I have the honor to enclose the report of the proceedings of the commissioners appointed to meet at Amboy, the 9th instant, for the purpose of settling a general cartel, by which Congress will perceive, that the present attempt has been as unsuccessful as all the former, and from the same cause. In January I was honored with a letter from the minister of France, informing me of his having received advice from Europe, that the court of London, on account of the difficulty they found in procuring men, had instructed their commander-in-chief here to treat with us on a national footing, rather than fail to obtain a reinforcement to their army by the release of their prisoners in our hands. He added, that he had communicated this intelligence to Congress, and that Congress had requested him to transmit it to me, as a matter which ought materially to influence the measures we were about to take on the subject of an exchange.

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Though I was strongly persuaded beforehand, that there was a mistake in his Excellency's information, and that the advantages to be reaped by the enemy from the proposed exchange would not be a sufficient inducement to a step of the nature it imported, which I took the liberty to signify to him, yet I thought it my duty to make the experiment, as well from motives of respect to the communication, as from the possibility of its being well founded. I therefore directed our commissioners to take every method to ascertain the enemy's views on this head, and, if the British commissioners did not come with national powers, to decline doing any thing with them in an official capacity; but, after satisfying themselves that nothing was to be effected on a larger scale, they were instructed to enter into private conversation on the terms of particular exchange. Their letter will show what was done in consequence. Congress will perceive, that their proposal was not accepted by the gentlemen on the other side, who insisted on the exchange being at all events extended to one half of the second division of the con

vention troops. This was a departure from the plan concerted between General Phillips and Colonels Magaw and Mathews. If Congress think that humanity requires or policy permits us to accede to the enemy's ultimatum, I shall be happy to execute their orders; but it is a point of so much delicacy and importance, that I cannot forbear earnestly requesting that I may be excused from deciding in it. On the one hand, the acquisition of so many men will be of great moment to the enemy, if they meet with success at the southward; on the other, I see not how we shall be able to maintain our officers in captivity, and the expense is no trifling consideration. I think it necessary to observe, that if the enemy's proposal should be accepted, it may be

June before the prisoners can be delivered up; but perhaps it will be judged advisable to delay a determination till the probable issue of southern affairs is a little unfolded. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO PHILIP SCHUYLER, IN CONGRESS.

MY DEAR SIR,

Head-Quarters, 31 March, 1780.

I was about to fulfil the promise made to you in my last, of writing fully on the subject of your letter and other matters, when your obliging favor of the 22d came to hand. The hint contained in it was too seasonable and striking for me not to derive a lesson from

* It turned out, that the enemy had not the remotest idea of treating on national grounds. Perhaps it was not to be expected; and yet, as there could be no fair exchange except on terms of equality, it would seem that the difficulty lay more in the form of words, than in the substance of the thing. The national faith was as much plighted on one side as the other, and the King was as much bound in honor to confirm the contracts of his generals, as Congress was to sanction those of General Washington. The difference was, that Congress pledged themselves beforehand to abide by his acts, whereas the British commanders took care so to express all the instructions to their commissioners as to make it appear, that these instructions emanated from no higher authority than themselves. If a consent to treat on national grounds, as it was called, would seem to imply the political independence of the Americans, it should have been likewise considered, that the course pursued was a standing reproach upon them as rebels; and if the former was unpalatable to one party, the latter must have been equally so to the other. It was a case, therefore, which required mutual concessions, especially as both parties, in regard to the matter in hand, stood on equal grounds, had the same interests at stake, and would be equally benefited or injured by the result. It was not a subject in which political considerations ought to have interfered. Justice and humanity had superior claims. There might and should have been an explicit understanding, that agreements for the exchange of prisoners should have no bearing on the other relations between the parties, and that the great points at issue should rest on precisely the same foun

it. I shall, therefore, as there is danger attending written communications of private sentiments, and my letters to the body of which you are a member will convey every occurrence and information of a public nature within my sphere of action, content myself with acknowledging and thanking you for the letters you may do me the favor to write.

I am much indebted to you for your communications from the southward. I feel many anxious moments on account of the Carolinas, which are increased by the daily diminution of our force in this quarter, the little

dation, as if no occurrences of this sort had taken place. Upon this basis there could never have been any substantial political obstacles in the way of an equitable exchange of prisoners. But there were reasons, perhaps, why neither party was inclined to propose such a basis, or even to adopt it if proposed.

Respecting the negotiation for a cartel at Amboy, mentioned above, General Phillips wrote as follows to Lord George Germain.

"This attempt for a general cartel and exchange has proved ineffectual, as every former one had done, founded on an objection to the powers given by Sir Henry Clinton; and your Lordship will directly observe the great object of the American Congress is to mark some public act, in which General Washington may be concerned with Sir Henry Clinton in character of equality with Great Britain, on principles of nation against nation at war; and the positive declaration of the American commissioners on this matter fully evinces the fact, and that a general cartel can never possibly take place on any other ground, which it may be imagined will never be suffered by Great Britain. In a number of attempts to release the troops of convention, the matter has broken off under several descriptions. At one time the American Congress would not exchange the troops in corps; at another they were willing to exchange private soldiers to a certain number, but it was never understood what number or in what manner. Interested as I have been, it has led me to hold conversations with a number of American officers, proving to them that the troops of convention stood under a particular description, and that exchanging the officers without the men against American officers prisoners of war could not be considered as equal, the American officers going to an immediate activity of service, and the convention officers not doing so, as the regiments to which they belonged would still be in captivity; and, however eligible and convenient for the officers themselves, it would be of no advantage to the King's service.". New York, March 25th.