuB.C preme Reason of God, in this fenfe of the word, Mysteries are neither against nor above Reafon: but if by Reafon is understood the * Reason of Men, I do not fee what Senfe there

is in the Diftinction; for all Orthodox Di"vines confefs, that we cannot fee how our My

fteries are connected with the Principles of "Philofophy: They feem then to us not to a gree with Reafon; now what feems not to agree with Reason, feems to be contrary to it, in the fame manner, as what does not feem to agree with Truth, feems contrary to Truth: “Why then should we not fay, that Mysteries

are contrary to, as well as above Reafon ?" The Answer of our Author is, that altho' we cannot perceive how natural Truths are connected with revealed Myfteries, we understand nevertheJefs that there is no Contradiction between them. He illuftrates this with the following Example, Suppose all the Books of Euclid's Elements were loft, except the first, and that we found fome

See Leibniz, Theod. Dif. Prelimin. §. 23. 4 Rep. aux Queft. d'un Provin. Tom. III. p. 999. apud Leibn. Ibid. §. 63.