Horse Inn, Worcester, aud. ac.; at 1, div.-Andrew Mor- broker.-Jos. Clifton, Cheshunt, Hertfordshire, plumber.-S. ison, Great Malvern, Worcestershire, lodging-house keeper, Andrews, Woollhampton, Berkshire, out of business.-Chas. Oct. 4 at 12, Golden Lion Inn, Worcester, aud. ac.; at W. Raggett, St. Peter's-terrace, Hammersmith, out of busi1, div.-Moses New, Crown Inn, Great Malvern, Wor- ness.-J. Groom, New North-st., Red Lion-sq., out of busicester, innkeeper, Oct. 10 at 12, Crown Inn, Worcester, ness.-Jas. Hamilton, Sherrard-place, Sherrard-st., Goldenaud. ac.; at 1, div.-Francis Sneade, Chester, timber mer- sq., artist.-Mary Phillips, Blenheim-st., New Bond-street, chant, Nov. 9 at 2, Royal Hotel, Chester, aud. &c.-Samuel | artificial florist.-Thos. T. Pugh, New Gloucester-st., Hoxton Birtwistle, Northwich, Chester, flour dealer, Oct. 14 at 10, New-town, carcase butcher.-John Browd, Bishopsgate-st. Commissioners'-rooms, Manchester, aud. ac.-Wm. Radcliffe, Without, out of business.-John Jones, Beauchamp-street, J. Radcliffe, and S. Radcliffe, Stockport, cotton manufacturers, Middle-row, Brook's-market, Brook-st., Holborn, milkman. Oct. 3 at 11, Commissioners'-rooms, Manchester, pr. d. and—John Bishopp, Brookham-green, Betchworth, Surrey, white div.; at 12, aud. ac.; at 1, aud. ac. sep. est. S. Radcliffe.-T. | hoop maker.-Mary Pringle, Queen's-buildings, KnightsMeale, Brynmawr, Llanelly, Brecknockshire, ironmonger, Oct. 4 | bridge, tailor. at 2, Commercial-rooms, Bristol, aud. ac.-Geo. Louis Stott, Bristol, soda manufacturer, Oct. 4 at 2, Commercial-rooms, Bristol, aud. ac.; Oct. 7 at 2, fin. div.—Samuel Sotheby and Sam. L. Sotheby, Wellington-st., Strand, auctioneers, Sept. 30 at half-past 12, Court of Bankruptcy, fin. div.-Anthony Stratton and John Henry Secretan, Cheapside, factors, Sept. 30 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, fin. div.-Thos. Burgon, Walbrook-buildings, merchant, Sept. 30 at half-past 1, Court of Bankruptcy, div.—William Morrison, Globe-st., Wapping, cooper, Oct. 5 at half past 11, Court of Bankruptcy, div. Jos. Colling, Yarmouth, Norfolk, grocer, Oct. 3 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, div.-Mary Glascott, Geo. M. Glascott, and Thos. T. Glascott, Great Garden-street, Whitechapel-road, copper merchants, Oct. 3 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, div.— G. Wilson and Rich. Briddon, Manchester, machine makers, Oct. 6 at 10, Commissioners'-rooms, Manchester, pr. d. and fin. div.; at 11, aud. ac. sep. est. of R. Briddon; Oct. 7 at 10, pr. d. and div.; at 11, aud. ac. joint est.-Richard Thelwell, Manchester, silversmith, Oct. 8 at 10, Commissioners'-rooms, Manchester, pr. d. and div.; at 11, aud. ac.-Jas. Bakewell, Manchester, size manufacturer, Oct. 6 at 11, Commissioners' rooms, Manchester, pr, d. and div.; at 12, aud. ac,-William Sayer, Rochdale, Lancashire, wool dealer, Oct. 8 at 12, Commissioners'-rooms, Manchester, pr. d. and div.; at 1, aud. ac. -Joseph Shillito, Manchester, warehouseman, Oct. 8 at 11, Commissioners'-rooms, Manchester, pr. d. and div.; at 12, aud. ac.-Wm. Antill, Bourn, Gloucestershire, umbrella stick manufacturer, Sept. 29 at 11, George Inn, Stroud, aud, ac.; at 12, fin. div.-Edward Moss, Liverpool, draper, Nov. 10 at 11, Clarendon-rooms, Liverpool, aud. ac.; at 12, div. Oct. 3, at the same hour and place. Wm. Willmott, sen., Buttesland-street, East-road, Cityroad, out of business.-Aaron Lawrance, East-end, Finchley, tailor.-Geo. Kilby, Regent-street, Kennington-cross, Lambeth, Surrey, cowkeeper.-John White, Queen-st., Charlessq., Hoxton, green grocer. John Long, Clement's-lane, Strand, artificial florist.-J. A. Wright, Phoenix-st., Somers'. town, historical engraver.-G. Riley, Warwick-sq., Newgate. st., bookbinder.-Jesse Langridge, Doughty-mews, Doughtyst., Foundling-hospital, cabriolet proprietor.-Jas. Bakewell, Rotherhithe-st., butcher.- Jas. Kilvington, Loughboroughroad, North Brixton, out of business.-J. Flintiff, Rastrick, Halifax, Yorkshire, innkeeper.-Wm. Woodley, Observatory house, Woodbury-vale, Green-lanes, Stoke Newington, captain in the Royal Navy. EQUITABLE REVERSIONARY INTEREST SOCIETY, 10, Lancaster-place, Strand.-Persons de sirous of DISPOSING of REVERSIÓNARY PROPERTY, LIFE-INTERESTS, ANNUITIES, and LIFE-POLICIES of ASSURANCE, may do so at this Office to any extent, and for their full value, without encountering the delay, expense, and uncertainty of an auction. Forms of proposal may be obtained at the Office as above, and of Mr. Peter Hardy, the Actuary, 37, Old Jewry; and every facility will be given by the Society to a speedy completion of its purchases. JOHN CLAYTON, Secretary. WORTHINGTON ON WILLS.-FOURTH EDITION. This day is published, price 15s. boards, GENERAL PRECEDENT for WILLS, with S. Sweet, 1, Chancery-lane; A. Maxwell & Son, 32, Bell yard; and V. & R. Stevens & G. S. Norton, 26 and 39, Bellyard. ** Tum Of whom may be had, Richard Williams, Alvington, Gloucestershire, farmer, Nov. A copious Practical Notes. By GEORGE WORTHING9 at 11, Bear Inn, Newnham, aud. ac, and div.-Richd. Bill, TON, Esq. The Fourth Edition, with considerable Additions Birmingham, japanner, October 3 at 1, Waterloo-rooms, Bir-and Alterations, bringing all the Decisions on the recent Statute mingham, aud. ac.; at 2, first and fin. div.-Robert Jones, of Wills down to the present time. Shrewsbury, Shropshire, grocer, October 3 at 11, Guildhall, Shrewsbury, aud. ac.; at 12, div.John May, Newport, Isle of Wight, mercer, Oct. 28 at 3, Bugle Inn, Newport, aud. ac,; at 4, fin. div.-James Kirkpatrick, Newport, Isle of Wight, banker, Oct. 28 at 12, Kirkpatrick & Co.'s, Newport, aud. ac. and div.-Wm. Thos. Wren, Chichester, Sussex, brewer, Oct. 6 at 11, Royal Hotel, Chichester, aud, ac.; at 12. fin. div.-Wm. Bentley, sen., Glasgow, and Wm. Bentley, jun., Liverpool, merchants, Oct. 29 at 12, Clarendon-rooms, Liverpool, fin. div.-John Cockcroft, J. C. Cockcroft, and William Cockcroft, Addingham, Yorkshire, stuff manufacturers, Sept. 30 at 1, Devonshire Arms Hotel, div. CERTIFICATES TO BE ALLOWED, Unless Cause shewn to the contrary, on or before Sept. 30. Tottenham Lea, Wakefield, Yorkshire, worsted yarn manu. facturer. Charles Rich, Brighton, Sussex, innkeeper. Ann Leach, John Leach, and Jas. Leach, Brick-lane, Spitalfields, dealers and chapmen.-Wm. Iredale, Smithriding, Almondbury, Yorkshire, woollen cloth manufacturer. David Low, Adam's-court, Old Broad-st., merchant. Robert Russell, Kingston-upon-Thames, Surrey, upholsterer. Luke Whitby, Green Dragon-yard, Whitechapel, builder. Thomas Barter, Poole, surgeon.-Robt. Handley, Drake-st., Rochdale, Lancashire, tailor.-Andrew Morison, Great Malvern, Worcestershire, lodging-house keeper. N. Baker, Newton Bushel, Highweek, Devonshire, banker. A TREATISE on the LAW or ARBITRATION and A PRACTICAL TREATISE on the LAW of EVI Counsel. V. and R. Stevens & G. S. Norton, Law Booksellers and Publishers, (Successors to the late J. & W. T. Clarke, of Portugal-street), 26 and 39, Bell-yard, Lincoln's Inn. Orders fo: THE JURIST given to any Newsman, or letter post-paid) sent to the Office, No. 3, CHANCERY LANE, or to V.&. STEVENS & G. S. NORTON, (Successors to J. & W. T. Clarke, late of Portugal Street), 26 and 39, BELL YARD, will insure its punctual delivery in London, or its being forwarded on the evening of publica tion, through the medium of the Post Office, to the Country. London: Printed by WALTER M'DOWALL, PRINTRE, 4, PEM BERTON Row, and Published by STEPHEN SWEET, BOOKSELLER and PUBLISHER, 3, CHANCERY LANE. Saturday, September 10, 14. No. 297. LONDON, SEPTEMBER 17, 1842. PRICE 18. The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity: utility to known manufactures can only be explainedby stating the reason, rationale, or principle of the difference: in short, the differentia of the logicians." (p. 498). And in another part of the same essay, (p. 555), the learned editor, although cautioning the draftsman, while he endeavours to embrace de facto the principle of the invention, to avoid the use of the word "principle," still, in a note, suffers his affection for the idea of claiming a principle to reappear, by referring to the case of Russell v. Cowley, (1 C., M. & R. 865), where, in the specification, he observes, that a "principle" was expressly claimed, and notwithstanding the importance of the invention, which came quickly into extensive use, the patent was never defeated t. We have been always in the habit of considering, that, if there was one doctrine of the Law of Patents more firmly established than any other, it was this, that a patent cannot be granted for a principle; and that to affect, in the specification of a patent, to claim the principle of the invention, is in the highest degree improper and dangerous. But in the volume lately published of Mr. Jarman's Conveyancing Precedents*, which comprises an elaborate and very valuable Essay on the Law of Patents, we find this doctrine controverted. The learned editor, after citing on the question, what is the proper subject of a patent, the material parts of the opinions delivered by the Judges in the great case of If in construction of law, or even in the vulgar conBoulton v. Bull, (2 H. Black. 463), and a variety of struction, the word principle bore the limited meaning other cases down to Minter v. Wells, (1 C., M. & R..which the learned editor of the precedents assigns to it, 505); Jupe v. Pratt, (Webs. Pat. Cas. 144); and Neilson v. Harford, (8 Mee. & W. 806), observes upon them thus: "Understanding the word principle, as applied to a patent, to mean a principle of operation or construction, or, in other words, a rule shewing the conditions essential to the attainment of a given end in manufactures, it may be safely laid down, that a patent may be supported for a principle to the extent to which it has been clearly apprehended by the inventor himself; but whether in effect a patentee secures the whole of the principle of his invention or not, will depend chiefly upon the terms of his specification; and not only is it no objection to a patent that it is for a principle as defined above, but it may be further asserted, that no patent can be successful, unless it does involve a principle of some kind, whether known to the patentee or not. For the essential characteristics of a good subjectmatter are its novelty and utility; and its superior * Jarman's Conveyancing, 3rd edit., by G. Sweet, Esq., Vol. 7. JJ VOL. VI. we might perhaps find less difficulty than we do in acceding to the novel doctrine which he has put forth on the question of sustaining a patent for a principle. But we incline to think that such is not the legal or general construction of the word principle as applied to inventions in the text; and we contend that, at any rate, the courts have never admitted, when they have supported a patent, that it was a patent for a principle. In the case of Boulton v. Bull, the inventor had in his specification laid claim to a principle, and it is true that the patent was notwithstanding supported. But if the arguments of the learned judges be attentively considered, it will be found that they did not support the patent as a patent for a principle; nor did they justify the specification †The passage cited from the specification of the patent in question in Russell v. Cowley was this:-"I have thus described the mode which I have employed and found fully to answer the purpose in welding tubes of iron, but I do not confine myself to the employment of this precise construction of apparatus, as several variations may be made without deviating from the principle of my invention, which is to heat the previously-prepared tubes of iron to a welding heat, &c. &c." as claiming a principle; they held, that what the inventor called a principle, was not a principle, but a process; they used their utmost ingenuity to demonstrate that the patent was really for a substantial thing, which was inaccurately termed by the inventor a principle. In other words, they made a specification for him, and then held his patent and specification good. But throughout the whole of the arguments, not only is there not one word to shew that the Court thought a principle in any sense the subject of a patent, but the great struggle made to shew that when Mr. Watt said in terms he had invented a principle, he did not mean a principle, but meant something else, proves that the Court thought they could not admit that the patent was for a principle, without ipso facto defeating it. Lord C. J. Eyre observed," An improper use of the word principle in the specification set forth in this case, has, I think, served to puzzle it. Undoubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle, but for a principle so far embodied and connected with corporeal substances as to be in a condition to act and to produce effects in any art, trade, mystery, or manual operation, I think there may be a patent. Now this is the thing for which a patent here was granted, and is what the specification describes, though it miscalls it a principle." So that, according to Lord C. J. Eyre, Watt's invention was not a principle; and because it was not, the patent was by him considered valid. combination, not by reference to its merely material parts, but by reference to what may, perhaps, be termed its vitality, that is, its functional aptitude for embodying and carrying into effect the principle. We admit that it may be objected to this, the generally received view of the result of the cases, that it supposes something very like discrepancy between the theory and the practice, and that it attributes to the Courts the apparent absurdity of saying, "You cannot have a patent for a principle eo nomine; but if you come before us in modest guise, disclaiming any right to a principle; then, if you have really invented one, we will take care indirectly to protect you in the exclusive enjoyment of it." But to this we reply, that, as lawyers, we have no concern with the question whether a doctrine is absurd or not. The question is here, not whether the rule and the practice are or are not in perfect harmony, but what is the rule, and what is the practice; and we think we have shewn that they are as we have stated*. At the same time we may observe, in defence of the distinction taken in the cases, between supporting a patent for a principle eo nomine, and for the application of a principle, that however refined and thin it may be in a logical point of view, it is not without material practical consequences. If the Court were to lay down the rule broadly, that a patent may be sustained for a principle eo nomine, where the inventor has discovered both the principle and some material mode Again, let us consider the dicta of Lord Lyndhurst of carrying it into effect, it would put the patentee in in Minter v. Wells. In that case, the patentee claimed such a case, in the position of a party in possession, leav"the application of a self-adjusting leverage to the backing it for the public to shew that he had no title. In and seat of a chair, whereby the weight on the seat acts as a counterbalance to the pressure against the back of such chair as above described." And Lord Lyndhurst repelled the argument that the patent purported to be for a new principle; saying that the inventor did not claim the principle, but the invention of applying that principle in a certain manner by certain machinery. His Lordship added, "It is true, that the patentee claimed the chair constructed on that principle, in whatever shape or form it might be," but still he repudiated the idea that the patent was for a principle, and only supported it because it was not for a principle, but for a certain mechanical combination embodying that principle. So in what fell from Alderson, B., in Jupe v. Pratt, we do not find any assertion that a patent may be sustained for a principle in any sense of the word; on the contrary, the learned judge expressly says you cannot have a patent for a principle alone, though you may for a principle coupled with some mode of carrying it into effect. And if you have invented both, then, he continues, you are entitled to protect yourself from all other modes of carrying the same principle into effect, that being treated by the jury as piracy of your original invention. other words, the patentee would have primâ facie a right of infinite extent, leaving it to the Court to abridge it; whereas, by the contrary doctrine, the patentee comes before the Court, not with an infinite right to be cut down, but with a right, the limits of which are primarily prescribed by the Court itself. What is the source of the discrepancy, which, if we are right, undoubtedly does exist between the technical rule and the actual practice of Courts of Law on this subject, it is perhaps not easy to ascertain. For our selves, we should seek the solution in their anxiety to escape indirectly, in support of meritorious inventions, from a rule, which, if carried out fully in practice, would undoubtedly have most absurd and pernicious results. It is worthy of remark, that in the cases in which patents affecting to be for a principle have been sustained, the inventions have appeared by the evidence to be of high public importance; and it has been shewn that on the success or failure of the patent, depended the success or comparative extinction of extensive trading interests. We are not, indeed, aware of any case in which a great struggle has been made to claim either direct or indirect to a principle, in which construe liberally in favour of a patentee, the indiscreet the evidence has not shewn that the invention was either actually in, or rapidly coming into general use, and indispensable to the perfection, if not actually to the existence, of some important branch of manufacture. The sound doctrine therefore we submit to be collected from the cases is this: that a patent cannot be on the face of it for a principle; and that if an inventor were to say in the specification of his patent, "I have discovered such and such a principle, which I carry into effect by such a combination of mechanical parts, describing it, and I claim the exclusive use of that prin- Precedents himself in another part of his essay, (p. 486, note * This view is indeed also taken by the learned editor of the ciple, however applied," such a patent and specification would be bad; but that if an invention be really of a (a)), where he says, "The true rule appears to be, that there new principle, and the patentee has also invented and cannot be a patent for a principle or method unless it is ap set forth in his specification a given mechanical combi- plied to practice, so as to produce a vendible result; but the nation, by which that principle is embodied in action, manner that is fairly suggested by or deducible from the speci patent is for the application of the principle in any and every he may practically secure to himself the exclusive en-fication." And we must add, that he elsewhere distinctly joyment of the principle, by claiming the mechanical cautions the draftsman against claiming a principle eo nomine. CAP. LXXXIX. [5th August, 1842.] An Act to promote the Drainage of Lands, and Improvement of Navigation and Water Power in connexion with such Drainage in Ireland. [5th August, 1842.] CAP. XC. An Act to defray the Charge of the Pay, Clothing, and contingent and other Expenses of the Disembodied Militia in Great Britain and Ireland; and to grant Allowances in certain Cases to Subaltern Officers, Adjutants, Paymasters, Quartermasters, Surgeons, Assistant Surgeons, Surgeons' Mates, and Serjeant Majors of the Militia, until the 1st July, 1843. [10th August, 1842.] CAP. XCI. An Act to amend an Act of the second and third Years of her Majesty, for the Suppression of the Slave Trade. [10th August, 1842.] CAP. XCII. An Act to permit, until the 31st August, 1845, Wheat to be delivered from the Warehouse or the Vessel Duty-free, upon the previous Substitution of an equivalent Quantity of Flour or Biscuit in the Warehouse. [10th August, 1842.] CAP. XCIV. [10th August, 1842.] costs, or any other than the usual costs between party and party, shall or may be recovered, shall be and the same are hereby repealed: Provided always, that in lieu thereof the usual costs between party and party shall and may be recovered, and no more. 2. That so much of any clause, enactment, or provision in any public act or acts, not local or personal, whereby it is enacted or provided that either double or treble costs, or any other than the usual costs between party and party, shall or may be recovered, shall be and the same are hereby repealed: Provided always, that instead of such costs the party or parties heretofore entitled under such last-mentioned acts to such double, treble, or other costs, shall receive such full and reasonable indemnity as to all costs, charges, and expenses incurred in and about any action, suit, or other legal proceeding, as shall be taxed by the proper officer in that behalf, subject to be reviewed in like manner and by the same authority as any other taxation of costs by such officer. 3. That so much of any clause or provision in any act or acts commonly called public local and personal, or local and personal, or in any act or acts of a local and personal nature, whereby any party or parties are entitled or permitted to plead the general issue only and to give any special matter in evidence without specially pleading the same, shall be and the same is hereby repealed. 4. And whereas it is expedient that the law should be uniform with respect to notice of action in all cases where such notice of action is required; be it therefore enacted, That from and after the passing of this act, in all cases where notice of action is required, such notice shall be given one calendar month at least before any action shall be commenced; and such notice of action shall be sufficient, any act or acts to the contrary thereof notwithstanding. and personal, or local and personal acts, and divers other acts 5. And whereas divers acts commonly called public local of a local and personal nature, contain clauses limiting the time within which actions may be brought for anything done in pursuance of the said acts respectively: And whereas the periods of such limitations vary very much, and it is expedient that there should be one period of limitation only; be it therefore enacted, That from and after the passing of this act the period within which any action may be brought for anything done under the authority or in pursuance of any such act or acts shall be two years, or in case of continuing damage, then within one year after such damage shall have ceased; and that so much of any clause, provision, or enactment by which any other time or period of limitation is appointed or enacted shall be and the same is hereby repealed. 6. That nothing herein contained shall extend or be con An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to the Services of the Ordnance Department, and the Vesting and Pur-strued to extend to any action, bill, plaint, or information, or chase of Lands and Hereditaments for those Services, and for the Defence and Security of the Realm. CAP. XCV. [10th August, 1842.] An Act for consolidating the Four Courts Marshalsea, Dublin, Sheriff's Prison, Dublin, and City Marshalsea, Dublin, and for regulating the Four Courts Marshalsea in Ireland. [10th August, 1842.] CAP. XCVI. An Act to alter the Number and Define the Boundaries of the several Baronies of the County of Dublin. CAP. XCVII. [10th August, 1842.] An Act to amend the Law relating to Double Costs, Notices of Action, Limitations of Actions, and Pleas of the General Issue, under certain Acts of Parliament. [10th August, 1842.] Whereas divers acts of parliament, public, local, and personal, contain enactments or provisions relating to the recovery of double, treble, or other costs in certain cases, and to the pleading of the general issue and the giving any special matter in evidence at any trial to be had for any matter done in pursuance of or under the authority of the said acts, and to the giving of notice of action before any action shall be commenced: And whereas it is expedient that the law should be altered in such respects: Be it therefore enacted &c., That so much of any clause, enactment, or provision in any act or acts commonly called public local and personal, or local and perBonal, or in any act or acts of a local or personal nature, whereby it is enacted or provided that either double or treble any legal proceeding of any kind whatsoever, commenced before the passing of this act, but such proceedings may be thereupon had and taken in all respects as if this act had not passed. ture. CAP. C. An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to the Copyright of Designs for ornamenting Articles of Manufac[10th August, 1842.] Whereas by the several acts mentioned in schedule (A.) to this act annexed, there was granted, in respect of the woven fabrics therein mentioned, the sole right to use any new and original pattern for printing the same during the period of three calendar months: And whereas by the act mentioned in the schedule (B.) to this act annexed, there was granted, in respect of all articles, except lace, and except the articles within the meaning of the acts hereinbefore referred to, the sole right of using any new and original design, for certain purposes, during the respective periods therein mentioned; but forasmuch as the protection afforded by the said acts in respect of the application of designs to certain articles of manufacture is insufficient, it is expedient to extend the same, but upon the condi tions hereinafter expressed; now, for that purpose, and for the purpose of consolidating the provisions of the said acts, be it enacted, That this act shall come into operation on the 1st September, 1842, and that thereupon all the said acts mentioned in the said schedules (A.) and (B.) to this act annexed shall be and they are hereby repealed. woven fabrics being or coming within the description technically called furnitures, and the repeat of the design whereof shall be more than 12 inches by 8 inches: Class 12.-Woven fabrics, not comprised in any preceding class: Class 13.-Lace, and any article of manufacture or substance not comprised in any preceding class. 2. That notwithstanding such repeal of the said acts, every copyright in force under the same shall continue in force till the expiration of such copyright; and with regard to all offences 4. That no person shall be entitled to the benefit of this act, or injuries committed against any such copyright before this with regard to any design in respect of the application thereof act shall come into operation, every penalty imposed and every to ornamenting any article of manufacture, or any such sub. remedy given by the said acts, in relation to any such offence stance, unless such design have before publication thereof been or injury, shall be applicable as if such acts had not been re-registered according to this act, and unless at the time of such pealed; but with regard to such offences or injuries committed registration such design have been registered in respect of the against any such copyright after this act shall come into opera- application thereof to some or one of the articles of manufacture tion, every penalty imposed and every remedy given by this or substances comprised in the above-mentioned classes, by speact in relation to any such offence or injury shall be applicable cifying the number of the class in respect of which such regis as if such copyright had been conferred by this act. tration is made, and unless the name of such person shall be registered according to this act as a proprietor of such design, and unless after publication of such design every such article of manufacture, or such substance to which the same shall be so applied, published by him, hath thereon, if the article of manufacture be a woven fabric for printing, at one end thereof, if of any other kind or such substance as aforesaid, at the end or edge thereof, or other convenient place thereon, the letters" Rd.," together with such number or letter, or num. ber and letter, and in such form as shall correspond with the date of the registration of such design according to the registry of designs in that behalf; and such marks may be put on any such article of manufacture or such substance, either by mak ing the same in or on the material itself of which such article or such substance shall consist, or by attaching thereto a label containing such marks. 3. And with regard to any new and original design (except for sculpture and other things within the provisions of the several acts mentioned in the schedule (C.) to this act annexed), whether such design be applicable to the ornamenting of any article of manufacture, or of any substance, artificial or natural, or partly artificial and partly natural, and that whether such design be so applicable for the pattern, or for the shape or configuration, or for the ornament thereof, or for any two or more of such purposes, and by whatever means such design may be so applicable, whether by printing, or by painting, or by embroidery, or by weaving, or by sewing, or by modelling, or by casting, or by embossing, or by engraving, or by staining, or by any other means whatsoever, manual, mechanical, or chemical, separate or combined; be it enacted, That the proprietor of every such design, not previously published either within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or elsewhere, shall have the sole right to apply the same to any articles of manufacture, or to any such substances as aforesaid, provided the same be done within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, for the respective terms hereinafter mentioned, such respective terms to be computed from the time of such design being registered according to this act; (that is to say), In respect of the application of any such design to ornamenting any article of manufacture contained in the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, or eleventh of the classes following, for the term of three years: In respect of the application of any such design to ornamenting any article of manufacture contained in the seventh, ninth, or tenth of the classes following, for the term of nine calendar months: In respect of the application of any such design to ornament- Class 1.-Articles of manufacture composed wholly or Class 3.-Articles of manufacture composed wholly or Class 4.-Articles of manufacture composed wholly or Class 7.-Shawls, if the design be applied solely by Class 8.-Shawls not comprised in Class 7: or, 5. That the author of any such new and original design shall be considered the proprietor thereof, unless he have executed the work on behalf of another person for a good or a valuable consideration, in which case such person shall be considered the proprietor, and shall be entitled to be registered in the place of the author; and every person acquiring for a good or a valuable consideration a new and original design, or the right to apply the same to ornamenting any one or more articles of manufacture, or any one or more such substances as aforesaid, either exclusively of any other person or otherwise, and also every person upon whom the property in such design or such right to the application thereof shall devolve, shall be consi dered the proprietor of the design in the respect in which the same may have been so acquired, and to that extent, but not otherwise. 6. That every person purchasing or otherwise acquiring the right to the entire or partial use of any such design may enter his title in the register hereby provided, and any writing purporting to be a transfer of such design and signed by the proprietor thereof, shall operate as an effectual transfer; and the registrar shall, on request, and the production of such writing, or in the case of acquiring such right by any other mode than that of purchase on the production of any evidence to the sa tisfaction of the registrar, insert the name of the new proprietor in the register; and the following may be the form of such transfer, and of such request to the registrar: Form of Transfer, and Authority to register. I A. B., author [or proprietor] of design, No. -, having transferred my right thereto, [or, if such transfer be partial], cles of manufacture or substances, or the locality with respect so far as regards the ornamenting of [describe the artito which the right is transferred], to B. C. of do hereby authorize you to insert his name on the register of designs accordingly. Form of Request to register. I B. C., the person mentioned in the above transfer, do request you to register my name and property in the said design as entitled [if to the entire use] to the entire use of such de sign, [or, if to the partial use], to the partial use of such design, so far as regards the application thereof, [describe the articles of manufacture, or the locality in relation to which the right is transferred.] But if such request to register be made by any person to whom |