Surrey, milliner.-Moses Nathan, Leman-street, Goodman'sfields, general merchant.-Jas. Merton, South-square, Gray'sinn, Holborn, clerk in the East India House.-Wm. Dickie, Eli-street, Pearson's-street, Kingsland-road, clerk to Messrs. Pickford & Co., carriers.-Henry Chas. Frost, Stockbridgeterrace, Victoria-road, Pimlico, silver-chaser.-John Burns, New-st.-square, Fetter-lane, green-grocer.-Wm. N. Ward, Caroline-place, City-road, St. Leonard, Shoreditch, cutler.James Martin, Sidmouth-mews, Gray's-inn-road, carman.Thos. Hutchinson, Tillotson's-place, Waterloo-road, Surrey, general merchant.

Dec. 15, at the same hour and place.

Geo. Wm. Alex. Milburn, Lyon's-inn, Strand, attorney.— John Costello, Old Bailey, house-decorator.-John Benson, Acre-lane, Brixton, Surrey, grocer.-John Taylor, Great Wild-st., Lincoln's-inn-fields, tailor.-Jas. Culverwell, Seamills, near Ilminster, and Beer-mills, near Chard, Somersetshire, miller.-Fredk. John Meyer, Sussex-terrace, Camdentown, artist.-John Blake, Bridge-st., Westminster, out of business.-Joshua R. Lowe, Hatfield-street, Stamford-street, Blackfriars-road, out of business.-Jas. Angles, Seymour-pl., Locks-fields, Walworth, tailor.-Jas. Chettle, Chapel-street, Edgware-road, out of business.-Jas. Eaton, Berwick-street, Soho, warehouseman.-Thos. Turtle, Alfred-st., Tottenhamcourt-road, butcher.-Robt. Jas. Moggridge, Bridges-street, Covent-garden, newsvendor.-Thos. Coleman, Castle-street, Leicester-square, grocer.-Thos. Waller, Belle-vue-terrace, Ball's-pond-road, near Kingsland, out of business. Court-house, AYLESBURY, Buckinghamshire, Dec. 14 at 10. Saml. Nash, Sparland's-end, Great Missenden, cart-saddle tree-maker. Wm. Babb, Prestwood-common, Great Missenden, sawyer.-David Edmonds, Bleddon-ridge, baker.

Court-house, LANCASTER, (County), Dec. 14 at 10. Jos. Holland, Hollinwood, Oldham, victualler. - Thomas Derbyshire, Manchester, tallow-chandler.-Thos. Hampson, Barton-upon-Irwell, labourer.-Wm. G. Schofield, Manchester, tailor.-Richd. Emery, Chorlton-upon-Medlock, greengrocer.-Thos. Stubbs, Chorlton-upon-Medlock, agent for sale of vinegar.-Absalom Wrigley, Oldham, out of business.Jas. Chadwick, Manchester, joiner.- Robt. Dixon, Lowergate, Clitheroe, carter.-Geo. E. Patchett, Manchester, manufacturer.-D. Quigley, Liverpool, shoemaker.-Ralph Mellor, Oldham, grocer.-Richd. Brandwood, Warrington, retail dealer in ale.-James Marsh, Leyland, shoemaker.-Robert Stewart, Tenterden, Liverpool, master in the Royal Navy.

MEETING.

Robert Stabler, East-parade, Heworth, near Yorkshire, livery-lace-weaver, Dec. 15 at 11, Field's, York, sp. aff.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 25.

BANKRUPTS.

BARNARD LINDSAY WATSON, Cornhill, and Gordonsquare, St. Pancras, Middlesex, and Queenborough, Kent, manufacturer of flags, Dec. 8 at half-past 11, and Jan. 4 at 10, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Graham; Sol. Hardingham, 11, Serle-st., Lincoln's-inn.-Fiat dated Nov. 16.

JOHN LOWTHER, Queen's-row, Pentonville, builder, Dec. 6 at half-past 1, and Jan. 7 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Groom; Sol. Lindo, 113, Fenchurch-street, City.-Fiat dated Nov. 17. WILLIAM DEDMAN, Bryanstone street, Portman-square, grocer and oilman, Dec. 1 at 11, and Dec. 30 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Green; Sol. Branscome, Wine-office-court, Fleet-street.-Fiat dated Nov. 22. FREDERICK NEWCOMB, Newgate-market, carcasebutcher, and Theberton-street, Islington, ham and beef shopkeeper, Dec. 6 at half-past 10, and Jan. 5 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Graham; Sol. Smith, 9, Barnard's-inn.-Fiat dated Nov. 21. HENRY CLAPHAM, Liverpool, woollen-draper, Dec. 3 at 12, and Jan. 6 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Turner; Sol. Frodsham, Liverpool.-Fiat dated Nov. 21.

JAMES ASHWELL, Salford, Lancashire, grocer, Dec. 2 and Jan. 9 at 11, Manchester District Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Pott; Sols. Dearden, Manchester; Johnson & Co.,

SAMUEL CLINCH BOYCE, Fenchurch-street, cheesemonger, and Rood-lane, accountant and agent, Dec. 7 at 2, and Dec. 28 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Johnson; Sol. Myatt, 75, Old Broad-street.-Fiat dated Nov. 22.

GEORGE SWIRES, High-town, Birstall, Yorkshire, merchant, Dec. 7 and Jan. 4 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds District: Off. Ass. Hope; Sols. Jacomb, Huddersfield; Van Sandau & Cumming, 27, King-street, Cheapside.-Fiat dated Nov. 17. WILLIAM BARTON, Saint Helen's, Lancashire, watch movement maker, Dec. 6 and Jan. 6 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Cazenove; Sols. Barnes & Barrow, or Taylor, St. Helen's; Norris & Co., Bartlett's-buildings, Holborn.-Fiat dated Nov. 21. THOMAS HOLYLAND, Manchester, woollen cloth manufacturer, Dec. 5 and Jan. 10 at 11, Manchester District Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Pott; Sols. Earle, Manchester; Fox, 40, Finsbury-circus.-Fiat dated Nov. 19. THOMAS PERRY, Liverpool, builder and brickmaker,

Dec. 3 at 11, and Jan. 5 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Bird; Sol. Whitley, Liverpool.-Fiat dated Nov. 21.

JOHN PARRY, Penygloddfa, Llanllwchairn, Montgomery. shire, mercer and grocer, Dec. 6 and Jan. 13 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Follett; StePETER LITTLE, Blackburn, Lancashire, currier, Dec. 9 and phens & Jones, Newtown.-Fiat dated Nov. 19. 29 at 1, Manchester District Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Fraser; Norris & Co., Bartlett's-buildings, Holborn.-Fiat dated Nov. 19.

JOHN WILKINSON, Ardwick, Manchester, innkeeper and tin-plate worker, Dec. 12 and 29 at 11, Manchester Dis trict Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Fraser; Atkinson & Saunders, Manchester; Mackinson & Sanders, Elm-court, Temple.-Fiat dated Nov. 18.

JAMES GREEN, Leeds, victualler, Dec. 6 and Jan. 3 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds: Off. Ass. Hope, Leeds; Sol. Naylor, Leeds.-Fiat dated Nov. 7. RICHARD BELLINGHAM, Wem, Shropshire, boot and shoemaker, Dec. 5 and Jan. 10 at 1, Waterloo-rooms, Birmingham: Off. Ass. Valpy; Sol. Walmsley, Wem.-Fiat dated Nov. 19.

JOSEPH WEBSTER and MARY PICKLES, Morley, Yorkshire, cloth manufacturers, Dec. 7 and Jan. 4 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds: Off. Ass. Hope; Sols. Blackburn, Leeds; Walker, 13, Furnival's-inn.-Fiat dated Nov. 15.

EDMUND LANE, Cirencester, Gloucestershire, edge-tool maker, Dec. 6 at 12, and Jan. 3 at 12, Court of Bankrupt cy, Bristol: Off. Ass. Hutton; Sol. Bevir, Cirencester.Fiat dated Nov. 16.

FIATS REMOVED

By Order of the Lord Chancellor. Robert Loosemore, Tiverton, Devonshire, scrivener, Dec. 19 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, Castle of Exeter.-J. Wyatt, Plymouth, Devonshire, upholsterer, Dec. 6 at 11, Court of Bank. ruptcy, Castle of Exeter.-John Pepper, Wotton-under-Edge, Gloucestershire, tailor and draper, Dec. 9 at 2, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol.-William Castle, Wanborough, Wiltshire, sheep dealer, Nov. 29 at 2, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol.

MEETINGS.

Augustus Applegath, Crayford, Kent, silk printer, Dec. 6 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London, last ex.-W. G. Dodds, Howford-buildings, Fenchurch-st., merchant, Dec. 6 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, last ex.-Edw. Corah, Bristol, hosier, Dec. 6 at 2, Court of Bankruptcy, London, last ex.-George Till, jun., Ester-st., Lisson-grove, Paddington, dealer and chapman, Nov. 29 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London, last ex.-Thomas Hutchinson, Dovor-road, Surrey, linen draper, Nov. 29 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, last ex.-Thos. Seddon and George Seddon, Calthorpe-place, Gray's-inn-rd., upholsterers, Dec. 12 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.; Dec. 19 at half-past 1, div. sep. est. G. Seddon.George Carpenter, Chelmsford, Essex, chemist, Dec. 15 at half-past 10, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.; Dec. 19 at half-past 11, div.-Thomas Dann, Reigate, Surrey, mer chant, Dec. 15 at half-past 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London,

No. 308.

PRICE 18.

House of Lords

Privy Council....

E. T. HOOD, Esq. of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law.

Inner Temple, Barrister at Law.

House of Commons Elec-[A-Y., IRWAN, ESQ. of Gray's

Committees.

Inn, Barrister at Law.

Ix a former volume of THE JURIST, (vol. 4, p. 593), we offered some observations on the nature and extent of the privilege of counsel in regard to the conduct of criminal proceedings. We did not then think it necessary to extend the inquiry into the question, what is the duty of counsel generally-an inquiry which seemed at the time purely theoretical; but circumstances have recently occurred, which have occupied some considerable portion of public attention, and which involve the general question so far, as to make it appear to us to be now fitting that we should inquire, what is the privilege and what is the duty of counsel in regard to proceedings in civil matters of litigation. The question that has been lately mooted is in substance, (as probably most of our readers are aware), whether, to any and what extent, counsel is required, by his duty to the public, personally to take cognizance of the propriety of the conduct of his client in using one or other of those processes which a Court of Law or Equity permits, and of the accuracy of those statements on which his client instructs him. It must be admitted, we think, by all who have sought to inform themselves of the true position and functions of the Bar, that counsel are not merely the organs of their clients, bound to see with their eyes and speak with their tongues; that they owe a duty to the Court in which they practise, and through it to the public, as well as to their clients, is most certain; and he would indeed be ill apprised of the position in which he is placed as counsel, who should imagine, that, in civil cases, any more than in criminal ones, all that he has to do is to struggle for his client, regardless of the consequences that may ensue to every other individual and to every other institution. That this is the doctrine we may collect, not less from what has fallen occasionally from Judges, than from the invariable practice in many particulars. "If (said Lord Langdale, in refer

VOL. VI.

UU

ence to the rule laid down by his Lordship with regard to hearing causes as short causes) the counsel had stated, that, in their opinion, the cause was not proper to be heard as a short cause, I should have reposed implicit confidence in their honour, and considered their statement as a sufficient reason to refuse the application... With respect to the task which I may be. considered to have imposed upon counsel, I wish to observe, that it arises from the confidence which long experience induces me to repose in them, and from a sense which I entertain of the truly honourable and important services which they constantly perform as ministers of justice, acting in aid of the Judge before whom they practise. No counsel supposes himself to be the mere advocate or agent of his client to gain a victory, if he can, on a particular occasion. The zeal and argumentsof every counsel, knowing what is due to himself and his honourable profession, are qualified not only by considerations affecting his own character as a man of honour, experience, and learning, but also by considerations affecting the general interests of justice. It is to these considerations that I apply myself; and I am far from thinking that any counsel who attends here will knowingly violate, or silently permit to be violated, any established rule of the Court, to promote the purposes of any client, or refuse to afford me the assistance which I ask in these cases." (Hutchinson v. Stephens, 1 Kee. 667, 668). Other passages to the same effect might be cited, and the practice is accordingly, since we constantly see, that the Court places in counsel a confidence, for which the only warrant is the knowledge, that it is the duty of counsel, and that counsel so feel and understand it, to assist and not to mislead the Court. Thus, it is every day's practice, that judicial orders are made on the mere assertion of counsel, that the affidavits make a proper case for them, Again, the settled and not unfrequent practice of comsel interpos ing as amici curiæ, a practice much sanctioned by the

most learned Judges, is another proof that the Court expects from them as a duty to assist public justice, by informing the Court, whether professionally engaged or not. Counsel, therefore, are undoubtedly not the mere agents of their clients, and are bound to exercise over the conduct of the cases intrusted to them some sort of control. But the question, to what extent they are bound to exercise such control, is one of considerable difficulty. Upon that point, perhaps, only some general principles can be stated as fixed, and the propriety or impropriety of the particular way in which they are applied, must frequently depend on the special circumstances of each case.

The general doctrine which it has been attempted lately to put forth on this subject, seems to go the length of saying, not merely that counsel are to exercise their own judgment and a wholesome control if necessary over their clients, in the mode of placing before the court their client's case; not merely that they are to keep in view the spirit, rather than the letter of the rules of pleading and practice, and are not to convert that license in pleading, which has been intended for the protection of one party, into an oppression on the other;-not even that they are to content themselves with inquiring into the propriety of the particular kind of remedy, for the attainment of which they are instructed to take steps; but that they are actually called upon to sift and question the accuracy of those statements of facts which constitute their instructions; that they are to form an ex parte judgment whether their clients have pursued a moral course in selecting one kind of legal remedy in preference to another;-in fact, to satisfy themselves that their client is not actuated by improper motives, and has adopted a course of proceeding unobjectionable on grounds of moral rectitude.

If this be indeed the duty of counsel, then high as we are disposed to place the standard of our professional duty, and, heavy as we have always been disposed to consider the responsibilities attaching to us, we must confess that a counsel is a much more exalted and a much more responsible person than we had ever, in our fondest conceptions of the dignity of our profession, imagined. Indeed, if such be really the duty of counsel, we do not see that there is any need at all for solicitors and attornies, and not much for judges. For, according to this doctrine, counsel are called upon to usurp the functions of both. But it is plain, that in fact such is not the duty of counsel. The collection of information from the litigant as to all those matters of fact on which questions of law arise, is clearly in the department of the solicitor. He alone can conveniently, according to the course of practice, come in close and frequent contact with the litigant, and to him alone must be entrusted the examination of his conduct, on which depends any inference as to the motives with which legal process is sought to be set in motion, and of the objects which are aimed at by setting it in motion. It is also we conceive the undoubted right of the party, and of his immediate agent the solicitor, to select, where several remedies at Law or in Equity are equally open to him, that one which appears to him for any reason most advantageous or convenient. And we cannot imagine on what ground it can be contended, that counsel are bound, or have even any shadow of right, to

dictate to a client, on any preconceived notions of their own, that he shall proceed by action at Law instead of suit in Equity, or vice versâ; or that he shall take one particular course of application to any court, when many are open to him.

Suppose, for instance, a case of this nature, that a party files a bill in equity against another, and that the defendant might meet it either by answer or by demurrer. If counsel is instructed to prepare an answer, is it his duty to decline doing so, because he may think fit to conceive that a demurrer would be less expensive to the defendant, and less oppressive as against the plaintiff? Is it his duty to cross-examine his client as to his motives for preparing a defence by answer, or has he not arrived at the boundary-line of his duty, when he has advised his client, that to defend by demurrer will have the same effect as to answer and go on to a hearing? Again, suppose an application for protection to be, as it is in many cases, susceptible of being made in a short way by action at law, or in a longer and more costly way by suit in equity: Is it the duty of counsel, if instructed to draw a bill, to impute to his client improper motives for the selection of the proceeding by suit? or is he, even if he have suspicion of such improper motives, required, or even authorized, to do more than point out to his client that he may obtain his relief in the shorter and cheaper form?

the

We apprehend there is no ground for asserting that counsel have any such authority or duty. To suppose that he is bound so to interfere, is to constitute him at once attorney and counsel for the party; it is to commit to him not merely the duty of advising on the law applicable to a certain assumed state of circumstances, or of conducting applications court according to its rules and practice, but of ascer taining whether the statements made to him are correct: in other words, of himself examining the party. It is arming him with the power which the law has given to the litigant, and through him to his immediate agent, viz. that of choosing his own remedy. It is imposing upon him the duty of determining whether it is moral or conscientious for the litigant to do that which the law permits him to do; and with very inadequate means of ascertaining whether his impressions are correct or not, to give them the effect of depriving such litigant of the assistance of counsel, which, as a suitor, he is intended and properly entitled to have; lastly, it involves a sweeping and most harsh calumny on an entire branch of the profession, by assuming, that, though an attorney may be trusted as an individual, he has no claim, in right of his professional character, to expect from counsel, that primâ facie integrity and honourable motives shall be imputed to him.

The rule as to where the duty of the solicitor terminates, and that of the counsel begins, we apprehend to be this-that the solicitor is intrusted with the care of collecting the facts, of ascertaining and placing before the litigant a statement of what remedies are open to him, and of determining with or for him (assuming that they have both full knowledge of the general effect of each kind of remedy) which of the several remedies open to him he will select. For the propriety of the course adopted, both as regards the interest of the party himself, and the question whether he is or is not abus