Mr. H. G. could be built for the cost of twelve "King Edward VII.'s." Gillmor. Following the method of comparison used in the article in the Rear-Admiral Scientific American alluded to by the Author, the sixteen "Vittorio Emanuele III.'s" would be about equal in military value to fourteen "King Edward VII.'s," neglecting altogether the military value which many authorities attached to additional numbers. It was recognized that all systems of comparison were more or less illusory, and all that could be said for the method upon which this statement of relative efficiency was based was that it had commended itself to some competent judges as not without value. In considering the employment of this kind of vessel, there was one element of the design which it would seem might well receive attention if prolonged tenure on the list of effectives was sought, and that was the battery. For some years there had been no change in the maximum calibre of the guns installed in naval vessels, and a progressive increase in the calibre of the mediumcalibre guns was to be observed. There were many who would consider an increase in the number of large-calibre guns and the suppression of the medium-calibre guns as too radical a step; but in the light of experience might it not be expected that the building of improved "Vittorio Emanuele III.'s" with a uniform battery of 12-inch guns, would render obsolete many of the armoured vessels building or projected, and that such vessels would hold a place on the list of effectives for a period which would approximate much more closely to the useful life of the hull and machinery than had been the case in many of their predecessors? Rear-Admiral GEORGE W. MELVILLE, of the United States Navy, congratulated the Author on making so clear and forceful a presentation of his case. In fact there was so little in the Paper to criticize, and so much to commend, that he felt diffident in attempting to say anything on the subject. America had been brought to believe that there were but two classes of fighting ships to be considered, the heavily armed and armoured battleship of large displacement, and the armoured cruiser of large displacement, the two ships differing only in their armour, weight of guns, and speed; and as they could not very well have both qualities in the same ship, they believed it necessary to have ships of both classes. In the United States, as in England, there was some difference of opinion in regard to the speed and tonnage of both battleship and cruiser; yet in both countries there was a strong conviction that the same amount of fight could not be got out of 12,000 tons as out of 16,000 tons, be the cost what it might; and therefore the larger tonnage was favoured. The question whether they should have a large number of moderate-sized ships, or a Rear-Admiral smaller number of large ships had been fully discussed in the Melville. States, and he believed that all officers who had given the matter proper thought were inclined towards the heavier ship. Personally, he believed that if a nation was able to bear the expense, the heavier ships of all classes had the best of the argument, under all conditions; and nations which could not afford to have the larger class of ship had better keep out of the expensive game of war, and confine themselves to the protection of their own harbours and coasts with harbour-defence ships of the "Monitor" class, or other vessels or appliances which would give them such protection as might allay their nervous fears, no matter how inadequate they might really be against the assault of their more heavily armed foes. In other words, the weaker nations must resort to such means as lay within their power. In this view the necessary fleet or fleets of small craft which all nations must provide to do the police-duty of the seas were left out of consideration. The heavy ships must be supported by colliers and scouting-ships, the latter to be the eyes of the fleet. Great Britain was strong in her strategic position in having naval stations in every part of the globe, not only as coaling-stations, but as naval stations for refitting, so essential now in the case of modern steam fleets. There could be but little doubt as to the requirements for scouting-vessels. The transatlantic liner was the ideal ship for this purpose, since she had large tonnage with great coal-carrying capacity, and speed enough to avoid a fight, which precluded the necessity of carrying a heavy battery; though she would naturally be fitted with a battery of light, rapid-fire guns, to enable her to repel torpedo-boats or destroyers. Being of large tonnage and high freeboard, these scouts could maintain their speed in all conditions of weather, and could fulfil in all respects the purpose for which they were intended. The torpedo-boat and the torpedoboat-destroyer had hitherto failed to be much more than a good dispatch-boat, and they had not done well for long-distance steaming without the aid of colliers, or "mothering" by the other vessels of the fleet. Up to the present, the usefulness of the submarine was speculative. At best they were but scarecrows to a blockading fleet, and, unhappily, Great Britain had had several serious experiences with this peculiar craft, both in being run down and by internal explosions of a serious nature. In regard to accidents from explosions she was not alone, for the same had occurred several times in American Holland submarines, though Rear-Admiral not with the same fatal results. The sad loss of Submarine "A1" Melville. had at least demonstrated the best mode of attack against the submarine, namely by a bold dash directly at the enemy, whether afloat or just submerged. There was no question at all in his mind of the destruction of the submarine, if struck by a speedy vessel of any kind, particularly by a deep-draught vessel of high speed. Such a ship could bear down upon a submarine with perfect immunity to herself; for no torpedo was likely to do damage to a vessel dashing head on toward the submarine or torpedo. The speed of the ship and the parting of the sea at the vessel's bows would carry the torpedo to either side clear of the attacking vessel. A great deal of discussion had taken place on what had been termed "putting many eggs in one basket"; yet this was what it was necessary to do if the fleet was to lie in the line of battle, and to give and take blows: and as more of the necessary qualities could be provided in the larger vessel than in the smaller one, he could see no reason, except the matter of experience, why the larger vessel should not prevail. If a mixed battery were considered essential for each class of ship, then the best battery for battleships would be 12-inch guns supplemented by 10-inch guns to balance the battery, and for armoured cruisers 10-inch guns with 8-inch guns to balance; all the batteries to be protected in turrets or behind casemates. If a mixed battery was not desired, and the ship in either case could carry its batteries well, then all 12-inch guns for battleships, and all 10-inch guns for armoured cruisers, should be used, supplemented in all cases with quick-firing guns for defence against torpedo-boats and destroyers. The plan of defence against submarines, if they were sighted, was to run them down with any fast vessel in the fleet, after the manner of hunting whales. The American service had been afflicted at times, like the British, with cliques running after strange gods: not only were peculiar ideas put forward in regard to the size and speed of ships, but men were often wiled away from their true reasoning powers by the idea of the weird and ghostly, or the impossible and ghastly; hoping to get something for nothing, or depending upon the submarine to do the duty of the battleship. In this he felt he was characterizing fairly the ideas of some officers of all navies. He had in mind a prominent officer of the American Navy who had appeared before the Board on Construction, and had pleaded that no battleship should have a speed of more than 15 knots per hour, at a time when every other nation was building 18-knot battleships, and some 19-knot and 20-knot ships. Thus did the idiosyncrasies of men run-and good men Rear-Admiral too, from whom better things were expected. In America faith Melville. was pinned to heavily armoured battleships and armoured cruisers of the heaviest class and high speed; and he believed that this was in agreement with the views of the best minds in Great Britain. 21 March, 1905. Sir GUILFORD L. MOLESWORTH, K.C.I.E., President, in the Chair. The discussion on Lord Brassey's Paper "Shipbuilding for the Navy" was continued and concluded. THE INST. C.E. VOL. CLXII.] E 28 March, 1905. Sir GUILFORD L. MOLESWORTH, K.C.I.E., President, in the Chair. (Paper No. 3516.) By CHARLES STUART RUSSELL PALMER, M. Inst. C.E. BEFORE proceeding to describe in this Paper the design and construction of the works undertaken for the water-supply of the Coolgardie district of Western Australia, it is necessary to touch briefly upon the history and topography of the district. Since the discovery of the great inland goldfield of Coolgardie in 1892, the career of the State of Western Australia, which previously had made but slow progress, has been uniformly successful; for the resulting mining population created a profitable market for the agricultural and pastoral produce of the well-watered coastal country, which was therefore rapidly settled on as railway facilities were afforded. The town of Coolgardie is situated about 350 miles from the west coast and about 250 miles from the south coast (Fig. 1); and, although along the sea-shore and for a considerable distance inland this part of Australia is well watered, the portion-say, 300 miles by 250 miles of the elevated tableland in the interior of which Coolgardie may be regarded as the centre is among the driest of the countries of the globe, the rainfall having been as little as 3 inches in a year. Moreover, the surface soil generally is very porous and so excessively saline that, except in rock-holes after rain, really fresh natural water is practically unknown, although repeated boring has proved the existence here and there underground of small quantities of fairly potable water. Coolgardie was discovered by pioneers who had pushed out, through this inhospitable country, for more than 200 miles from the terminus of the railway: they spread themselves over the length and breadth of the tableland already mentioned, discovering additional, though mostly smaller, goldfields. Their settlements, |