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In Swenson v. City of Aurora, 196 Ill. App., the injury occurred on April 18, 1910, while 83, the statute mentioned, in the last case the proof was that it occurred April 28th cited, was under consideration, and the court of that month. The court correctly held held that it was only necessary for notice to the notice fatally defective. state that the injury occurred "about the hour," but that if it stated the exact hour the law would hold him to strict proof, for otherwise the notice would be misleading.

It would seem that some courts are quite easily misled, especially where justice is the polar star guiding their footsteps.

In White v. Stowe, 54 Vt. 511, the statute required the notice to state "the time when, and the place where, such injury was received," etc. Omitting formal parts, the notice read:

"Stowe, August 21, 1874. I enter complaint for the roads not being what they should be. My wife stepped into a hole in a culvert near the Chas. Hanks place, or where R. W. Demeritt lives. July 2d, and hurt her left limb and back, and I wish you to come and settle the damages."

The court held the notice insufficient and defective, in that it "omitted to state with the required certainty the time when the injury was received, and that it was received upon a highway in the defendant town. The date given might as well refer to some previous year as the year in which the notice was dated," etc. That case was unquestionably well decided, yet it is made the basis of many of the ridiculously technical rulings we have called attention to.

In Ouimette v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 501, 90 N. E. 300, the statute required the notice to state "the date and about the hour of the accident." The notice stated that the injury occurred on November 10th, and the proof showed that it occurred October 10th. The court held that the notice was bad; the same as if no notice at all had been given. That case was properly decided.

In Touhey v. City of Decatur, 175 Ind. 98, 93 N. E. 540, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 350, the notice was not given at all; but, as I gather from the opinion, the lack of notice was sought to be excused because the injuries sustained prevented the plaintiff from giving the notice. The court held that the giving of the notice was a condition precedent to a right of recovery, and that no excuse would justify a noncompliance with the statute in that regard. That ruling manifestly was correct.

I think I have reviewed all of the cases cited and relied upon in support of the majority opinion, and, when analyzed, there are but a limited few which support the conclusion announced in the majority opinion.

When we deduct from that list those which are not in point, those which held the notices defective because of the peculiar In Gardner v. City of New London, 63 wording of the statute, those where the noConn. 267, 28 Atl. 42, the statute provided tices were not served within the specified that no action should be maintained "unless time or not served at all, and those which written notice of such injury, and of the na- hold that a variance from 8 to 30 days beture and cause thereof, and the time and tween the date of the injury and the date place of its occurrence," shall be given with-stated in notice, there are not a sufficient in a specified time. The notice stated that number left to force upon the bench and the injury occurred May 5th, but the proof showed that it occurred the 2d of that month. The court held the notice to be fatally defective, and that made no difference that the city was not misled by the error. That ruling was based upon the idea that the giving of the notice was a condition precedent to a right of a recovery. That is true, and I have no fault to find with that view of the case, but the court seems to entirely overlook the fact that there is a fundamental difference between the giving of the notice and the sufficiency of the notice given; the service of the notice has reference to time, while the sufficiency of the notice relates to the contents thereof.

In Weisman v. City of New York, 219 N. Y. 178, 114 N. E. 70, the variance between the date of the injury and that stated in the notice was eight days. The court held that the variance rendered the notice fatally defective. The result of that opinion, I think, was right, but in my opinion some of the arguments advanced were unnecessary and unsound.

In City of Wayne v. Bender, 57 Ind. App.

bar, from sheer weight of authority, the unjust and unreasonable construction of the statute contended for by counsel for the defendant. In my opinion the great weight of authority, as well as sound reason, is against defendant and in favor of the plaintiff, which I will try to show in the next paragraph of this opinion.

III. Having disposed of the cases cited and relied upon by our learned Commissioner in support of the majority opinion, I now approach the question, Was the notice given in this case a substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute?

In the case of Reno v. City of St. Joseph, 169 Mo. 642, 70 S. W. 123, which was a suit to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by reason of a defective sidewalk, a statute similar to the one here under consideration was involved there, and in deciding that case this court said:

"In order to maintain an action against a city of the second class on account of injuries caused by a defective sidewalk, the statute (section 5724, supra) requires the injured person to give notice in writing, verified by affidavit, to the mayor within sixty days of the

from such city.

time when, such injury was received, and the character and circumstances of the injury, and that such person will claim damages therefor "The notice with respect to the injury is as follows: 'I slipped and fell and was permanently injured; said accident occurred by reason of snow and ice being allowed to accumulate and remain on said sidewalk; said injuries consist of wounds and bruises of the sciatic nerve of my left hip and thigh.'* * * "Our conclusion is that the date of the service of notice was sufficiently shown, and that this contention is untenable.

"It is also urged that the notice does not state all the facts in relation to the sidewalk and plaintiff's injury as fully as these matters are stated in the petition, nor sufficient facts to show the liability of the city. The notice is only required to state the time and place and the character and circumstances of the injury. It is intended for the benefit of the city in order to put its officers in possession of the salient facts upon which the claim for damages is predicated, and the place where the injury is alleged to have occurred, in order that they may investigate them, and thereby ascertain whether the claim be a just one or fictitious and fraudulent, and to this end it was not necessary that the injury, to its fullest extent, scope, and effect, be set forth in the notice, but a substantial compliance with the statute was all that was necessary. It is not claimed that the notice was intended to deceive.

"In Dalton v. Salem, 136 Mass. 279, it was said: "The purpose of the notice was to give the city such information as would enable it to investigate the cause relied upon; and, if it was sufficient for this purpose, it was sufficient as a condition precedent to maintaining the action.' Lowe v. Clinton, 133 Mass. 526. The notice states, as the cause of the injury, a fall 'consequent upon the icy and slippery condition of the said sidewalk.' It is true that a sidewalk may be icy and slippery without being defective. Stanton v. Springfield, 12 Allen, 566. It is equally true that the ice on a sidewalk may be in such form as, combined with its slipperiness renders the way defective. Luther v. Worcester, 97 Mass. 268. It was not necessary that the notice would designate the cause of the injury as a defect. Savoy v. Haverhill, 132 Mass. 324. And it should not be construed with technical strictness. Spellman v. Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443. We are of the opinion that the notice in this case called the attention of the city with sufficient distinctness to the cause relied upon to answer the purpose required, and that it was not necessary that it should state with such particularity the form of the ice as to show that it was necessarily a defect."

The majority opinion holds that the Reno Case is not in point in the case at bar, because the record disclosed the fact "that the notice gave the true date of the injury, and hence the question now before us, in regard

gested, and we are unable to see why the same liberal construction should not apply to the provision regarding the time when, and

the place where, the injury occurred; all are contained in the same section and clause of the statute, and it was the statute that was being construed, and the court held that a substantial compliance with its requirements was all that was necessary..

Moreover, I know of no rule of construction which authorizes or permits a court to place a liberal construction upon one of a number of words contained in the same sentence of the same paragraph of a statute, connected by a copulative conjunction, and a strict construction upon another one of those words, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary. The same liberal or strict construction must be placed upon all the words alike. It is the statute, and not one particular word thereof, in such a case, that is construed; and, in the very nature of the case, a different construction could not be placed upon each of the different words thereof without the court should interpolate into the statute a provision not placed there by the Legislature. That case is directly in point, and is decisive of this case.

That case was cited with approval, and was largely quoted from, in the case of Mathieson v. Railway Co., 219 Mo. 542, 118 S. W. 9.

In the case of Sullivan v. City of Syracuse, 77 Hun, 440, 29 N. Y. Supp. 105, the injury occurred on August 4, 1891, and the notice stated that it was on the 5th. The court held that the notice substantially complied with the statute.

In Murphy v. Seneca Falls, 57 App. Div. 438, 67 N. Y. Supp. 1013, the notice stated that the injury occurred "on or about April 10, 1897," and the proof showed that it occurred on that day April 10th. The court held the notice sufficient under the statute.

In the case of Connor v. Salt Lake City, 28 Utah, 248, 78 Pac. 479, the notice stated that the injury occurred "on or about January 15, 1902," and the evidence showed that it occurred on the night of that day. The court in holding the notice good, on page 259 of 28 Utah, on page 481 of 78 Pac., said:

"The appellant also contends that the court erred in admitting in evidence the notice of claim for damages presented to the city coun

to time of accident, was not considered, nor cil to be audited and allowed. The objection to the notice was that it did not sufficiently dewas it an issue before the court in that case." scribe the place where, nor sufficiently desigIn a limited sense that is true, but the stat-nate the time when, the accident occurred. In ute which required the notice to state "the this class of cases notice is required to be given to the city council by statute, which, inter place where, and the time when, such injury alia, provides for the presentation of claims rewas received, and the character and circum-sulting from defective, unsafe, dangerous, or obstances of the injury," was under considera- structed sidewalks, and the notice must detion; and the court held that "a substantial scribe the time, place, cause, and extent of the damages or injury.' Section 312, Rev. St. compliance with the statute was all that was 1898. And a failure to present a claim to the necessary." And while it is true the suffi- city council in the manner provided by the statciency of the notice was limited to the state- ute is made a 'bar and answer to any action or ment of the character and circumstances of St. 1898. The notice in question, so far as maproceeding against a city.' Section 313, Rev. the injury, yet no good reason has been sug- terial here, reads: 'I hereby present to the

sug-terial

city council of Salt Lake City a claim for dam-, As against the demurrer the allegation is suffiages for personal injuries by me sustained on or about January 15, 1902, while walking on the sidewalk at and along First West street, between Seventh and Eighth South, in said city, through negligence of said city in suffering and permitting said sidewalk at said place to be out of repair and obstructed, and suffering and permitting a fence, fencing material, and obstructions to be upon and along the said sidewalk.'

cient. Our court has held that the notice of
injury must fairly apprise the municipal officers
of the time and place and circumstances of the
accident, and the nature of the injuries receiv
ed, so that due investigation may be made, and
that a notice conforming to these requirements
is sufficient. Kandelin v. City of Ely, 110 Minn.
55, 124 N. W. 449, and cases cited; Larkin v.
City of Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 311, 127 N. W.
1129, and cases cited. The following cases,
though not parallel, give support to the notice
against the claim that a variance of a day ren-
ders it invalid.
ders it invalid. Sullivan v. Syracuse, 77 Hun,
440, 29 N. Y. Supp. 105; Connor v. Salt Lake
City, 28 Utah, 248, 78 Pac. 479; Marcotte v.
City of Lewiston, 94 Me. 233, 47 Átl. 137. The
case of Gardner v. City of New London, 63
Conn. 267, 28 Atl. 42, where there was a vari-
ance of three days, is opposed."

In the case of City of Lincoln v. O'Brien, 56 Neb. 761, 77 N. W. 76, the court, in construing a statute almost precisely like the one under consideration as to time, place, and condition of the sidewalk, on page 770 of 56 Neb., on page 78 of 77 N. W., said:

"While this notice was not drawn with such particularity as proper caution would suggest, still we do not think it is fatally defective. In In determining the sufficiency of such a notice the court is not bound by its terms alone, but may examine it in the light of extraneous evidence, showing the situation and surroundings, and thus determine whether it sufficiently apprised the municipality of the location and nature of the alleged defect or obstruction which caused the accident. Doubtless the principal purpose of the notice is to afford the proper officers an opportunity to look into the facts and circumstances connected with the occurrence; to preserve the evidence of the existing conditions; to determine the liability of the municipality; and, in case liability exists, to effect a settlement without resort to litigation. When, therefore, such a notice is not misleading, but "The other question presented is by no means advises the municipality promptly of the acci- free from doubt, but we think that, too, must be dent and claim, so as to afford an opportunity resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Section 36 for investigation, it is sufficiently definite, and of the act already cited provides: "To mainsatisfies the purpose and requirements of the tain an action against said city for any unlaw. It is true, in this case the accident is liquidated claim, it shall be necessary that the stated in the notice to have occurred on or party file in the office of the city clerk, within about January 15, 1902,' the precise time not three months from the time such right of acbeing stated: but the evidence shows that the tion accrued, a statement giving full name and occurrence did actually take place on the night the time, place, nature, circumstance, and cause of the day mentioned, and there is nothing to of the injury or damage complained of.' It has show that any other accident happened on or been held that this is a reasonable exercise of about that time or at that place. Nor is it legislative power, and that a compliance with claimed or shown that any officer was in any the requirement must be alleged and proved in way misled in any investigation because of the 38 Neb. 369 [56 N. W. 995]; City of Lincoln order to a recovery. City of Lincoln v. Grant, failure to state the exact time. The statement as to time, therefore, cannot be held to v. Finkle, 41 Neb. 575 [59 N. W. 915]. This have been prejudicial. So the notice fails to requires that the place of the injury be stated. state the exact spot where the accident oc- "That on or about the 6th day of October, 1894, In the notice served by plaintiff she states: curred, simply stating that it happened on 'First West between Seventh and Eighth South' this affiant was passing on and over the sidestreets; but both the notice and the evidence walk on the north side of Q, between Eightshow that the obstruction was of such a char- eenth and Twentieth streets, in said city, in acter that no officer, in the exercise of ordi- the evening of said day, and stepped into a hole nary care, could walk or drive along the street in said sidewalk which was in a bad state of at the place stated without observing the dan- repair. It is to be inferred that it was the gerous condition of the sidewalk where the in- sidewalk, and not the hole, which plaintiff injury occurred. It is clear that the notice did tended to say was in a bad state of repair-a not mislead the municipality, and, considering fact which, it will be seen, is of some importit in its entirety, we are of the opinion that it ance. It is asserted that this statement is enwas sufficiently definite to subserve the pur-tirely insufficient, in that it designates a space pose of the statute, and that it was properly of two city blocks, and does not lead to any admitted in evidence. On similar questions more precise location. It is argued that one On similar questions of the objects of the statute is to permit the other courts have ruled likewise. Burdick v. Richmond, 16 R. I. 502, 17 Atl. 917; City of Lincoln v. O'Brien, 56 Neb. 716, 77 N. W. 76: Rusch v. City of Dubuque, 116 Iowa, 402, 190 N. W. 80; Owen v. City of Ft. Dodge (Iowa) [98 Iowa, 281], 67 N. W. 281; Lyman v. Hampshire, 138 Mass. 74; Lowe v. Inhabitants of Clinton, 133 Mass. 526; Brown v. City of Owosso (Mich.) [126 Mich. 91], 85 N. W. 256; Harden v. City of Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 446, 42

city, on receiving notice, to avouch the proper landowner to defend the case, and that the statement must be sufficiently definite to permit decisions, and in those of other states where the accomplishment of this object. In our own similar statutes exist, it has always been said that the object is to advise the city promptly of the claim so as to afford an opportunity for investigation. It may be that, where the property owner is liable over to the city, the other object also exists, and that a better statement In the case of Murphy v. City of St. Paul, of the purpose of the law is that it is to per130 Minn. 410, 153 N. W. 619, the court, dis-mit the city promptly to take any steps proper cussing that subject, said:

N. W. 350."

"The injury occurred on the 24th day of December, 1913, about 9 o'clock in the evening. The notice is required to state the 'time, place, and circumstances.' The notice stated that the injury was sustained 'on the 23d day of December, 1913, at 9 o'clock in the evening.' It is claimed that this variance of a day makes the

for its protection. However, there is no practical difference in the result. Whether the object be one or the other, or both, it is clear that the statute requires a reasonably certain description of the place-such a description as, from its terms and from inquiries suggested thereby, will permit the officers of the city to identify the place. On the other hand, no case here or elsewhere has required that such a no

nitely given, but the obstruction was described, and this was held enough, the court saying that the city certainly would not insist that there were several such defects in the neighborhood. "The cases cited illustrate the principles already stated, and also serve to show with what liberality the courts have construed this somewhat harsh statute."

As one court has said, it was never contem- | 484, the place on the street was not very defiplated that one who has been injured must employ a surveyor to fix the precise spot where the injury occurred. In examining the rather numerous cases on the subject, certain principles will be found to run through all. One is that it is sufficient, as above stated, if the place be so described that from that description it can be identified with reasonable diligence. Another is that the sufficiency of the notice is not to be determined from its terms

alone, but in the light of extraneous evidence of the situation and surroundings.

"In Fopper v. Town of Wheatland [59 Wis. 623], 18 N. W. 514, in that part of the notice fixing the place a considerable extent of road was described, but in describing the accident circumstances were stated which showed that it must have occurred at a particular spot along the course indicated, and this was held enough.

"In Wall v. Town of Highland [72 Wis. 435], 39 N. W. 560, the notice said the accident occurred on a bridge. It was in fact a culvert, but its place was quite definitely fixed, and the notice was held good, although there was a bridge not far away.

In the case of Rusch v. City of Dubuque, 116 Iowa, 402, 403, 90 N. W. 80, 81, in discussing a similar statute, where it was contended the notice did not with sufficient definiteness describe the place of the injury, the court said:

"In Owen v. City of Ft. Dodge, 67 N. W. (Iowa) 281, the notice was somewhat ambiguous, but showed that the accident was about the in-house facing forty feet on the avenue, the intersection of two streets. It also showed that it occurred on a plank crossing. The evidence on the trial showing that there was only one plank crossing at the intersection named, the notice was held good, although the corner may have been improperly described.

"In Laird v. Town of Otsego [90 Wis. 25], 62 N. W. 1042, the description was uncertain in itself, naming an indefinite portion of a highway; but it afterwards described the obstruction causing the injury, and it was held that, as this obstruction was conspicuous, its description made the notice good.

"In Lyman v. Hampshire, 138 Mass. 74, the notice placed the accident on a bridge of considerable length, but said that it was caused by stepping in a hole in the flooring caused by a short plank. There were three such holes, but the notice was held good because it did not but the notice was held good because it did not appear that more than one was large enough to permit such an accident.

"In Brown v. Town of Southbury, 53 Conn. 212 [1 Atl. 819], the notice described 'a defectice sluice across a highway' between certain houses. There were three sluices across the highway in the space described, but only one was defective. This was held sufficient.

"In Lowe v. Clinton, 133 Mass. 526, the place was fixed between two houses which were 50 rods apart, and there were intervening houses, but there was also described as the cause of the injury a stump projecting 4 inches above the sidewalk. There was only one such stump, and therefore it was held that the notice was sufficient.

"In Harder v. City of Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 446 [42 N. W. 350], the notice was particular on its face, but it named the adjoining cross street as 'Sixteenth street.' As a matter of fact it was a street of another name, and the street on which the injury occurred did not extend to Sixteenth street. The plaintiff had inferred that, as the last street he had crossed was Fifteenth, the next would be Sixteenth. This was held good, because the officers must certainly know what was meant.

"In Cross v. City of Elmira, 86 Hun (N. Y.) 467 [33 N. Y. Supp. 947], the notice said that plaintiff was walking on the plank sidewalk on the north side of East Washington avenue, between Oak and Pratt streets. The distance named was 368 feet, and there was plank sidewalk containing other holes than that causing the injury for a distance of 150 feet. This was held sufficient.

"In McCabe v. City of Cambridge, 134 Mass.

"It is contended that the place of the accident was not described with sufficient definiteness in the notice served on the city. Section 1051 of the Code simply requires the place where such injury occurred' to be indicated. The locality is pointed out in the notice as 'a plank sidewalk on the east side of Windsor Ave., between Providence street and Lincoln Ave., and about 150 feet from said Eagle Point Ave., and at a point opposite building No. 254 on said street.' At the corner of Providence street and Windsor avenue was a double brick side apartment being No. 254. Forty-six feet beyond this was a frame house. Plaintiff testified, "The exact place where I was injured was just about half way between these two houses.' That point was twenty-three feet north of the north line of No. 254, and one hundred and eighty-one feet north of Eagle Point avenue. But the notice did not purport to give the precise location, nor was it necessary that a survey and plat be made, that the particular point might be known. Reasonable certainty as to the street was given, and the defects clearly the place is all that was required. The side of stated. The place was about one hundred and that distance, as insisted by appellant; and a fifty feet from Eagle Point avenue-not exactly variation of thirty-one feet cannot be held fatal. Nor was the place described as in front of No. 254, as seems to be thought. It was opposite to it along the walk; but which way? It was between Lincoln avenue and Providence street, and in quite a number of cases this has been held in principle sufficiently definite. In City of Lincoln v. O'Brien, 56 Neb. 761, 77 N. W. 76, the place was described as the north side of Q street between Eighteenth and Twentieth streets. In Lyman v. Hampshire County, 138 Mass. 74, the location was on a bridge of considerable length. In Lowe v. Inhabitants of Clinton, 133 Mass. 526, it was fixed as between two houses 50 rods apart. In each of the above cases, however, a single defect of the kind described appeared within the limits designated, and the notices were adjudged sufficient. Here the evidence on the part of the plaintiff tended to show that the walk from Providence street to the frame house was in substantially the same condition, with many boards loose and spikes projecting in several places, while that of defendant was to the effect that the walk was in perfect repair. As the defendant investigated the walk to the extent mentioned and discovered no defects, it was not prejudiced by plaintiff's failure to locate the place within the few feet mentioned. As bearing on the question, see Owen v. City of Ft. Dodge, 98 Iowa, 281, 67 N. W. 281; Fopper v. Town of Wheatland, 59 Wis. 623, 18 N. W. 514; Brown v. Town of Southbury, 53 Conn. 212, 1 Atl. 819; Harder v. City of Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 446, 42 N. W. 350; Cross v. City of Elmira, 86 Hun, 467, 33 N. Y. Supp. 947; Trost v. City of Casselton, 8 N. D. 534, 79 N. W. 1071, relied on by appellant, differs radically from the instant case. There the accident was described as having occurred at the southwest corner of lot 7, at the intersection of two

streets, when it happened at a point 100 feet north of the corner. Nothing in the notice indicated in which of the four directions the officers were to look for the scene of injury. In Weber v. Town of Greenfield, 74 Wis. 234, 42 N. W. 101, the notice described the place as at the intersection of the line between sections 17 and 18, with the Beloit road, where several loads of gravel had been dumped to repair the highway. There were heaps of gravel scattered along the road 15 or 20 rods west, and also as far as 20 rods east of the place stated, while the accident occurred 394 feet to the east, and it was held that, owing to the fact that loads of gravel had been dumped at so many places, the inaccurate notice afforded no aid to the authorities in ascertaining if the road was insufficient. In Miller v. City of Springfield, 177 Mass. 373, 58 N. E. 1013, the defect causing the injury was 300 yards from the place described. From the terms of the notice, with the inquiries suggested, in connection with the peculiar defect designated, we think the authorities, with proper diligence, could have discovered the locality of the projecting spike and loose plank alleged to have occasioned the injury with as much certainty as possible without an accurate survey. If so, the notice was sufficiently definite. Affirmed."

In the case of Lyman v. Hampshire County, 138 Mass. 74, the court had the same character of a statute before it, and in construing it the court, on page 76 of 138 Mass., said:

"Under these statutes it was necessary for him to give, within thirty days after his injury, written notice to the county of Hampshire of the time, place, and cause of the said injury.' It is admitted that the notice which was given in this case sufficiently states the time and the cause of the injury; but the defendant contends that it does not state with sufficient definiteness the place of the injury.

"The notice states that the injury was received 'upon the bridge in said Huntington, known as and called Norwich bridge, and situated at or near the house of the late Horace Taylor, in said Huntington.' The place on the bridge where the accident happened is pointed out by the statement that 'said injuries were caused by a defect in the planking of the said bridge, one of the plank being insufficient in length, which insufficiency caused a hole in the said bridge into which I fell.' Taking the whole notice together, the place of the injury is described as being on the bridge at a point where there existed a hole, caused by a short plank, so large that the plaintiff stepped or fell into it. "Prima facie this was a sufficient notice of the place. The object of the statute was that the officers of the county or town should be informed promptly, with substantial certainty, of the time, place, and cause of the injury, so that they might investigate the question of the liability of the county or town. Spellman v. Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443; Vronin v. Boston, 135 Mass. 110. The notice in this case called the attention of the officers of the county to a large hole in the planking as the place and cause of the plaintiff's injury. They would naturally be led by it to examine the flooring of the bridge, and could not fail to find the defect described in the notice. Lowe v. Clinton, 133 Mass. 526.

"In this case there was no evidence that no evidence that there was more than one hole capable of causing the plaintiff's injury. He stepped into a hole eleven inches long and nine inches wide, caused by one of the planks being too short. It appeared in evidence that there were three holes of a similar character in the floor planking of the bridge, but nothing was shown as to the size of these holes, except that they were not so large as the one into which the plaintiff stepped. There is nothing to show that the

plaintiff's notice and an inspection of the bridge a knowledge of the precise place where the injury was received. The ruling, as matter of law, that the notice was fatally defective, in not stating the place of the injury, was erroneous."

The same question, under a similar statute, came before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case Lowe v. Clinton, 133 Mass. 526. The statute, facts of the case, and ruling of the court are well stated in the syllabus, which reads:

"In an action for personal injuries occasioned by a defect in a highway, the notice given by the plaintiff under the St. of 1877, c. 234, stated the cause of the injury to be a defect in that portion of a certain street in the defendant town lying between the residences of two persons named, 'to wit, a stump projecting four inches above the surface of the sidewalk on the east side of said street, between the residences aforesaid.' The evidence showed that these houses were about fifty rods apart; that there were three other houses between them; that between two of the other houses there was a stump projecting two and a half inches above the surface of the street, the roots of which, extending easterly and westerly, were distinctly other stump within fifty rods. Held, that the traceable by the eye; and that there was no notice sufficiently designated the place of the injury, within the statute.'

In Brown v. City of Owosso, 126 Mich. 91, 85 N. W. 256, the statute under consideration required that the notice of the injury received should state substantially the time when, the place where, the injury occurred, the manner in which it occurred, and the extent thereof, etc.

In discussing that part of the statute regarding the manner in which the injury occurred, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, on page 94 of 126 Mich., on page 258 of 85 N. W., said:

"Counsel contend that the notice shows no negligence upon the part of the city, and that it does not state that the walk was defective, or that one of its boards was loose, but that she was injured by falling over a loose plank lying upon the sidewalk. We think this a technically correct construction of the language, though most people would understand that the words 'loose plank,' referred to a plank of the walk which had become loosened. Had the words been transposed, so as to state that she had been tripped upon the sidewalk by a loose plank, it would have been a more definite statement, though even that would not have excluded the inference that the plank might not have been one that was not at any time a part of the walk. This notice is not a pleading, and we are of the opinion that the requirement should not receive so strict a construction as to make it difficult for the average citizen to draw a good notice, especially in view of the evident intention that a substantial statement should be sufficient, and the serious consequences of reliance upon a defective notice until after the expiration of the 60-day period."

It is true the statute mentioned in that case provided that the notice should substantially state the time, place, and cause of injury; yet it will be observed that the court first construed the statute independent of the word "substantially," and held that it should not receive too technical a construction; and the court then added, especially in view of the evident intention that a substantial state

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