the contract be so entered into for money, payable at a place on a day certain, and no interest be stipulated, and payment be delayed, interest by way of damages shall be allowed, according to the law of the place of payment, where the money may be supposed to have been required by the creditor for use, and where he might be supposed to have borrowed money to supply the deficiency thus occurring, and to have paid the rate of interest of that country." If a note made in Boston and payable in California were demanded in California and unpaid, and afterwards put in suit in Massachusetts, and personal service made on the promisor there, we should say that any interest which it bore should be recovered, provided it were lawful in California. And indeed, generally, that such a note, being made in good faith, might always bear any interest lawful where it was payable. So it would be if the note were made in Boston, and payable in New York, with seven per cent interest. But a note made in Boston, and intended in fact to be paid in Boston, and bearing seven per cent interest, could not escape the usury laws of Massachusetts merely by being written payable in New York.

In everything relating to process and remedy, the lex fori (by which Latin phrase is meant the law of the forum or court, or of the place where the suit is brought) prevails over every other. This is true of arrest. Thus, in a suit between. A and B, both resident in England, on a contract made between them in Portugal, the contract was interpreted according to the laws of Portugal, but the remedy was taken according to the laws of England where the suit is brought; that is, A could arrest B in England for a debt which accrued in Portugal, while both resided there, although the Portuguese law does not allow of arrest for debt. In New York, where a seal is necessary to constitute a deed, the action peculiar to sealed instruments will not lie on a contract to be performed in Pennsylvania, with a scrawl and the word seal in the place of the seal, though, by the law of Pennsylvania, this constitutes a seal.

The form of action relates to the remedy, and is governable. by the law of the forum. This is also true of the statutes of limitation and of prescription. Thus, a foreigner, bringing in Massachusetts an action on a simple contract debt more than

six years after it accrued, would find his action barred by our statute of limitation, although the debt accrued in his own. country, where there might be a longer limitation, or none at all.

SECTION V.

OF DOMICILE.

It is sometimes important, and very difficult, to determine where a person has his domicile, or HOME. In general, it is his residence; or that country in which he permanently resides. He may change it by a change of place both in fact and in intent, but not by either alone. Thus, a citizen of New York, going to London and remaining there a long time, but without the intention of relinquishing his home in New York, does not lose that home. And if he stays in New York, his intention to live and remain abroad does not affect his domicile until he goes in fact.

He may have his legal domicile in one place, and yet spend a very large part of his time in another. But he cannot have more than one domicile. His words or declarations are not the only evidence of his intent; and they are much stronger evidence when against his interest, than when they are in his favor. Thus, one goes from Boston to England. If he goes intending not merely to travel, but to change his residence permanently, and not to return to this country unless as a visitor, he changes his domicile from the day that he leaves this country. Let us suppose, however, that he is still regarded by our assessors as residing here, although travelling abroad, and is heavily taxed accordingly. If he can prove that he has abandoned his original home, he escapes from the tax which he must otherwise pay. Now, his declarations that he has no longer a home here, and that his residence is permanently fixed in England, and the like, would be very far from conclusive in his favor, and could indeed be hardly received as evidence at all, unless they were connected with facts and circumstances. But if it could be shown that he had constantly asserted that he was

still an American, that he had no other permanent residence, no home but that which he had temporarily left as a traveller, such declarations would be almost conclusive against him. In general, such a question would be determined by all the words and acts, the arrangement of property at home, the length and the character of the residence abroad, and all the facts and circumstances which would indicate the actual intention and understanding of the party.

Two cases have occurred in the city of Boston, which illustrate this question. In one, a citizen of Boston, who had been at school in the city of Edinburgh when a boy, and formed a predilection for that place as a residence, and had expressed a determination to reside there if he ever should have the means of so doing, removed with his family to that city, in 1836, declaring, at the time of his departure, that he intended to reside abroad, and that if he should return to the United States he should not live in Boston. He resided in Edinburgh and vicinity, as a housekeeper, taking a lease of an estate for a term of years, and endeavored to engage an American to enter his family for two years, as instructor of his children. Before he left Boston, he made a contract for the sale of his mansionhouse and furniture there, but shortly afterwards procured said contract to be annulled, (assigning as his reason therefor, that, in case of his death in Europe, his wife might wish to return to Boston,) and let his house and furniture to a tenant. Held, that he had changed his domicile, and was not liable to taxation as an inhabitant of Boston in 1837. In the other case, a native inhabitant of Boston, intending to reside in France, with his family, departed for that country in June, 1836, and was followed by his family about three months afterwards. His dwelling-house and furniture were leased for a year, and he hired a house for a year in Paris. At the time of his departure he intended to return and resume his residence in Boston, but had not fixed on any time for his return. He returned in about sixteen months, and his family in about nine months afterwards. Held, that he continued to be an inhabitant of Boston, and that he was rightly taxed there, during his absence, for his person and personal property. This last case was distinguished from the former, by the different intent of the parties upon their departure from home.

It is a general rule, that, if one has a domicile, he retains it until he acquires another. Thus, if a seaman, without family or property, sails from the place of his nativity, which may be considered his domicile of origin, although he may return only at long intervals, or even be absent for many years, yet, if he does not, by some actual residence or other means, acquire a domicile elsewhere, he retains his domicile of origin.

It seems to be agreed that one may dwell for a considerable time, and even regularly during a large part of the year, in one place, or even in one State, and yet have his domicile in another. If one resides in Boston five months in the twelve, including the day on which residency determines taxation, and the other seven months at his house in the country, he will be taxed in Boston, and may vote there, and his domicile is there..

A woman marrying takes her husband's domicile, and changes it with him. A minor child has the domicile of his father, or of his mother if she survive his father; and the surviving parent, with whom a child lives, by changing his or her own domicile in good faith, changes that of the child. And even a guardian has the same power.

CHAPTER XX.

OF THE LAW OF SHIPPING.

SECTION I

OF THE OWNERSHIP AND TRANSFER OF SHIPS.

THE Law of Shipping may be considered under three divisions. First, as to ownership and transfer of ships. Second, as to the employment of ships as carriers of goods, or of passengers, or both. Third, as to the navigation of ships. We begin with the first topic.

Ships are personal property; or, in other words, a ship is a chattel; and yet its ownership and transfer are regulated in this country by rules quite analogous to those which apply to real property.

In ex

The Constitution of the United States gives to Congress the power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce. ecution of this power, acts were passed in 1792, and immediately after, which followed substantially (with one important exception, to be hereafter noticed) the Registry and Navigation Laws of England, one of which had been in force about a century and a half. The English laws were intended to secure English commerce to Englishmen and English ships; and it was supposed that the commercial prosperity of England was in a great measure due to them.

To secure the evidence of the American character of a vessel, the statute of 1792 provides for an exact system of registration in the custom-house. There is no requirement of registration. The law does not say that a ship shall or must be registered, but that certain ships or vessels may be; and if they are registered, they shall have certain privileges. And the disadvantage of being without registry operates as effectually as positive requirement with a heavy penalty could do.

The ships which may be registered are those already regis