Game Theory: Analysis of ConflictHarvard University Press, 1991 - 568 Seiten Game theory deals with questions that are basic to all social sciences; it offers insight into any economic, political, or social situation that involves people with different goals or preferences. This book presents some of the most important models, solution concepts, and resutls of noncooperative and cooperative game theory, as well as the methodological principles that have guided the development of the fundamental models of game theory: games in extensive form and strategic form and Bayesian games with incomplete information. He defines Nash equilibria, sequential equilibria, and other equlibrium concepts and discusses their uses and limitations. He also covers incentive compatibility in games with communication, repeated games, two-person bargaining problems, cooperative solutions for coalitional games, and cooperation under uncertainty. |
Inhalt
DecisionTheoretic Foundations | 1 |
Basic Models | 37 |
Equilibria of StrategicForm Games | 88 |
Urheberrecht | |
8 weitere Abschnitte werden nicht angezeigt.
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
argmax assumption average payoff axioms b₁ Bayesian game behavioral strategy belief probabilities C₁ choose coalitional game consider cooperative correlated equilibrium decision-maker defined denote the set efficient example exists expected payoff expected utility extensive-form game feasible finite game in Figure game in strategic game theory games with incomplete given incentive constraints incentive-compatible incomplete information individually rational maximize mechanism move multiagent representation Myerson Nash bargaining solution Nash equilibrium node nonempty normal representation optimal option outcome Pareto efficient payoff allocation payoff to player player I's positive number positive probability possible probability distribution pure strategies randomized strategy randomized-strategy profile repeated game round satisfy sequential equilibrium sequentially rational set of players Shapley value solution concept specifies strategic form strategic-form game strategy for player subgame subset suppose t₁ Table Theorem transferable utility unique utility function utility payoff weakly dominated y₁ Σ Σ
Verweise auf dieses Buch
Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade James R. Markusen Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2002 |