complete armoured belt of adequate thickness, namely, 9.8-inch and 7.8-inch, well designed defensive power, an extensive radius of action, and a speed equal to that of the best. cruisers, the Vittorio Emanuele' would be much superior to the cruisers proposed in the French Naval programme."

With limited resources, the Italian constructors have borne a leading part in the evolution of armoured shipbuilding. Their ships have been remarkable for boldness of conception and excellence of workmanship. They are well satisfied with their latest production. The design for the "Vittorio Emanuele III." was prepared under the direction of Admiral Morin, Minister of Marine, the aim having been to produce a powerful vessel of war, of relatively moderate dimensions and cost. The considerations in view have been set forth in an interesting Paper by Colonel V. E. Cuniberti. It was easy enough to increase the number of eggs-in other words, to increase the fighting-efficiency-when the basket was enlarged. Cost could not, however, be disregarded, even by the wealthiest nations; and there were considerations of fighting efficiency. There was an advantage in superior numbers. Considerations which must have great weight in Italy cannot be wholly disregarded by a British naval administration. No country is so wealthy as to be able to make unlimited appropriations to new construction. The most despairing of pessimists could hardly propose that England should go beyond the combined shipbuilding of France, Germany, and Russia.

In growth of dimensions, Great Britain, departing in these later days from the shipbuilding policy of the age of Nelson and Collingwood, has ever led the way. There is no cause to speak disparagingly of the big ships, nor to wish that there were one less on the British Navy List. England's constructors have served their country well. The nation has had in succession Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, Sir William White, and Mr. Philip Watts. Such men never stand still. They have not been restricted as to dimensions. Parliament has been liberal. The Government has been encouraged by popular sentiment-rather be it said by sound public opinion-to spend freely on the Navy. In the hands of skilful naval architects, increased dimensions give a more than proportionate gain in fighting-efficiency. Each new design for British battleships has shown a marked advance upon the preceding type. There are none better under any flag. It may be claimed that England has led the way in these splendid creations of the labour and ingenuity of man. Let the credit which is his due be given to Sir William White,

There are arguments on the other side. In the mêlée of a naval battle, numbers must tell; and if the units are less costly, they can be built in larger numbers. The largest ships have no immunity from the dangers of darkness and of fog, from stranding and collision, from injury below the belt-from the blow of the ram or the torpedo, or the explosion of submarine mines. In the present war one Russian and one-possibly two-Japanese battleships have been destroyed by mines. Three Russian battleships have been torpedoed.

It is not only below the belt that the large ships are as vulnerable as those of less dimensions. Conning-towers cannot afford perfect protection to commanders. The captain steering for an enemy must keep him always in view. The risk of exposure must be faced. The most precious life is the most exposed: it is as the heel of Achilles. And then there are the hydrographical conditions-the many harbours which heavy ships cannot enter, and the long stretches of coast which they cannot approach. The Baltic is a shallow sea. English ships must pass to and fro through the Suez Canal, difficult of approach through shoals and banks deposited by the mud-laden Nile. Much has been heard lately of the North Sea. Within the wide area lying between a line from the Texel to the Spurn, and from Cape Gris Nez to Dungeness, even for the boldest and most expert seaman navigation must be difficult with ships of 20,000 tons in charge.

In the discussion on the Paper by Sir John Hopkins, already referred to, Sir Edmund Fremantle laid stress upon the hindrances to the action of any fleet consisting of ships of deep draught. Copenhagen and the Nile were fought in shallow waters. And, to quote some later experiences, when Sir Geoffrey Hornby led the Mediterranean fleet into the Sea of Marmora, his flagship lay for some hours aground in the narrows of the Dardanelles under the fire of the Turkish guns. So, too, at the bombardment of the forts of Alexandria, only two ships could cross the bar, and close with the works erected by Arabi Pasha. The fire from the "Condor," in a well-chosen position, was more effective than that from heavier ships at too great a distance.

And there may be assailants which it will be difficult for the heavy battleships to keep at bay. Unarmoured destroyers cannot withstand the hail of bullets from their quick-firing armaments; but a determined attack by a group of destroyers protected by armour-say armoured torpedo-rams-might be very formidable. The armoured torpedo-ram is no new conception. The "Polyphemus" was a first specimen of the type, Faults---inevitable

when all is novel-might be corrected. It should not be difficult to design a vessel of the same class, heavily armoured, of high speed, armed with torpedo-tubes and with one heavy gun in the bows. Many might be built for the cost of one battleship. Armoured rams might do more than the heavy ships to decide the issue of a hard-fought day.

A few words on submarines seem to be called for. There is a consensus of opinion that they are valuable for harbourdefence ability to navigate the seas has yet to be proved. In a sense, it may be said that the submarine is the arm of the feeble; it is essentially a defensive weapon. The British Admiralty has never been foremost in the construction of such vessels. There was hesitation in the case of the submarines; but a decision having been come to that they were required for the Navy, building has been pushed forward vigorously. The official list from which the foregoing figures have been taken gives the number of submarines built or under construction for the British Navy at twenty-nine. The Committee on the French Navy Estimates for 1905 contrast the hesitating policy of their own country with the more decisive action taken on this side of the Channel. France has been building submarines since 1886. In 18 years she has fifty-eight submarines, built or being built, while Great Britain in 5 years has, as stated, a total of twenty-nine. In the presence of eminent professional authorities, it is not necessary for a layman to say more on such a highly technical problem.

As already said, Great Britain has led the way in increasing dimensions. All the battleships now under construction for the British Navy are ships of 17,000 tons, their cost, in round figures, being not less than £1,500,000 each. Five battleships of similar cost and displacement are being built for the French Navy. France has followed with reluctance. The eight largest battleships now building for Germany are those of the "Deutschland" and "Braunschweig" classes, of 13,200 tons. The battleships built for Germany are not rated as inefficient. The Italian ships, as already pointed out, are of less dimensions. An illustration of what is contended for may be given. Assume that it is required to reinforce the Navy by putting afloat a given number of guns of a certain calibre and mounted behind armour. Assume an irreducible minimum of speed. Is it better to concentrate the required number of guns in few ships, or to distribute those guns in more ships? The armament of the "Lord Nelson" consists of four 12-inch and ten 9.2-inch guns. The same guns could be mounted in two ships of the "Vittorio Emanuele III." type. The cost of

the "King Edward VII." may be taken at £1,500,000; the cost of two ships of the Italian type would be £2,000,000. Is the advantage of two ships to one worth the extra cost? The Author submits that the answer should be in the affirmative. Looking to the maritime powers of Europe as those which England must be prepared to meet, it does not appear necessary that all fighting ships of the British Navy should be of the same dimensions, and as costly as the latest types. Appropriations to new construction cannot be unlimited. It would seem desirable that some of the British battleships should be of the same type as those now being built for Italy and Germany. It is not for a revolution in shipbuilding policy that the Author would contend; but it does appear desirable that some vessels should be adapted for narrow and shallow waters.

The cruisers may next be considered; but not with a view to criticism of any vessels now under construction. The latest British examples will well bear comparison with those under construction elsewhere. They steam 22 knots; they are well protected by armour, and are powerfully armed. In the cruiser class two types are necessary. In the scouts of the fleet, speed and coal-endurance are the essential qualities. In cruisers for the protection of commerce, fighting-efficiency must be combined with speed and coal-endurance.

Dealing first with the armoured type, the dimensions must be large. Cruisers for the protection of commerce must range the open ocean. They are not exposed, in the same degree as battleships must be, to the risk of destruction by the ram, the torpedo, or the submarine mine. In the opinion of the Committee on the French Navy estimates, speed, protection, armament, and long coal-endurance necessitate displacements of 15,000 tons. England needs powerful armoured cruisers, nor is the Admiralty neglecting to build them. The list of cruisers now building includes three ships of the "Minotaur" class, of 14,600 tons, and six of the "Duke of Edinburgh" class, of 13,550 tons. In addition, there are on the Navy List four armoured cruisers of the "Drake" class, of 14,100 tons, and the "Powerful" and "Terrible," of similar tonnage. For the French Navy one large armoured cruiser only, the "Edgard Quinet," has been laid down. For the German Navy two ships of 11,200 tons are proposed. It may be argued that the British cruisers, though of much larger dimensions, are not superior in fighting-efficiency to the Italian battleships. The superiority of the British ships would be found in their seakeeping qualities-in their high freeboard-very necessary for the

health of crews on long cruises, and giving a great advantage in steaming head to sea.

Turning to cruisers for scouting duties, as the dimensions advance, the numbers which the wealthiest nation can build must be less. Can scouts be supplied to the Navy without specially building for this service? As a first reserve of scouts for the fleet, the numerous British cruisers protected by armoured decks, but without sufficient protection by vertical armour, would be looked to. With the increasing power of quick-firing guns and explosive shell, such vessels, as the experiences of the war in the Far East have shown, can hardly be reckoned as combatants. The "Rossia"-fast, heavily armed, but without sufficient protection -was compelled to retreat before the Japanese squadron into Vladivostock, and the "Rurik" was sunk.

Looking next outside the Navy, the mercantile auxiliary has not been in favour. The annual subsidies are grudgingly paid; and naval opinion is sceptical as to the value of these ships. On the list of reserve cruisers some vessels have been put which should not be there: it is the ocean greyhound, and only the greyhound, that is needed for the Navy. If the ships were selected with more care, the mercantile auxiliary might be of great value. Valuable professional advice is available in this -matter. In giving evidence before the Select Committee on Steamship Subsidies Lord Charles Beresford said: "The word · cruiser' is a mistake. The words 'armoured cruiser' are a greater mistake, and the only use these vessels can be to us in war, as admirals fighting the nation's battles, is for the lines of communication. An Admiral can say to one of them (taking the question of the French fleet leaving Cherbourg), Go to Cherbourg, let me know when they leave, and you must be back here in so many hours, at Gibraltar or Malta, after leaving Cherbourg.' Those ships can do it; there are no other ships in the world that can do it better than the ocean greyhounds that are built for speed in any weather. That is their utility."

6

Lord Charles Beresford asked for eight ships. In the stress of war, when the success of all the operations undertaken must essentially depend on the completeness of the information obtained as to an enemy's movements, more than eight ships would be required. "More frigates! More frigates!" was the memorable cry of Nelson, paralysed by the lack of news.

In this connection the Author may refer briefly to the policy of steamship-subsidies, recently considered by a Committee of the House of Commons, though mainly in relation to trade. In the