TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SAMUEL SMITH.

Skippack Camp, 11 October, 1777.

6.4109

SIR,

I received yours of the 9th, informing me of the occasion of the late firing. I imagine the enemy stil persist in their attempt, as the firing has continued at intervals ever since.* As the rear of the fort is only defended by a picket work, I think you ought to lose no time in throwing up a bank against the picket, which would strengthen it and make it defensible against shot. If some blinds were thrown up, within the area of the fort, they would be a security against shells, of which I think you are in more danger than from shot. You seem apprehensive, if the enemy should possess Province Island, that your men must quit their barracks. In that case you should think of finding out some more

* The enemy erected a battery, on the 9th of September, at the mouth of the Schuylkill, to secure the passage at Webb's Ferry. Commodore Hazelwood sent several galleys to attack the battery, which was silenced in a short time. In the night of the 10th the enemy crossed Webb's Ferry and erected a redoubt opposite the fort, within two musket shots of the blockhouse. As soon as the redoubt was discovered in the morning, the Commodore despatched three galleys and a floating battery to attack it; which was so well executed, that one lieutenant, one ensign, and fifty-six privates were compelled to surrender themselves prisoners of war— Hazelwood's MS. Letter, October 11th.

In speaking of the probability, that the enemy would bring their cannon to bear upon the fort from the opposite shore, Colonel Smith wrote; -"I shall in that case be obliged to cover my men; and should they keep up their fire in the night, it will compel us to sleep in the open air, which will soon destroy my small party. I have already sent away six men and one officer sick. Besides this, we have seven more in garrison unfit for duty; however, if they keep their men in the marshes two or three days, they must in this weather become equally sickly. From the number of the enemy we saw on the shore, I am of the opinion that they have at least seven hundred and fifty men, perhaps a thousand. I have now two hundred effective men in garrison. The number of wounded in last Saturday's engagement [at Germantown], by every account we can get from the city, exceeds twelve hundred."-MS. Letter, October 9th.

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secure place for sheltering them. I cannot at present think of any place better than between the east face of the Stone Fort and the lower battery; they will at least be safe there until an attack begins from the water. I desired Captain Brewer, who went from hence yesterday, to caution the Commodore against an unnecessary expenditure of ammunition, and I beg that you will also be careful in that point; for should the enemy cut off your intercourse with us, you will find the want of it. I am, &c.

P. S. It is my wish that Colonel Greene and you, in concert with the gentlemen of the navy, would turn your attention to every place, which will contribute to the defence of the water obstructions, and, if it is in my power to afford assistance, I will do it.

TO GOVERNOR GEORGE CLINTON.

DEAR SIR,

Head-Quarters, 15 October, 1777.

I was this day honored with yours of the 9th, containing a full account of the storm of Forts Montgomery and Clinton. General Putnam had given me information of the loss two days before, but not in so full and ample a manner. It is to be regretted, that so brave a resistance did not meet with a suitable reward. You have however the satisfaction of knowing, that every thing was done, that could possibly be done by a handful against a far superior force. This I am convinced was the case. This affair might have been attended with fatal consequences, had not there been a most providential intervention in favor of General Gates's arms on the 7th instant; but I am fully of opinion, that

Sir Henry Clinton will not advance much farther up the river, upon hearing of Burgoyne's defeat and retreat. Nothing but an absolute necessity could have induced me to withdraw any further part of the troops allotted for the defence of the posts up the North River; but such was the reduced state of our Continental regiments, after the battle of Brandywine, and such the difficulty of procuring reinforcements of militia from the southward, that without the troops from Peekskill we should scarcely have been able to keep the field against General Howe. I had the greatest hopes, that General Putnam would draw in as many Connecticut militia, as would replace the Continental troops, and I make no doubt but he did all in his power to obtain them in time. I am sorry that you were under the necessity of destroying the frigates. The only consolation is, that if we had not done it ourselves, the enemy would either have done it for us, or have carried them down for their

Since the battle of Germantown, the two armies have remained in a manner quiet. The enemy have made several attempts to remove the obstructions in the Delaware, but hitherto without effect. They are now making preparations to raise batteries in the rear of Fort Mifflin, which commands the uppermost chevauxde-frise. If we can maintain that post, and one opposite upon the Jersey shore, I hope our ships, galleys, and floating batteries, will be able to keep their stations and repel any force, that can be brought by water directly in front. I most earnestly wait for further news from the northward, which I hope will bring us accounts of the total ruin of Burgoyne's army.

* For other particulars respecting the capture of Forts Montgomery and Clinton, see APPENDIX, No. IV.