France, the hereditary rival and almost perpetual enemy of EnglandFrance, dissatisfied and resentful in view of the recent conquest by England of her Canadian colonies, naturally presented herself to the minds of the statesmen of the Revolution as not unlikely to favor and promote an event which, though it did not restore to France her lost possessions in America, yet inflicted a correspondent loss on England.

Accordingly, early in 1776, Silas Deane was despatched to France as a private agent, to ascertain the views of that country; and, in consequence of the favorable representations sent home by him, he, and Benjamin Franklin, and Arthur Lee, were, in the same year, appointed commissioners to negotiate an alliance with France. They were instructed and empowered to "assure his Most Christian Majesty, that such of the British West India islands as, in the course of the war, shall be reduced by the united force of France and the United States, shall be yielded in absolute property to his Most Christian Majesty; and the United States engage, on timely notice, to furnish, at their expense, and deliver at some convenient port or ports in the said United States, provisions for carrying on expeditions against the said islands to the amount of two millions of dollars, and six frigates, mounting not less than twenty-four guns each, manned and fitted for sea; and to render any other assistance which may be in their power, as becomes good allies."

These instructions are material to be remembered, because they show that we, on our side, as the consideration of the aid we solicited from France, proffered to her an alliance offensive and defensive, designed, as the treaties actually concluded prove, to embrace within the scope of its operation all the French and British possessions in America, which it appears to have been in contemplation to conquer, and divide between the allied Powers.

In the event of the negotiation, two treaties were concluded on the same day, the 6th of February, 1778: one entitled a "Treaty of eventual and defensive Alliance;" and the other a "Treaty of Amity and Commerce." The Treaty of Alliance, after providing for the active prosecution of the existing war between the United States and Great Britain, to the end of maintaining the independence of this country,-for the making of common cause with France, in case of eventual hostilities between her and Great Britain, and for the conquest and partition of the remaining British colonies in America,-proceeds, in the 11th and 12th articles, to stipulate as follows:

"ART. 11. The two parties guaranty mutually, from the present time and for ever, against all other powers, to wit: The United States to hist Most Christian Majesty, the present possessions of the crown of France in America, as well as those which it may acquire by the future treaty of peace; and his Most Christian Majesty guaranties, on his part, to the United States, their liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, as well in matters of government as commerce, and also their possessions, and the additions or conquests that their confederation may obtain during the war, from any of the dominions now or heretofore possessed by Great Britain in North America, conformable to the fifth and sixth articles above written; the whole, as their possession shall be fixed and assured to the said States, at the moment of the cessation of their present war with England.

"ART. 12. In order to fix more precisely the sense and application of

the preceding article, the contracting parties declare that, in case of a rupture between France and England, the reciprocal guarantee declared in the said article shall have its full force and effect the moment such war shall break out; and if such rupture shall not take place, the mutual obligations of the said guarantee shall not commence until the moment of the cessation of the present war between the United States and England shall have ascertained their possessions."

In execution of this treaty France entered heartily, and with ample forces of sea and land, into the war of the Revolution; and with her aid, and the blessing of God on the united efforts of the allied nations, we achieved our independence, and established our sovereignty as a nation. Whether France was actuated more or less by considerations of generosity or of policy, certain it is that she promptly, faithfully, and effectively, fulfilled her part of the treaty; "the essential and direct end" of which, as declared in the instrument itself, was "to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, of the United States." And equally certain it is that, for the sacrifice of men and of treasure she thus incurred, she received from us at the time no direct equivalent or benefit whatsoever, except that of the humiliation and loss of territory inflicted on her rival, Great Britain. And it is not less certain that, when the United States issued from that terrible conflict, a great and free republic, full of a deeply grateful sense of the inestimable advantage she had received from the alliance of France, and having thus far rendered to her benefactress no correspondent advantage, there remained, of all the stipulations of the treaty, but one which, in any future possibility, could be profitable to France; and that was, the perpetual guarantee of the possessions of the latter in America.

The Treaty of Amity and Commerce provided, among other things, by the 6th and 7th articles, that each nation should protect and defend, as its own, the vessels and property of the citizens of the other, in port or on the seas; by the 17th, that the ships of war, privateers, and prizes of either, should have free entrance into the ports of the other, and that the cruisers of the enemy of either should be excluded; by the 23d and 24th, that each party might trade freely with the enemies of the other, except in goods enumerated as contraband, and that free ships should make free goods; together with many other analogous provisions in other articles of the treaty, advantageous to the commerce and naval operations of the respective parties. To which is to be added, that by the Sth article of a Consular Convention, subscribed the 14th of November, 17SS, it was provided, that the consuls of each party, in the ports of the other, should exercise police, and also exclusive jurisdiction, in civil matters, over the vessels of their respective nations.

Such, under these three treaties, were the mutual rights and obligations of the parties at the opening of the French Revolution. It remained to be seen, in the general crash of governments and of kingdoms which ensued, how far the nations would redeem those of their engagements, which could not fail to press heavily on one or the other: the United States, her guarantee of the French possessions in America against all enemies, and her concession of privileges to the armed ships of France; and France, her stipulations in favor of the neutral trade of the United States. And the critical time for each was not slow to arrive.

The French Revolution awakened, in the outset, universal sympathy

and deep interest throughout the United States. It was plainly seen to be an effort of the Many to reconquer to themselves the political rights which had been usurped too long by the Few. It was manifestly the cause of national reform and of civil liberty. In principle, it was intimately associated with our own successful Revolution, of which, in the great continuous train of human events, it was the sequel at least, if not the consequence. Lafayette, the young hero of our Revolution, was the popular chief in that of France. We looked, therefore, to the progress of events with lively regard, but without distinctly anticipating, any more than the rest of the world, the stupendous influence which the French Revolution was to exercise over the destinies of Europe and of America. As the weakness of the King of France, the misconduct of the nobles, or the violence of the people, went on to plunge the country into anarchy and blood, our interest in the spectacle deepened, while our sympathy moderated. But it was not until the rest of Europe coalesced together to punish the French nation for presuming to regulate its own domestic affairs in its own way, and the universal people of France started up in a mass of armed men to repel the invaders from their soil, and the French Republic arose on the ruins of the monarchy to challenge and defy the universe, that we began to realize how possible it was for the conflagration, which now embraced all Europe, to extend its ravages to America. The respective Governments of France and the United States then began to perceive how onerous, if not impracticable, it was, to fulfil, literally or substantially, the conditions of their common treaties.

It is curious to remark, as evidence that what followed was the result, not of bad faith, but of the unforeseen circumstances of insuperable difficulty in which the two nations found themselves suddenly involved, that both of them, almost simultaneously, and without the action of the one being originally induced by that of the other, entered upon a course of policy not strictly reconcilable with their treaties of alliance and of amity. On the 22d of April, 1793, appeared the Proclamation of Neutrality, by which President Washington pledged the United States "to adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards the belligerant powers." This measure was expressly discussed in his cabinet, with reference to the bearings of the eleventh article of the Treaty of Alliance. Did the casus federis thereby stipulated exist? There was no decision on this point by the President; but Chief Justice Marshall informs us that the proclamation "was intended to prevent the French minister from demanding the performance of the guarantee contained in the Treaty of Alliance." And the proclamation was complained of, in this relation, by the Government or diplomatic agents of France, at once, and not merely, as it has been asserted, long afterward; although it did not, as yet, become the subject of a formal demand of execution. Meantime, several American vessels had been captured by French cruisers; but these acts were mere excesses of war, admitted as such on both sides, and neither assumed nor justified by France. But, on the 9th of May, 1793, only seventeen days after the date of the Proclamation of Neutrality, and before it had arrived in France, the National Convention issued a decree subjecting all neutral vessels laden with provisious to arrest, and their cargoes to confiscation. This decree was retroactive in terms, extending back to cover all seizures made since the beginning of the war. It was avowed, in the preamble, to be a violation of neutral right extorted by the necessities of war, and it promised in

demnification to the suffering parties. Gouverneur Morris, then minister of the United States, immediately remonstrated against this decree. TheConvention proceeded to make another decree on the 23d, saving the vessels: of the United States from the operation of that of the 9th; but it was rescinded on the 28th of May, renewed again on the 1st of July, and again finally rescinded on the 27th of July; the decree of the 9th of May continuing to be enforced against us, as it always had been amid all the vacillations of the Convention.

Intelligence of these events excited great alarm in the United States. Aware of the wants of the belligerants, and confiding in the faith of treaties, and the forbearance due to us by the law of nations, our citizens, in the prosecution of a lawful commerce, shipped large quantities of provisions to Europe, which, unprotected by any navy of our own, fell a prey to the rapaciousness of contending nations, pursuing a general war of desperation with a ferocity regardless of the ordinary rules of civilized warfare. In order to tranquillize, in some degree, the public mind, the Government of the United States came forward, voluntarily, to give assurance to its citizens of protection and redress. On the 27th of August, 1793, the Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, issued a circular letter containing the following

assurance:

"I have it in charge from the President to assure the merchants of the United States, concerned in foreign commerce or navigation, that due atten-tion will be paid to any injuries they may suffer on the high seas, or in foreign countries, contrary to the law of nations and existing treaties; and that, on their forwarding hither well-authenticated evidence of the same, proper proceedings will be adopted for their relief."

Reposing trust in this distinct assurance, our citizens transmitted the evidence of their losses to the Department of State; but they yet wait, even to this day, to receive the redress, to which the Government then proclaimed they were justly entitled.

Meanwhile, during the years 1793 and 1794, each nation continued to prefer complaints against the other, for alleged infractions of treaty, or violations of the law of nations. France complained that the United States prohibited the fitting out of her privateers in our ports; that we threw embarrassments in the way of the sale of prizes brought in by her cruisers; that the armed vessels of England were admitted into our ports; and that supplies of provisions were refused by us to the French West Indies. The United States persisted in their neutral policy; complaining of France, that she withheld the indemnity promised to persons injured by the decree of the 9th of May; that she subjected our vessels to an embargo in Bordeaux; that she neglected bills drawn by us for supplies; and that she persisted in most extensive depredations on our commerce.

But, in all this period, each party practised much forbearance towards the other, each being conscious that neither acted in strict conformity with the letter of their respective obligations. France distinctly admitted that, so far as she was concerned, she had been compelled, by the necessities of her position, and by the conduct of the allies, especially England, to perform acts, for which indemnification was justly due. The United States,. aware of the difficulties attending the subject, anxiously avoided the question of the guarantee, though it was ever present in the minds of the cabinet. In the instructions to James Monroe, when appointed successor to Gouverneur Morris, the Secretary of State says: "If the execution of the

guarantee of the French islands by force of arms should be propounded, you will refer the Republic of France to this side of the water." And, in his correspondence with the department, Mr. Monroe says, "I felt extremely embarrassed how to touch again their infringement of the Treaty of Commerce,-whether to call on them to execute it." And, again: "Merlin (of the Committee of Safety) commenced by observing, that I had advised and pressed them to execute the 23d and 24th articles of the Treaty of Commerce: and after making some other comments, he finally came to this point: 'Do you insist upon our executing the treaty?'* * I was brought back twice again to the question, Do you insist upon or demand it? I therefore repeated my declaration, and in the most explicit terms, that I was not instructed by the President to insist on it, nor did I insist on it." And he adds in his letter, that one of his motives for not demanding it, was the fear that it might "excite a disposition to press us on other points, upon which it were better to avoid any discussion." And France was equally shy of demanding the fulfilment of the Treaty of Alliance; for in a letter dated the 1st of June, 1795, the Secretary of State says, in explanation of the Proclamation of Neutrality: "No casus fœderis had arisen upon our alliance with France. We had not, nor have we yet, been required to execute the guarantee; and therefore it was unnecessary to speak concerning it." In fact, neither party felt ready or willing to incur the hazards of drawing out a positive refusal on the part of the other to comply with their respective treaty engagements. And so marked was this feeling on both sides, that, in his message to Congress of the 20th of February, 1795, the President says: "It affords me the highest pleasure to inform Congress that perfect harmony reigns between the two republics;" that is, France and the United States.

This amicable tendency of things was abruptly broken off by the conclusion of our treaty with Great Britain of the 19th of November, 1794, ratified on the 28th of October, 1795, and commonly called Jay's Treaty. The moment the terms of this treaty became known to France she complained of it in the strongest language, considering it not merely as in violation of our express engagements to her, but as evincing a disposition on our part to sacrifice our old connexion with her, and contract a new one with Great Britain. How far these complaints were well founded, is not material to the present inquiry. Suffice it that they became the inducement to a total change of policy on the part of France.

On the 15th of November, 1796, M. Adet announced to our Government the order of his own, suspending his functions as minister of the French Republic here, and made a formal demand for execution of the guarantee in the Treaty of Alliance, in these words: "The undersigned, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, now fulfils to the Secretary of State of the United States a painful duty. He claims, in the name of the American honor, in the name of the faith of treaties, the execution of that contract which assured to the United States their existence, and which France regarded as the pledge of the most sacred union between two peoples the freest on earth." This demand was preceded or followed by various acts of France, aimed directly and avowedly against our commerce. One was a decree of the Directory, that the flag of the French Republic should treat all neutrals, either as to confiscation, searches, or capture, in the same manner as they should suffer themselves to be treated by England. Another, that the Directory considered the stipulations of