leave it him? Or, did he acquire it, dur- "himself behind a screen, because, in his ing his campaigns; during the time, that" impatience to find pretexts for destroying he served under the Brissotines, Robespierre," Moreau, he could not wait for the rethe Directory, and Buonaparté; during the "port."Now, wind, nothing was done time that he was in the service of his coun- to Moreau upon this occasion. The thing try; aye, that very country, in fighting was either overlooked by Napoleon; or, there against the armies of which he, at last, re- was not sufficient evidence to proceed upon ceived the wound that put an end to his against the accused. If the former, it shews Jife? In the midst of those "sweets of the magnanimity of Napoleon; if the latter, "conjugal union," which the tender Rus- it shews, that the law, as established by sian tells us he enjoyed at Grosbois and at himself, was above his arbitrary will. Take Morrisville; in the midst of all the hospi- it which way you choose, the fact redounds tality and charity, in which he delighted to to his honour; for, upon the confession, dwell, did he not, now and then, look back and even the boasting, of this Russian, the and trace his fortune to its source? The Abbé was the bearer of a letter of friendMemoir does not do it for him; and, there- ship and approximation from Moreau to a fore, I will leave the task, not a very diffi- man, whom that very Moreau himself had cult one, to the good sense of every candid denounced as a trailor.- -We now reader, who will, I am sure, join me in come to the last and grand scene, on which laughing at such an attempt at the tender Moreau appeared in France; to his particisublime as is exhibited in this history of pation in the plot of Pichegru and Georges; -Morrisville and Grosbois.At Grosbois, his accusation; his trial, and his banishhowever, we left him, and back again we ment.We will here take the very must go to join him at Grosbois, where, as words of the Russian, and, I think, that, we read in the Memoir, he blamed, with before the English reader gets to the end of great frankness, all the acts of Napoleon; the extract, he will exclaim: if I must and that all Paris were well acquainted have some one to defend my memory, with what he said. Notwithstanding God defend me from the scribbling subthis, however, there he lived unmolested.jects of the Emperor of all the Russias!It is not to be supposed, that all Paris knew" Pichegru, sure of what were the senti what Napoleon was ignorant of; and,ments of his early friend, had directed therefore, the inevitable conclusion is, General Lajolais to him in 1803, in or that the latter either despised the blame der to become acquainted with the proof Moreau, or that he did not wish to jects which occupied him; ́ but Moreau hurt him, or, else, that the laws were having but little esteem for the latter, such, that he could not hurt him." had confined himself to assurances of the The Russian may take which supposition" entire interest he took in the fate of his he pleases. But, we now come to more friend, and of the desire which he had serious matter. In the beginning of 1802," of soon seeing him again in France. the Memoir tells us, that an Abbé David" Lajolais fancied he could interpret this conceived the idea of "approximating Pi- avowal as an invitation given to Piche❝chegru and Moreau, foreseeing that their " gru to repair thither, in order to concur ❝ union might one day be useful to France, "in the overthrow of the government of "and found from the very first overture," Buonaparte; and he came to London to "that Moreau was delighted with the "bring the positive assurance, that Moreau * idea.". David took a letter from Moreau was ready to connect himself with any to Pichegru, but was stopped by the Police," kind of project which should have that and was sent to the Temple," to expiate" for its object; and that he ardently dethe wrong of having wished to re-esta-“sired the presence of Pichegru at Paris. ❝blish between two great men, that confi-"He took good care not to say, that Mo"dence and friendship which had once united “reau had testified to him so little con** them."—And, was that all that this good "fidence, that he refused to lend him fifty son of the church had in view? Was that all?" louis d'or for his journey.--For several The sequel will shew us that it was not." months General Georges was in Paris, Pichegru was in England. What could to PREPARE the means of CARRYthis approximation mean? Did the AbbéING OFF BUONAPARTE by main intend to work a miracle, and bring Poland force, in one of his rides from Paris to Street, where Pichegru lived, close to Grosbois? We are told, that Buonaparte," during the examination of the Abbé, hid St. Cloud. The plan he had concerted with Pichegru was just at its maturity; and from day to day, advices were ex more so, the purpose, like another Ulysses, of bringing this Achilles to the battle, but against his country instead of for it here we have the plain and distinct avowal of this very man, whose work is circulated by the great means above spoken of, that Moreau is fully entitled to the honour of being ranked with Georges and Pichegru in the memorable plot of 1803, and that he was not hanged, but banished, and suffered to carry away a brilliant fortune.-If it be asked; if any one can ask, what crime he was guilty of, I will not name any. I will coutent myself with a recapitulation of the facts. What were they, then, as stated in this Memoir? That, in 1803, England being at war with France, Georges and Pichegru went from London to Paris, where, with divers others, they prepared a plot for CARRYING OFF the sovereign of that country, with whom England had recently made a treaty of peace and friendship, and for libelling whom Mr. Peltier had recently been found guilty in the English Court of King's Bench, the Chief Justice laying it down, that Buonaparte was the sovereign of France in fact, and ought to be so considered by us; that Georges and Pichegru, being at Paris for this purpose, and having prepared the means for putting it into execution, made known their designs to Moreau, who approved of those designs; and who agreed to be ready, with his party, to protect them in the execution of them; that the ultimate consequence was to be the restoration of the Bourbons.These are the facts. And, is it possible for any man, not divested of every just senti ment, to deny, that, in only banishing Moreau, Napoleon discovered more magnanimity than, in a like case, was to be ex "pected which were to determine the departure of the latter with two Princes of "the house of Bourbon. But what Lajo"lais announced of the intentions of Ge"neral Moreau, appeared too important not to encourage an attempt to profit by them immediately; and it was decided "that, as this General earnestly desired the presence of Pichegru in Paris, the "latter should set out directly to concert "with him. Moreau in fact testified to "his early friend how happy he was to see him, but he was far from guessing the project which brought him, and still that every thing was ready to "realize it.. Without disputing the "NECESSITY OF THE RE-ESTA"BLISHMENT OF THE BOURBON "FAMILY, Moreau still wished to prepare for it by gradations, which should bring over his own party, in which he "counted several republicans, to approve "and second it. Pichegru, who had con"certed every thing with Georges, and "who felt that any slowness of proceeding "might occasion the loss of the latter, and "of the people whom he had collected for "the audacious enterprise in contemplation, wished that Moreau should declare "himself immediately, and unconditionally "bind himself to the cause, of which he secretly desired the success. At length "Moreau, sacrificing his scruples to the security of his friend, and to his warm "entreaties, had agreed that those who had prepared the plan should execute it; and that in case of success, he should "place himself in advance with his party, "to protect them against the measures "which the partisans of Buonaparte might "take at the first moment to avenge him. "He decided too late: the police, en-pected even from the greatest of men?lightened by what Guerelle revealed, As to its being the design of these, men to "knew of the presence of Pichegru, and CARRY OFF Buonaparte, every reader of "Georges at Paris, and of their con- common sense will laugh at the idea; and, "nexion with Moreau; the latter was I cannot refrain from believing, that the first arrested.- All Europe knows English translator, knowing the taste of his the details of this disastrous, affair." readers better than his Russian original, Yes, the result is known. Georges has made free with the text, putting was hanged; Pichegru hanged himself in " carry off" for "take off." But, then prison; Moreau was banished; and great comes the outrageous absurdity of the thing. numbers of the inferior actors, with someTo suppose, that Georges and Pichegru and of the principal ones, were pardoned. Moreau, with a band of desperate men at We are here relieved from the necessity of their back; to suppose, that they could resorting to conjecture. Evidence itself mean to take Napoleon away as a girl is would now be useless. All room for dis- carried away to Gretna Green, is something pute and doubt are now completely remov- so farcical, that I will not longer dwell on ed; for here is the friend, the eulogist, the it; but will leave the reader to characterize companion of the last months of Moreau's the real design; to put himself, for a molife; the identical man who was selected forment, in the place of him against whom it *; 66 was meditated; to compare his conduct, upon this occasion, with that of other sovereigns under similar circumstances; and, then, to say whether Moreau had cause of complaint, and whether all history affords such a proof of magnanimity, as was here displayed by him, who is now the Emperor of the French. I will not waste inany words upon the assertion of the Memoir, that a crowd of Generals, when they saw Moreau going to his trial, told him, that they had sworn on their swords to defend his life. Why did they not defend him from banishment? As in the case of Job, of old, I suppose, they gave him up to Napoleon with an injunction not to touch his life! If Napoleon "thirsted for his blood," as we are told he did, and if he was, as it is asserted, an absolute tyrant, what restrained him? Why was not that blood shed? And why did not the same sword swearing Generals save the lives of Generals Georges and Pichegru? Why was the latter "il“lustrious friend" of Moreau abandoned? That "illustrious friend," whom Moreau himself had denounced as a traitor, and whom he had afterwards embraced for the purpose of carrying off Buonaparte? Why was not he saved too ?- What more need be said? The question is discussed. Let the reader decide. " THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON'S LATE CAMPAIGNS.If we are to believe the conductors of the press in this country, we shall be forced at last to acknowledge, that the French Emperor is neither a brave soldier nor a profound politician; that he is, in fact, a coward; that all the victories which have attended him in his career, have been more the effect of low cunning than the fruits of superior military talents; that in his recent campaigns, which have proved so fatal to the glory of France, he displayed nothing but imbecility, and an unjustifiable contempt of his opponents; and that, for these reasons, he ought, and was, justly detested and abhorred by the French people, who were ready to submit to any sacrifice, provided they could get rid of him. This, we are gravely and positively assured, by the Times and the Courier, is the exact situation of Buonaparté; and, therefore, it is but reasonable, according to them, to conclude, that his downfall will be speedy and certain, and happiness and prosperity be secured to Europe, in the restoration of the balance of power which, these profound politicians take it for granted, must result from Napoleon's overthrow. Were such advantages really to follow the humiliation of Buonaparté; were prosperity and happiness, even to half the extent which these advocates for the deliverance of Europe promise themselves, to be the consequence of confining France to her ancient boundaries, I should rejoice if the first accounts from the continent announced the overthrow of Napoleon, and the restoration of the Bourbons. But, entertaining no such sanguine views; being firmly persuaded, that the existence of France, as a great and independent nation, occupying an extent of territory equal, at feast, to what she does at present, is essential to the safety and security of the other continental powers, I cannot subscribe to the opinion, that curtailing Buonaparte's empire, far less dethroning him, will promote the interests of humanity. But why should we trouble ourselves with calculations upon the effect of causes, until we have ascertained whether or not these causes exist? Why should we promise ourselves prosperity and happiness from an event which, as far as I can at present judge, has no other existence than in the brain of those who desire it? Are we certain that the French people are inimical to Buonaparté ? Are we sure that they are prepared to second the views of those who wish his overthrow? Can we rely upon its being the intention of his enemies to restore the Bourbons on his dethronement? Or is it absolutely certain that the Jacobins would not assume the reins of government, on that event taking place? Ever since the result of the battle of Leipsic was known, we have been amused with accounts, from high authority, of France being ready, to a man, to drive the "Corsican Usurper" from the throne, and of that people only waiting for the countenance of the Allies to restore the Bourbons. Every Frenchman's mind, we were told, was so completely estranged from the Buonapartean family, and the way to the throne for Louis XVIII. so secure, that there was not an individual in France who was not ready to shed the last drop of his blood in this holy cause.In strict conformity with these views, it was said, that the Confederates addressed their declaration to the French people on the 1st of December. To second this measure, it was thought necessary, not only to publish the Proclamation of Louis the XVIIIth in this country, but to translate, and circulate thousands of printed copies of that document, through all the territory subject to . the sway of Buonaparté. Such unexampled | to separate their interests from Napoleon's. activity surely merited its reward. The They complained of his inordinate ambivoluntary exertions of men actuated, as tion, they attributed all the evils with they pretended, by a motive so pure as that which Europe has been afflicted, to this of restoring thirty millions of people to li- cause; and, in order, evidently, to induce berty; of breaking the chains with which his adherents to desert his fortunes, they they had been so long held in thraldom, held out the prospect of securing to France and restoring them to that elevated rank a greater extent of territory than she ever which they are entitled to hold among na- enjoyed under her former kings. Again, tions, could not expect less than complete when we look at the Proclamation of the success as the consequence of their merito- Bourbons, we find that every thing was to rious efforts.In these flattering views, be conceded to the people, which their however, we find that these restorers of the heart could desire; and that, in addition rights of men have hitherto been disap- to the many advantages they enjoyed by pointed: the magic effect expected to be virtue of the Napoleon Code, their reliproduced by their different appeals is yet to gion, of which they had been deprived be felt; and all Frenchmen, as far as can under the reign of terror, and which Buobe discovered, seem disposed, by their naparté had not recognised to its fullest conduct, to negative the assertion, that they extent, was to be restored. It might have were hostile towards the existing govern- been expected, that documents which proment, Instead of shewing any disposition mised to secure so many blessings to the to break in pieces their chains, they appear French nation, would have been hailed by to embrace them the closer; and if private that people with delight; that they would accounts, recently received, as to the state have received with rapture these harbingers of France, are to be relied on, the call of the restoration of a family, under whose which Buonaparté has made upon his sub- sway they were to realize all that the poets jects to arm and repel their invaders, has not had 'depicted as peculiar to the golden age. been made in vain. In these accounts it is But no; this stupid, this incorrigible peostated, that "large founderies for the ma-ple are insensible to these advantages. "nufacture of arms of all descriptions are Though we are constantly assured, that "working with great rapidity" in several their government is more tyrannical, and departments of France; that "considerable more despotic, than all other governments "quantities of artillery are collected;" that put together; though the news-papers all numerous detachments of troops, many agree in telling us, that they are the "of whom are not such mere boys as had most miserable, the most abject, and "been represented," are marching in all the most wretched people existing on the directions; that these troops are "perfect- face of the earth; that, in fact, they "ly disciplined," and are composed partly dare neither eat, drink, nor think, withof veteran cavalry, well mounted," and out permission from Buonaparte; yet that their horses are "apparently in good amidst all this moral and political degrada"condition."--How is all this? Whence tion, and which truly forms a striking is it that this activity has arisen? Is it for contrast to what they were only a few years the purpose of overturning the throne of ago; the French nation are so much wedded Buonaparte? No; for we find that it is to despotism, and so deeply in love with the consequence of his activity? Is it, their oppressor, that they actually refuse then, to restore the Bourbons? No; for it to be delivered, and reject, in scornful siis openly avowed, that it is the determina- lence, the, boon of emancipation, which has tion of Frenchmen to resist, with these very been offered them. Taking experience for arms, all attempts to alter their form of our guide, we might have supposed that government. From all this I am. appre- past events would have convinced the enehensive that the French have been lately mies of Napoleon, that it was folly to atthinking of their situation, and comparing tempt to supplant him by means of the notes; that they have been drawing con- Bourbons. But this far from being the trasts between the condition of their fathers case:-Determined to force a King upon under the reign of the Capets, and their France of their own choosing, and indig own situation under Buonaparté. On turn- nant at the conduct of that people for reing our attention to the Proclamation of thejecting their proffered mercy, they are reAllies, it must be admitted, however well gardless of experience; their arrogant pride think of it, that it was their object will not permit them to concede that they in publishing it to persuade the French people are wrong; and they cling to their favourite we may project of destroying Buonaparté, even newspapers as the Times and the Gourier, after hope itself is gone. With this view the rather than give themselves the trouble of Times newspaper lately put forth a mani- exercising their own judgment, even for a festo, in which it is attempted to depreciate single moment. Thinking appears to them the military character of Buonaparté, for the greatest of all evils, which they are always the professed purpose of exciting a revolt desirous to avoid, lest, perchance, they among his subjects. All his splendid suc- might discover something connected with cesses are represented to have been the their favourite project, the deliverance of fruits of his cunning and intrigue; his Europe, neither congenial with their feelmaintaining his position on the Elbe, in ings, nor with their interest. But while spite of the storm which was gathering these men enjoy their fancied security, let around him, is ascribed to foolish temerity; us not shrink from the vindication even of his return to Paris after the battle of Leip. an enemy, when he is wantonly abused; sic, is regarded as proof of his cowardice; but let us on all occasions be forward to and a charge is preferred against him of undeceive the less credulous, who may be having created a fictitious famine in France, honest in their inquiries after truth; but by monopolizing the corn, for the double who, in this age of abominable deception, purpose of screening himself from the ven- in which sophistry and cunning are parageance of his subjects, which was ready to mount, may find the inquiry somewhat burst upon him, and to give facility to the difficult.As to the charge brought Conscription, which it is asserted, was against Buonaparté, of having monopolized "filled up by the actual fear of famine." all the corn in France, for the purpose of If these accusations are well founded, is it compelling his subjects to comply with his credible that the French nation should be measures, it is a sufficient answer, that it ignorant of them? and if acquainted with | rests upon the bare assertion of the writer them, is it possible that, believing them, of the Times.No authority is referred they should not inflict a signal punishment to in support of the accusation. Having upon the author of the calamities to which been advanced as a matter of fact, and not they have given birth? So far, however, as a vague speculation, it was incumbent from the sufferings which are alleged to upon this writer to mention the source of have arisen from these supposed enormities, his information, that others might have it having incensed the French against their in their power to examine it. His silence Emperor, his conduct seems to have en- upon this essential particular shows that deared him the more to them. There the story is of a piece with what has been were obvious reasons for submitting to his so often said, and as often disproved, about yoke when victory followed his footsteps, Buonaparte poisoning his sick at Jaffa. and when nearly a million of soldiers were Besides, had France been lately afflicted devoted to his service; but now that the with a famine, all Europe must have heard tide of fortune has turned against him; that of it; yet we find that every press in at the moment he returned to his capital, Europe has been silent as to this occurnot as a conqueror, but humiliated by de-rence, except the press of this country. feat, and with only a handful of men to But we are told that it is impossible to jussupport him, he should not only be receiv-tify the conduct of Buonaparté in his invaed and acknowledged as the lawful sovereign of the French Empire, but new levies be raised to give stability to his government; are circumstances that can only be accounted for by admitting, that all that we have been told about the predilection of Frenchmen in favour of the Bourbons, is false; and that the charge of cowardice and other imputations thrown upon Buonaparte's character, by a vile and prostituted press, are disbelieved in France, and entirely without foundation. It is a melancholy truth that there are people so besotted in this country, as to give implicit credit to these falsehoods, and who would even assent to other fabrications, ten times more absurd, upon the bare statement of such sion of Russia, for that heaven manifested its displeasure at his impious attempt by destroying his army. Well then, if it was heaven that defeated his purpose, how is Buonaparte to be blamed for this? or why are the French people to drive him from his throne, because a power, which no mortal can resist, chose to fight against him? It would seem, if any thing is to be inferred from this circumstance, that it was not with Buonaparte that the Almighty was offended, but with the people of France, for it was his subjects and not himself that heaven sacrificed in its wrath. If it is insisted that Buonaparte was preserved to convince him of the folly of his conquests, ought not this to afford a striking lesson to |