the Prussian army-a delay, perhaps, politically necessary— will become the cause of a succession of misfortunes in the next campaign, of which the consequences are incalculable."

With equal justice the Duke pointed out the cause of the French successes: "When a great nation, such as the French nation is, is led to great actions by the double motives of fear of punishment and enthusiasm, a single principle, a single will, ought to preside in the councils of the Allies. But when instead of that, each army acts for itself, without a fixed plan, without unity, without principle, without method, the results are naturally such as we have seen at Dunkirk, at the raising of the blockade of Maubeuge, at the sack of Lyons, at the destruction of Toulon, at the raising of the blockade of Landau."

The brave old man then offered his resignation. He was at once taken at his word, and Marshal Mollendorff, who was quite prepared to act the mean part which his Court intended for him, was sent to command the Prussian army on the Rhine.

The Court of Vienna in its turn, pressed for subsidies by Prussia, and humbled at defeats inflicted by France, began also to think of peace. Thugut suggested the recognition of the Republic, and a truce for two years, during which time a regular government might be formed in France, and a definitive treaty of peace considered. The Committee of Public Safety saw in this proposal a snare and a danger. The leaders of the Committee must, however, have drawn from it the inference that the Emperor was not totally averse to a regicide peace.

While the Cabinet of Austria, however, were in doubt whether they should accept the bloody hand of Robespierre, or the tempting gold of England, the King of Prussia seems

to have been bent on attaining at once the objects of retiring from the Alliance, and securing the subsidies of Great Britain. He had another object still more dear to him-that of annihilating altogether the independence of Poland.

These triple ends-of treachery towards England, oppression of Poland, and reconciliation with France-were, it must be owned, difficult of attainment, and it required an unusual degree of blindness in Pitt to permit of their successful accomplishment. His ignorance of Continental affairs, his want of intercourse with foreign statesmen, his extreme eagerness to obtain a triumph where no triumph was to be had, and his sanguine temper, can alone account for the success of Prussia in her dishonest policy, and the blunders of England in her infatuated course.

Such was the conduct of the war on the Continent of Europe. Further details will develope further errors.

CHAPTER XL.

PRUSSIAN DEFECTION.-BRITISH SUBSIDIES.

THE policy of Prussia-that of so directing the great Alliance of Europe as to ensure its failure-had to encounter many difficulties; but the skill of the Prussian statesmen, and their extreme perfidy, won the day against them all.

In 1794, the Austrian Colonel Mack went to London, and there unfolded to Pitt and his colleagues a plan of campaign, by which Landrecy being invested and taken, a direct march upon Paris, founded on that base of operations, should be made with all possible speed. The plan having been approved by the Cabinets of London and Vienna, Marshal Mollendorff was asked to assist in its execution by marching upon Tréves. To this summons the Marshal coldly replied that he did not know what part his Government might have taken in adopting this plan of campaign; that it contained some good ideas, but many inconvenient arrangements; and that for his part he should not march upon Tréves, lest by so doing he should lose Mayence. Prussia likewise captiously objected to a proposal of Austria to have a levy en masse in the empire, in order to defend the soil of Germany. Hardenberg was detached from his post, on a mission to the ArchChancellor of the Empire, the Elector of Mayence; and a counter proposition was made on the part of Prussia, that

six circles of the empire should be required to furnish provisions for the Prussian army. Prussia thus succeeded in preventing any effectual preparation being made for the defence of the empire.

A more open sign of defection was now ventured. Three agents of the Committee of Public Safety, sent to Mayence nominally to regulate the exchange of prisoners, were directed by the Prussian General upon Frankfort. They went there in a coach of Louis XVI., displaying ostentatiously the tricolor flag. General Kalkreuth, with whom they were put in communication, held out, as it was supposed, hopes of a separate peace. What is certain is, that the prolonged stay of these Jacobin Commissioners at Frankfort gave rise to the most sinister rumours. The King of Prussia now openly opposed any levies en masse, and in the middle of March declared that he should withdraw his army to his own States, leaving for the defence of Germany only the contingent he was obliged to furnish. An order to march homewards followed immediately on this announcement.

Austria and the Empire were alarmed at this measure, and could only expect the dissolution of the Alliance. But Pitt, who had but one remedy for all emergencies, immediately offered to Prussia a treaty of subsidies, and engaged Holland to aid him in giving a sum of money to Prussia to induce her to remain faithful to a cause which she had been the first to espouse. On the 28th of April, the Treaty of Subsidy, signed on the 19th, was laid before Parliament, with a Royal Message, and on the 30th, Pitt explained the treaty, and asked the sanction of the House of Commons to its provisions. Pitt on this occasion adopted a tone almost of apology. He confessed that it would be much more satisfactory to him to state that the King of Prussia

continued to carry on the war as a principal, rather than to state that henceforth that Sovereign was content to act a subordinate part. He then explained that by the terms of the treaty, England and Holland were to furnish 400,0007. to the King of Prussia, by way of outfit, and afterwards 50,0007. a month for the maintenance of his troops. He concluded by asking for 2,500,000l. as a vote of credit. Fox, in a high tone, commented on the speech of Pitt, which he justly called very extraordinary.

"The right honourable gentleman had said, that if he had the honour of advising the Court of Berlin, he had no doubt which way his opinion would be given, because the existence of the nation depended on the issue of the contest, but that the Court of Berlin, from a consideration of the restricted commerce, the limited resources, and the nature and form of the constitution of Prussia (which, by the way, was no proof of its excellence), might have entertained doubts how far it was prudent to remain a principal in this contest. Yet, notwithstanding these considerations, the right honourable gentleman would have had no hesitation in advising that Court to have continued a principal in the war. The House would recollect, therefore, that it was told by the Minister of the King of England, that his ally the King of Prussia had been so ill-advised, that he had taken the timid, the weak, the mean, the wicked, the shameful and scandalous determination, by abandoning the war, of abandoning his own honour, abandoning the interest and safety of his own sub⚫jects.

"The right honourable gentleman had not, however, stopped there; he went further: he said, since this was the case, since such has been the disgraceful conduct of Prussia,