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effects of the excellent code of laws which he has established; whatever were their motives for acting the part they did, it is certain they never gave that support to the new government which it was asserted they had given. On the contrary, though Napoleon was compelled, by reverse of fortune, almost to abandon Holland to its fate,

ple saw nothing worth fighting for. At least, having had a trial of Buonaparte's government, they were not, perhaps, so very tired of it as to determine, all at once, to sacrifice their lives for the new king, of whose government they had had no trial, and which had nothing more favourable in its aspect than the former to recommend it. This train of reasoning was naturally to be" the Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands" expected of a people so proverbially phleg- has not been able to clear his kingdom of matic as the Dutch. The page of history French troops, even with the assistance of no doubt represents that nation, at one pe- at least 10,000 of our best troops, an incalriod, engaged in a gallant and successful culable quantity of military stores, and a opposition to foreign domination. But in sum of money from this country fully adethat case the consequence of submission was quate to his views. But men and money the entire loss of independence, while the can accomplish nothing in the cause of a advantages of resistance were manifest and sovereign, when that cause, as is evidently incalculably great. In the present instance, the case here, is not also the cause of the and supposing them to have been stript of people. This is a fact of which we ought to, their political rights by Buonaparte, it no (and I am certain might) have informed ourwhere appears that the Prince of Orange selves better than we did, when we espousintended to restore them. On the contra- ed the interests of the house of Orange. ry, his Royal Highness took upon himself Had we acted in this cautious and prudent the title of a king, and, it is to be pre- manner, we might have avoided the dissumed, he has since exercised all the powers grace which must attend the withdrawing of sovereignty. It is true, the noise and our troops from Holland, without accomclamour which the first news of this coun- plishing the object for which they were sent ter-revolution occasioned, and the impor- thither; and we might have saved the tance which government attached to it, ope- Prince of Orange the mortification which rated, for a while, to make some believe he must feel if, as is likely to happen, he that the people of Holland had in truth should be forced to relinquish a crown, thrown off the French yoke. In the House which was assumed without any calculation of Commons it was said, by Lord Castle- of chances as to the probability of his being reagh, that this revolution was "the result able to retain it. But instead of acting "of the spontaneous and unanimous wish in this way, the proceedings were gone into of the people of Holland of all parties;" with the greatest rashness by the managers and the event was every where hailed as a in this political drama, and the lookers on, triumph of freedom over oppression. But without any regard to the consequences, the less credulous were not long in discover- displayed the most consummate folly in the jug that the people had nothing to say in the applause which they gave to the first act of business; that they interested themselves as a piece which so very soon disappointed little, perhaps less, in the fate of William their hopes, and which may now, in all the first, the "Sovereign Prince of the probability, terminate fatally to the indivi"Netherlands," as what they did in the duals who were urged on, by the most flatfate of the Emperor Napoleon. In no tering promises, to become the chief actors. shape did they justify Lord Castlereagh's But this is not all. Our news-paper press, statement; for if the impulse had been with its usual regard for truth and justice, spontaneous and unanimous in favour of has commenced an indiscriminate and William, this would have been seen in its abusive attack upon the people of Holland corresponding effects. All Holland would and the house of Orange, because the result have been in arms to make good the claims of the event which they were so active in of the house of Orange. Like France, the promoting (and on the failure of which voice of the sovereign would have aroused every judicious person might easily have the people; like France they would have calculated) has not been what they expectunited their fortunes to his; and, like ed, and what they were so forward in tellFrance, they would have discomfited the ing the public it would assuredly be. The armies, and baffled the projects of all the Times paper, which takes the lead when combined Powers of Europe. But no- any dirty work is to be performed, has the Dutch were actuated by no such feel- opened its budget of abuse with the following. Whether they were attached to Buo-ing article:- "The Dutch proceed very naparté, or had experienced the beneficial leisurely in their efforts to distinguish

themselves among the allied nations. Gorcum was taken possession of on the 20th justant; but Naarden, even yet, shows no indication of an intention to surrender. It is difficult to say whether this supineness reflects more discredit on the people or on the government; but we cannot help thinking, that one or the other must be much to blame to suffer the existence of any foreign garrison in the heart of their country so long after all external dauger has been removed from the frontiers. Do they still allow the traitor Verhuel to insult them with impunity? Do they not look on the fortresses occupied by a foreign force, as the very badges of their recent slavery, most into lerable to the eyes of freemen?-The other allied powers have a right to expect that Holland shall not set an example of apathy in the sacred cause. Unless they see in her a spirit to maintain her independence, they will hardly venture to guarantee, much less to secure it by stronger barriers, or new accessions of territory; and if the House of Orange does not act up to its hereditary greatness, it will be ill suited to an union with that of Brunswick.". -So, if the Dutch people, according to this writer, do not make common cause with the Allies against France, they are to be punished with the loss of independence, and of new accessions of territory; and if the Prince of Orange does not do what his subjects will not let him do; if he does not accomplish an impossibility, he is to be punished also, by denying to his son his affianced bride, the Princess Charlotte of Wales, who, we have long known, was destined to be the wife of the hereditary Prince of Orange. I dare say the Dutch people feel themselves very little interested in the business. To them it must appear a matter of indifference whether the man who is to be their ruler marries a greasy Hottentot or a refined European. Their views chiefly centre in commerce, and from the experience which they have acquired during the last 20 years, I am inclined to think, if the question were asked them, that they would prefer an alliance with Buonaparte's family to that of every other, because they would find it more conducive to their interest. But to punish the house of Orange for the fault of another; for misplaced confidence in the patriotism of a nation, after being assured by Lord Castlereagh that that nation had spontaneously and unanimously declared in their favour, would be a species of cruelty and injustice unexampled in history. The most absurd and curious part of the Times' statement is,

that which respects the Allies. It appears, that it was at one time in contemplation to enlarge the ancient boundaries of Holland by "new accessions of territory," and this idea is fully warranted by the new title which William the First assumed when he landed in Holland. But it is not so clear that the allied powers were parties to this arrangement, or that it had even been communicated to them prior to that Prince's declaration. It seems to have originated entirely with this country; and as a proof that neither the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, nor Prussia were consulted in the business, we find them, at the breaking out of the counter-revolution, offering to Napoleon to recognise the title of his brother Louis to the crown of Holland. It was our interest undoubtedly, in the event of a family compact, that that kingdom should be enlarged. Though this might not give us direct possession, it would extend our influence on the Continent; and, what is of far greater consequence, enable us to cripple the maritime power of Buonaparte. Here is the true secret of our anxious wishes for the restoration of the Orange family. Not the emancipation of the Dutch people from the tyrant of France, but the establishment of an order of things in Holland, which would enlarge our political influence, and increase our means of annoying our greatest enemy. Hence our wish to get possession of Antwerp; hence our anxiety to burn or get into our power the Scheldt Heet, and hence the virulence of the Times, the Courier, and the whole tribe of hireling writers, against Admiral Verhuel, whom they impudently denominate a traitor, because he is acting in strict conformity to his oath of allegiance, and in a way which does credit to his valour and to his integrity. Instead of landing the army under General Graham at a point where, from the well-known skill and courage of that gallant officer, something might have been effected, in conjunction with the Allies, of importance to the common cause, these troops were ordered to take the nearest route to Antwerp, in the expectation, no doubt, that that place, amidst the consternation and confusion which prevailed, would be taken by surprise, or present a feeble resistance to a besieging army. Could the Allies be ignorant of all this? Are they so stupid as not to have discovered in this proceeding the particular object we had in view? Is it to be supposed that they are not aware of the policy which influences Great Britain in her hostility. against France? that it is the annihilation

of her maritime power which we aim at; | which have been used to bring Murat round and that, this once effected, they may perhaps to the cause of the Allies, I could not for a find it necessary at no very distant period, to moment have hesitated as to the fact. It arm against us in defence of their own naval no where appears that Britain is to allow rights. In these circumstances, it is ridi- the King of Naples a subsidy in money, as culous to talk of the Allies having a right we do Bernadotte for his magnanimous conto expect any thing from the people of duct. But Murat has received, and actualHolland. It must, in the first instance, ly taken possession of territory, as a bonus be shown that the Sovereigns of Europe are for joining in the "sacred cause," equal in disposed to forward our views as to that point of real value to the whole kingdom of country; that they are willing the succes- Naples.The Courier at first told us sion to the crown should be fixed in the that Murat was "to have an accession of Orange family; that the proposed matrimo-" territory from the Papal States." It apnial alliance with this country should be carried into effect; and that they are inclined to submit to the vast accession of maritime" power which this would eventually give

us.

It is proper, I say, to clear up these necessary points, before we presume to threaten the Dutch people or the house of Orange; because we night, perhaps, find, as we have often done, when it was too late, that it is one thing to manage a government and a people when they look upon us as friends, and another when we have made them our enemies by our arrogant and unjust pretensions. Whatever the aggregate of the English nation may think, it is very clear to me, that the allied powers will not stand by and suffer Great Britain to maintain the sovereignty of the seas, while their own rights, as naval powers possessing a large extent of sea coast, are compromised; nor do I believe they will permit France, Holland, or the other maritime states, to become a prey to the inordinate ambition of any sovereign, be his power and pretensions what they may.

pears, however, he has not only got a part, but the whole of these States; he has taken possession of the south of Italy as far as the right bank of the Po."Why the Allies should have given up so much; why they should have sacrificed so large a portion of this fine country, for the mere cooperation of a Power like Naples, has excited a good deal of surprise. Our newspapers, such as the Times and the Courier, have attempted to create doubts as to the arrangement, on account of the very advantageous terms obtained by Murat.-Others again, while they give implicit credit to the fact, have thought they discovered some symptoms in the transaction of a scheme, a stratagem, on the part of Napoleon, to save Naples from falling into the hands of the Allies, at a moment when, from the dangers which threatened him on all sides, he could not afford her any succours in case she should be attacked by a superior force.As to the apparent defection of Murat, I see no reason to doubt this because he has obtained better terms than the Times and Courier would have allowed MURAT, KING OF NAPLES.- I dare him. But I have not discovered any thing say the Emperor Napoleon begins to think which enables me to form a positive opinion that the kings he was lately so active in as to the other point-namely, that the making, have turned out rather scurvy whole is the result of a deep policy on the fellows. First, Bernadotte deserts his part of Napoleon to preserve Naples. This cause, leagues with the Allies, and then may be the case; it is likely enough; but, invades France, regardless of what fools as far as is yet seen, nothing positive can be may say about patriotism, and rebellion advanced on the subject. Still, sufficient has against one's country. Then comes the al- transpired to satisfy me, that Murat has leged defection of Murat, a personage not been a willing instrument in the busi whom, we had every reason to believe, ness, but has yielded only to circumstances, was the particular favourite of Buonaparte, which he could not control. In short, and who always evinced a decided attach- that it was necessity, as in the case of the ment to his cause. It was some time, I Danes, which led him to join the Allies. confess, before I could persuade myself that In proof of this, we have his own proclathis last sovereign of Napoleon's creation mation, published at Milan, on the 17th of had followed the example of the "great January, which runs as follows:-"Mi"Prince of Sweden," and, like him, taken | " lan, Jan. 30th. The King of Naples, up arms against his native country. But on the 17th inst. issued the following this reluctance on my part, I now find, was "proclamation:-Having, for sundry owing to inattention; for if I had consider- weighty causes, found ourselves OBLIGED. to adopt measures for being admitted into

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"the Alliance of the States united against "France, we have in this instance been "successful. We have given up the three "islands situated opposite to Naples, and "our whole fleet: but for this we are to "have a sufficient compensation. We are "going to take possession of the South of "Italy, as far as to the right bank of the "Po. We shall always remember our "duty; and those persons in office who "have always performed their's, and who "have made no opposition to our measures, "may assuredly reckon on our protection, "and on keeping their respective posts.'

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-From this document it is sufficiently clear, that Murat was obliged, from "sun"dry weighty causes" not explained, to solicit an alliance with the powers" united "against France." It requires very little penetration to discover what these causes were. He could not be ignorant of the recent disasters of France, on which alone Naples can depend for assistance in the hour of danger. Surrounded on all sides by the enemies of that sovereign to whom he owed every thing, it was, indeed, a wise and profound policy on the part of the Neapolitan king to avert the threatening storm by conciliation. Whether this was the result of Buonaparte's schemes or not, it seems to me that terms have been obtained by Naples, much more favourable than she had any reason to expect. These, indeed, have excited the indignation of the Gourier, which exclaims, "A sufficient compensation with a vengeance! for as "the Po, having its source in the Alps in "Savoy, flows into the sea, north of Co"machio, Murat would, besides Naples, "have all the Papal States, Tuscany, "Modena, Parma, Bologna, &c. !!" It is no way surprising to find our hireling press venting its spleen in this way; but it is somewhat singular, if we can believe Buonaparté serious, to see him censuring the conduct of Murat, recalling, as he has done, all Frenchmen from Naples, and denouncing them defaulters, who would be "pursued by the agents of the public go"vernment, "if they did not "return into "the territory of the empire within the space of three months." Napoleon is either acting a double part in the business, or he is become quite unreasonable if, as Murat says, he was actually obliged to adopt measures for being admitted into the alliance. By that step he has not only preserved Naples from being invaded by the Allies, but all Italy to the south of the Po; and young Beauharnois has shewn by his late successes, that the rest of Italy

Should

may safely be left to his care. Murat, however, have been influenced by motives really hostile towards Buonaparté, of which the latter, it must be acknowledged, is the best judge, he has only himself to blame for confiding so much as he has done in his generals, and showing so great a partiality for the craft of kingmaking. He may, perhaps, at this moment, be accusing himself, and repenting his illplaced confidence; but he should recollect, that kings are but men, whose vices and propensities do not always change with a change of circumstances. He should also remember, that he is not the first sovereign who has had to struggle against the treachery of friends. King Henry the Vth had much to complain of in that way; and although I never was a great admirer of Shakespeare, I cannot resist the temptation, for once, of giving an extract from the above play, which, I think, contains a pretty apt illustration of the point under consideration:

But oh! Ungrateful, savage, and inhuman monster! What shall I say to thee, LORD SCROOP, thou cruel, Thou that didst bear the key of all my counsels, That knew of the very bottom of my soul, That almost might'st have coin'd me into gold. May it be possible that foreign hire Would'st thou have practis'd on me for thy use? Could out of thee extract one spark of evil That might annoy my finger? Tis so strange, That though the truth of it stand off as gross As black and white, mine eye will scarcely see it. Treason and murder ever kept together As two yoke-devils, sworn to either's purpose, Working so grossly in a natural cause, That admiration did not whoop at them; But thou 'gainst all proportion didst bring in And whatsoever cunning fiend it was Wonder, to wait on treason and on murder; That wrought upon thee so preposterously, Hath got the voice in hell for excellence: And other devils that suggest by treasons With patches, colours, and with forms, being Do botch and bungle up damnations

fetched

From glittering semblances of piety;
But he that temper'd thee bade thee stand up,
Unless to dub thee with the name of traitor.
Gave thee as instance why thou shouldst do treason
If that same demon that hath gull'd thee thus,
Should, with his lion-gait, walk the whole world,
He might return to vasty Tartar back,
A soul so easily as I won his.
And tell the legions, I can never win

King Henry the Vth, Act the 2nd.

PEACE OR WAR?-If we are to judge from the altered tone of that vile press, which has, for twenty years, sacrificed every principle of justice, of honour, and of humanity, to its interested clamour for interminable war, the great question is now about to be settled, and Europe once more restored to a state of peace. Not many

amicable termination of the negociation. With such shallow-minded people, Great Britain is every thing; she is the fulcrum which moves and directs all the proceedings at Chatillon; she is the pivot upon which the whole must türn. To say nothing of France, with a population of 30 millions of people, who are now in a condition to dictate terms to their invaders, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and the whole of the confederates must, according to these sage politicians, submit to be controlled by the whim and caprice of this country; must prosecute the war if England resolves on war; must make peace if it suits her pleasure. Highly absurd and ridiculous as this must make us appear in the eyes of other nations, it is a sort of language not only to be found in the mouths of thousands who can neither read nor write, but, to their eternal disgrace, of thousands more who have received a liberal education, and, of course, ought to know better. In fact, the same false ideas with regard to national

days have elapsed since we were told in the Courier, that the Allies had determined not to make peace with the Emperor of France until they were in possession of his capital. This insolent language was doubtless suited to the narrow views of those who had been all along endeavouring to persuade the country, that France was sunk in a state of apathy, and unwilling to continue the contest any longer in support of its present government. It was language quite consistent with the assurances they gave their readers, that the Allies were actually in possession of Paris, and were about to "dethrone the tyrant," and restore to France the "mild and virtuous sway of the house of Bourbon." In fine, it was language every way becoming men who talked and boasted thus in the absence of the intelligence of Napoleon's victories, which, like a powerful talisman, has in one instant overthrown their vain and towering hopes, and converted their imperious exultation into doleful lamentations. Those, in particular, who were the most active in sound-importance and national superiority, pering the everlasting war-whoop, and who vades all ranks, and disgustingly obtrudes piously told us that "to make peace with itself upon our notice in every news-paper Buonaparte would be to make war against and political pamphlet which issues from virtue and against God," are now the most the press. The period is fast approaching forward in proclaiming their expectations when the eyes of mankind will be open to of an immediate peace. It has been this this horrible delusion, and when they will expectation, they say, which has led to be made sensible of the folly of treating another prorogation of parliament to the every other nation with contempt that does 21st instant, before which day, they con- not bow to the mandates of an unjust and fidently assure us, the preliminaries will imperious domination. But let peace come have been signed; not merely by the minis- when it may, it will be found, to our sad ters of Russia, Prussia, and the other con- experience, that it would have been more tinental powers, but also by Lord Castle- to the advantage of Great Britain if, instead reagh in behalf of this country. This is of assuming a dictatorial tone, and being what the newspapers, who pretend to be in the prime mover in the greater part, if not the secret, and who, only the other day, in all the coalitions that have been formed told us a very different story, would now against France, she had confined her views have us to believe is the state of the nego-to the improvement of her manufactures, to ciation for peace. It is possible that what they say may at last be true; these lying oracles may for once have spoken the truth, and many of their former dupes, notwithstanding the repeated proofs they have had of their total disregard of all honest principle, may credit every iota of it. For my part, however, I confess that peace, a general peace such as these newspapers have described, is an event which does not appear to me so very near. The recent disasters of the Allies, may have disposed the minds of those who manage our affairs at home, to pursue more peaceable measures with the French Emperor than we were lately taught to expect; and this may have superinduced a persuasion in some minds, that nothing now stands in the way of an

her agricultural pursuits, and to the encouragement of the other useful arts. Then, indeed, she might have been great; then she might have had reason to be proud of her superiority. But she preferred a state of ruinous warfare, which has had the effect of giving to the people against whom she fought, the pre-eminence she might have enjoyed; and caused herself to tremble at the prospect of peace, which she dreads because it must be fatal to millions, and place, the country in a situation in which it will poignantly feel all the pernicious effects consequent on the destructive system which has so long desolated Europe. No one can suppose me an enemy to peace, without supposing me destitute of the common feelings of humanity. But I cannot

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