No. 287. LONDON, JULY 9, 1842. PRICE 18. * The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity: THE very ancient jurisdiction of the Justices of Sessions, which has for no inconsiderable time been tottering in the estimation of the public, has at length received an almost stunning blow at the hands of the Legislature. Originally, it seems, Justices of the Peace had powers almost co-extensive with those of the Judges. By 34 Edw. 3, c. 1, their Courts were to be constituted of "one Lord, with three or four of the most worthy, together with more learned in the law," and had power to take, arrest, and chastise offenders, and to hear and determine, at the King's suit, all manner of felonies and trespasses done in the county, according to the laws and customs of the realm.. "This statute, according to Lord Holt, (Harcourt v. Fox, 1 Show. edit. Leach, 507), made them complete Judges; they were to have a commission; they had authority to hold a Court; and thereby they were Judges of a Court of Record;" and they have been since held to have jurisdiction to try generally felonies and trespasses, with some few exceptions. "In the result," says a learned author on this subject, "it appears that the Quarter Sessions have power to try all indictable offences, whether offences at common law, or created by statute; with the exception of treason, misprision of treason, præmunire, forgery, and perjury at common law, and, perhaps, usury.' (Dickinson's Guide, edit. Talfourd, p. 130). And although in practice scarcely any of the higher order of crimes are tried at Sessions, the Justices very judiciously confining in general the exercise of their jurisdiction to cases of simple larceny, and crimes not exceeding that class in extent; yet the jurisdiction, until the statute just passed, has subsisted, and has occasionally been exercised, and while it gave great dignity and importance to the Quarter Sessions, gave them also greater power of doing mischief. VOL. VI. Z Of the crimes over which the Courts of Quarter Sessions had jurisdiction, a great many, and some of those over which they exercised it in practice, are now taken from them by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, intituled " An Act to define the Jurisdiction of Justices in General and Quarter Sessions of the Peace." The Act recites, "that it is expedient that the powers of Justices of General and Quarter Sessions of the Peace, with respect to the trial of offences, be better defined;" and then proceeds » to enact, firstly, that "neither the Justices of the Peace acting in and for any county, riding, division, or liberty, of the Peace, or at any adjournment thereof, try any nor the Recorder of any borough, shall at any Session person or persons for any treason, murder, or capital felony, or for any felony which, when committed by a person not previously convicted of felony, is punishable the following offences, that is to say,” by transportation beyond the seas for life, or for any of 1. Misprision of treason. 13. Offences against any provision of the laws relating acquire judicially from the evidence. Hence, proto bankrupts and insolvents. bably, the frequent complaints of unjust and absurd 15. Bribery. 14. Composing, printing, or publishing blasphemous, decisions at Sessions. And hence, we apprehend, will seditious, or defamatory libels. the diminution of the extent of their jurisdiction meet with approbation at the hands of the Profession as well as of the public. There will still be quite enough of jurisdiction left to occupy those Courts to the full extent of their learning and legal fitness, and they will be at the same time relieved from the necessity of the self-condemning practice, of not venturing to exercise the larger and more important part of their jurisdiction. 16. Unlawful combinations and conspiracies, except conspiracies or combinations to commit any offence which such justices or recorder respectively have or has jurisdiction to try when committed by one person. 17. Stealing or fraudulently taking, or injuring or destroying, records or documents belonging to any court of law or equity, or relating to any proceeding therein. 18. Stealing or fraudulently destroying or concealing wills or testamentary papers, or any document or written instrument being or containing evidence of the title to any real estate or any interest in lands, tenements, or hereditaments. The 2nd and 3rd sections of the Act relate to the necessary powers to be given to the Judges of the Superior Courts, for effectually transferring to their jurisdiction the trial of crimes, the jurisdiction over which is taken from the Quarter Sessions by the Act, and the prelimi nary proceedings in respect of which have been instituted before the passing of the Act. The 4th section gives power to the Justices of the Peace to divide their Courts, so that where a chairman and deputy chairman are appointed, some of the justices may, with the assistance of the chairman, hear part of the business, while others, with the assistance of the deputy chairman, may hear other parts of the business. | With regard to the construction of the Act just passed, it is impossible but that an act effecting such great changes in so laconic a mode, should fail to open many points for doubt and discussion, or to have in some measure effects probably not intended. For instance: the sixteenth exception from the jurisdiction of the Quarter Sessions is "unlawful combinations and conspiracies, except conspiracies or combinations to commit any offence which such Justices or Recorder respectively have or has jurisdiction to try, when committed by one person." We doubt not that the intention of this clause was to exclude the Quarter Sessions from trying a conspiracy for the commission of any offence, which of itself is in point of magnitude above the jurisdiction; but to permit them to try conspiracy for the commission of any offence, of itself of sufficiently trifling character to But this excluding clause be within their jurisdiction. will, we apprehend, have the effect of withdrawing from It needs scarcely be observed, that this Act goes very their jurisdiction a class of cases not falling within the far in reducing the jurisdiction of the Courts of Quarter ground of exclusion, and therefore not intended to be Sessions, and must have the effect of very soon reducing excluded; we mean all cases of conspiracy where the them to the transaction, with a few exceptions, of act conspired to be done is in itself not unlawful, and comparatively trivial business. That the administra- the crime is solely in the conspiracy, or the means of tion of Criminal Justice will be benefited by this trans-conducting it. Here, it is plain the Justices would not fer of a great part of the occupation of Courts of Session have jurisdiction to try the act conspired to be done, if to the superior Courts is, we think, not very much to be it were done by a single individual; because then it doubted; the constitution of a Bench of County Ma- would not be an offence at all; and as the Justices cangistrates being of such a nature as to render it, in the not try a conspiracy unless they could try the act conpresent state of the law, almost of its very nature in-spired to be done, if done by a single individual, it seems competent to deal with all the graver classes of crime of a violent nature, in which, if not the life of the accused, at least his personal liberty for a lengthened period, is at stake; and also, with the whole class of cases of crime, involving in the question of its commission, investigations of law bordering upon the domain of the laws of property and of contract. The mere absence of legal learning, which must characterise a body selected from among laymen, and that more on account of general respectability of character and personal importance in the county, than on account of predominant intellect, would be of itself no slight evil, where the business to be done is the determination of legal rights. But the absence of mere learning is perhaps even less pernicious than the absence of those judicial habits in the hearing of causes and the reception and application of evidence, which nothing but a long course of legal education and attendance upon courts can give. Persons not bred as lawyers find habitually a difficulty approaching almost to impossibility, in discharging from their minds all knowledge relating to the matter before them, except that which they that all conspiracies where the crime is merely in the conspiracy, or in the means of carrying it into effect, and not in the act, must be tried elsewhere than at sessions, although the means used might of themselves fall within the jurisdiction of the justices. Again, with regard to the 13th clause of exclusion, cases will probably arise where the offence is an offence at common law, and also incidentally an offence against some provision of the laws relating to bankrupts and insolvents. Whether it is the intention of the act to take away the jurisdiction of magistrates in such cases, may become an arguable question. Great, and we believe beneficial, changes will however be on the whole effected by this act; and it does not seem altogether unreasonable to imagine, that, if it has not been intended to do so, it will in fact pave the way to some plan for ingrafting on the jurisdiction of Justices of Quarter Sessions and Recorders, a jurisdiction in civil matters, in the nature of that local jurisdiction, which has been hitherto so frequently the subject of futile legislative schemes for local or county courts. STRAINT OF TRADE. A LEARNED correspondent has favoured us with an ON BONDS AND OTHER CONTRACTS IN REelaborate argument in support of the claim of a judgment creditor who has taken possession under an elegit, without notice of prior equitable incumbrancers, to hold the land against such incumbrancers. We apprehend, that the point is too plain to be questioned. The novel part of Lord Cottenham's dictum in Whitworth v. Gaugain, (1 Cr. & Ph. 325; 5 Jur. 523), and that which has not met with the general acquiescence of the profession, is the doctrine, that a judgment creditor who has taken his judgment without notice of a prior equitable incumbrance on specific lands, may, after he has notice of the incumbrance, sue out execution and extend the lands, without any liability to equitable interference; the objection to his claim to do this being, that, according to some old authorities, a creditor cannot be regarded as having the security of specific lands in his contemplation when he takes a judgment, and therefore his equity to resort to those lands must be treated as inferior to the equity of an incumbrancer by direct charge; so that the case does not fall within the rule, that a Court of equity will not interfere to take away the legal estate in favour of one whose claim is founded on no better equity, but on priority merely. Upon this question we shall take an early opportunity of offering some further remarks. But where the creditor, before he receives notice of a prior claim, actually resorts to the security of the particular lands in dispute by suing out execution, there can be no pretence for treating his equity as being in any way inferior to or less specific than that obtained by the most direct and formal charge that can be made. ATTENDANCE AT the Judges's CHAMBERS.-A Correspondent suggests, that, amidst the various improvements in the practice of the Courts, it is somewhat surprising to find that no effectual improvement has taken place to diminish the long-existing and universally complainedof inconvenience of attendance at the Chambers of the respective Judges. There can be no doubt that the Judges would willingly lend their aid to amend the present vexatious system of attending summonses, if some better mode were suggested to them. At the present time, and during a part of the long vacation, the attornies and their clerks are uselessly kept waiting sometimes the whole day, and on other days for two or three hours together, before they can take their turn to go before the sitting Judge; and in many instances, the matter to be heard is of such a nature as to be disposed of by the Judge in a few seconds. Now, with a view to lessen the labour of the Judge, and to save much valuable time, our correspondent suggests that summonses for time to plead, for delivery of better particulars of plaintiff's demand, for admission of documents, and for taxation of costs, and such other matters as might be approved of by the Judges, should be heard and disposed of by one of the present Masters of each court, whose duty it should be to attend daily at the chambers of the respective Judges, in the same manner as the Masters in Chancery give their attendance at the public office. This arrangement would occupy the Masters but a short time, and would afford greater facility to the Judges to dispatch their other business. During the long vacation, the inconvenience is intolerable, for one Judge has to take on himself the burthen of the business of all the courts; and although he attends from ten o'clock in the forenoon till five o'clock in the afternoon, he is frequently unable to get through his summonses, many of which are necessarily adjourned till the following day. It is therefore to be hoped that some such improvement as is here suggested will soon be effected. It has been long laid down as a principle of law, that contracts in restraint of trade generally cannot be supmodern ones, (Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. W. 181, and 10 ported. In an early case, much cited in all the more Mod. 130), in which the court determined in favour of a bond, reciting, that A. had taken a shop of B., who was a baker, for a certain term, and had given B. so the term B. should not exercise the trade of a baker much money for it, and conditioned to be void if during within the parish where the shop was, the court discussed the law on this subject at length, and laid down, that general restraints in trade over all England are void, whether by bond, contract, or promise; and that, whether relating to a man's own trade to which he is brought up, or any other trade; and that no man can contract not to use trade at all. (See 1 P. W. 187). The doctrine was put in that case on the twofold ground of the mischief to the party restrained, by the loss of his livelihood and the subsistence of his family, and the mischief to the public by depriving it of an useful member*. Again, in The Gunmakers' Company v. Fell, (Willis, 388), the court said, referring to the case above cited-"The general rule is, that all restraints of trade, (which the law so much favours), if nothing more appears, are bad." And without going through the whole list of cases in which this doctrine has been recognised as law, it may be sufficient to refer to the recent case of Ward v. Byrne, (5 Mee. & W. 548), in which the court, holding that a bond entered into by the defendant, prevented him (if valid) generally from setting up in business on his own account as a coal merchant, or for a certain time limited in the bond, held as a consebeing employed by any other person in that business quence that the bond was void in law, as this would be a restriction unlimited in point of space. "The parties," said Lord Abinger, C. B., "stand thus-The defendant served the plaintiff in his capacity of a coal merchant, probably to keep his accounts; and if the plaintiff had limited the restraint to his accepting any office as clerk to a coal merchant within a given distance, so as not to prejudice the plaintiff, that might have been reasonable. But the construction which the court have put upon the contract is, that he (the defendant) is not to become a coal merchant, or serve one in any capacity whatever for the space of nine months. This restriction extends to all parts of England, and to every species of engagement by which this person during that time could gain a livelihood by his trade. What protection could the plaintiff require to an extent like this? Can it be supposed the plaintiff's trade could be prejudiced by this man's entering into the service of a coal merchant in Scotland? . . . The obligation which the defendant undertakes by his bond is, that he neither shall be nor serve a coal merchant in any capacity for nine months. That goes so far beyond what the plaintiff could require, that it is an unreasonable restriction. It is void on both grounds." And per Parke, B."The question is, whether the restraint is not void as being against the general policy of the law. The principle on which these cases stand is laid down in Mitchell v. Reynolds, that the public have an interest in every person for if a man contracts for an adequate consideration not to pur*The soundness of this reasoning may be much questioned; sue a trade, he does not deprive himself of his livelihood or his family of subsistence, any more than the owner of land does when he sells his land and obtains the price of it; nor can the public be said to lose the services of an useful member, for the effect of the transaction is in substance merely to take A. out of a particular mode of serving the public, and replace him by B. carrying on his trade freely, and therefore a general restraint of trade is void on a principle of public policy, when entered into by bond or by simple contract." And further: "It seems to me that there is no authority in favour of the position that there can be a general restriction limited only as to time*. It might therefore now be considered, but for a very recent case which we will next notice, that any agreement by which a party affects to bind himself not to carry on trade, either with or without limit as to time, is void if it be not limited as to locality. But in Whittaker v. Howe, (3 Beav. 383), Lord Langdale, M. R., held an agreement by a solicitor for valuable consideration not to practise as solicitor in any part of Great Britain for twenty years without the consent of the plaintiff valid, and his Lordship accordingly restrained the defendant from practising as an attorney or solicitor in any part of Great Britain, in his own name or in the name of any other person, and from endeavouring to induce any persons clients of the plaintiff to cease or abstain from employing the plaintiff as their attorney or solicitor. It does not appear that Ward v. Byrne was cited to his Lordship; but the cases and dicta most relied upon in Ward v. Byrne were cited. There were several points made in the case, but on the principal one, of the validity of the agreement, Lord Langdale thus expressed himself: "The agreement is alleged to be void as being in restraint of the exercise of trade or profession. In the cases which have occurred, I have not observed any distinction taken between trade and professions. But the distinction between different sorts of trades or professions has been taken and appears to be material. In this case a valuable consideration being given, the tion is, whether the restraint intended to be imposed on Mr. Howe is reasonable. The words of Chief Justice Tindal, in Horner v. Graves, (7 Bing. 743), may be safely adopted: We do not see how a better test can be applied to the question, whether this is or is not a reasonable restraint of trade, than by considering whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public. Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the party (requires) can be of no benefit to either; it can only be oppressive, and if oppressive, it is in the eye of the law unreasonable. Whatever is injurious to the interests of the public is void on the grounds of public policy.' 6 ques "Now, whatever may be the talents, knowledge, and experience of Mr. Howe, and I am disposed to rate them highly, I cannot say that in my opinion, the public interest will be in any way interfered with or affected, by his not being allowed to practise as an attorney and solicitor in Great Britain for twenty years without the consent of Mr. Whittaker. "The question therefore is, whether the restraint ought to be considered as reasonable in this particular case. The business is that of an attorney and solicitor, which, to a large extent, may be carried on by correspondence or by agents; and as to which it has already been decided, that a restraint of practice within a distance of *It should be observed, that in this case a case was cited from the Year Book, (2 H. 5, pl. 26), as determining that a bond not to carry on the trade of a dyer for half-a-year was void. But on examining that case, it does not appear that the restriction was general. The condition was, that if the defendant should not use his trade of a dyer in the town where the plaintiff, &c., for half-a-year, the bond should be of no force. The words in the Year Book are 66 sur condition q si le def ne usent my son art de dier's craft deins le ville ou le plaintiff, &c., per certain temps, &c." The case therefore determined, not that a general restriction of trade is void, but what is clearly at this day not law, viz. that a restriction against carrying on trade for a limited time in a particular place, is void. 150 miles was not an unreasonable restraint. It was decided in the case of the surgeon dentist, where the occupation required the personal presence of the practiser and the patient at the same place, that a restraint of practice within a distance of 100 miles was an unreasonable restraint. "Agreeing with the Court of Common Pleas, that in such cases no certain precise boundary can be laid down within which the restraint would be reasonable, and beyond which excessive;' having regard to the nature of the profession, to the limitation of time, and to the decision that a distance of 150 miles does not describe an unreasonable boundary, I must say, as Lord Kenyon said in Davis v. Mason, I do not see that the limits are necessarily unreasonable, nor do I know how to draw the line.' "At present, therefore, I cannot come to the conclusion that this agreement is void; and I do not think that this court can refuse to grant an injunction to restrain the violation of a contract or covenant, because there may be some part of the agreement which the court could not compel the defendant specifically to perform." The Master of the Rolls appears therefore to have considered that the rule is, not merely that a general restriction on trade is void, but that every restriction on trade is void, subject to this, among other exceptions, that if it can be shewn that the particular restriction before the court is not de facto injurious to the public, and is not unreasonable, as regards the protection of the contracting party, having regard to the nature of the business to which the restriction applies, then the general rule does not apply, and the contract may be supported. In this view of the case, Whittaker v. Howe, although at first sight it seems inconsistent with the cases in general, and in particular with Warde v. Byrne, will be found perhaps not to impugn the authority of that case; for although in Warde v. Byrne, the circumstances, so far as regards time and locality, were of exactly the same nature as in Whittaker v. Howe, yet, in Warde v. Byrne, it would seem, by what fell from the judges, that the determination was partly grounded on this-that the restriction, to the extent to which it was carried, was not necessary for the protection of the contracting party, and therefore there was nothing to displace the application of the maxim, that, as tending to the withdrawal of the restricted party from serving the public, and as tending to preclude him from using his trade as a means of subsistence, it was against public policy. It cannot however be denied that the case of Whit taker v. Howe to some extent modifies, if it does not actually clash with the doctrine of preceding cases, and unless that case is overruled, the principle must now, as we apprehend, be considered this-that a restriction is bad, unless the nature of the business to which it reupon trade generally, without any limit as to locality, fers is such, that the protection of the contracting party may require so extensive a restriction, and that the public interest may not be damaged by the withdrawal of the services of the individual restrained. That there are many exceptions to the general rule in respect of special restrictions on trade, whether as to particular customers or particular localities, is also well settled on authority. We shall reserve the consideration of these special restrictions to a future number. C. D. MASTERS IN CHANCERY.-The following gentlemen have been appointed Masters Extraordinary in the High Court of Chancery:-Henry Edward Ridgway, of Manchester; Robert James Sykes, of Nottingham. Emperial Parliament. HOUSE OF LORDS. The Tithe Commutation Act Amendment Bill went through committee, was reported with amendments, and ordered to be printed as amended. The Lord Chancellor gave notice of motion for Tuesday nert, for the second reading of the Bankruptcy Law Amendment Bill. Lord Cottenham gave a similar notice for the second ing of the Bankrupt Law Amendment Bill, the Local Courts Bill, and the Bankruptcy, Insolvency, and Lunacy Bill. London Gazettes. TUESDAY, JULY 5. of Bankruptcy, aud. ac.—Saml. Garcia, Brydges-st., Coventgarden, shell fishmonger, July 28 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, aud. ac.-Joseph Hayward, Manchester, bookseller, July 30 at 10, Commissioners'-rooms, Manchester, aud. ac.; at 11, div.-John Bridle, Shepton Mallet, Somersetshire, grocer, Aug. 3 at 11, Mitre Inn, Wells, aud. ac.—Joel Gardiner, Cathay, Bristol, common brewer, Aug. 5 at 12, Commercialrooms, Bristol, aud. ac.-M. Potter and John Lever, Manchester, commission agents, July 27 at 10, Commissioners'rooms, Manchester, aud. ac.-Henry Duckett, Ramsgate, Kent, carpenter, Aug. 16 at 9, Royal Oak Inn, Ramsgate, aud. read-ac.-Thos. Renny and Wm. Brown, Liverpool, oil-cloth manufacturers, Sept. 14 at 12, Atkinson's, Liverpool, aud. ac.— John Brook and Thos. Brook, Stourbridge, Worcestershire, drapers, July 28 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, div.-E. Smith, Southampton, grocer, July 26 at 2, George Inn, Southampton, aud. ac.; at 3, div.-Thos. W. Kirkbride, Nantwich, Chester, brewer, July 27 at 1, King's Arms, Middlewich, aud. ac.; at 2, fin. div.-Nath. Litherland, Liverpool, merchant, July 30 at 1, Clarendon-rooms, Liverpool, aud. ac.; at 2, div. -James Weldon, Kidderminster, Worcestershire, and Bell'sbuildings, Salisbury-sq., London, feather merchant, July 30 at 11, Black Horse Inn, Kidderminster, aud. ac.; at 12, div. -Jos. Ankers, Birmingham, grocer, July 26 at 1, Waterloorooms, Birmingham, last ex. and aud. ac.; at 2, div.-John Tarleton, Gloucester-pl., merchant, July 27 at 1, Clarendonbuilder, August 1 at 12, Old London Inn, Exeter, first and rooms, Liverpool, aud. ac.; at 2, div.-Edw. Jeffery, Exeter, DECLARATION OF INSOLVENCY. BANKRUPTS. EDWARD POORE, Bampton, Devonshire, druggist and stationer, Aug. 2 and 16 at 12, Old London Inn, Exeter: Sols. Bishop & Pitts, Exeter; Harris, 5, Stone-buildings, Lin coln's-inn.-Fiat dated June 25. JOHN SMITH, Hoo-mill, Haselor, Warwickshire, miller, dated June 28. JOHN ROBINSON, Dundalk, Louth, Ireland, commission June 10. GEORGE RENNOLDSON, South Shields, Durham, mil- WILLIAM HAIGH, Huddersfield, Yorkshire, woollen cloth merchants, MEETINGS. John Bowring and Wm. Garrard, Exmouth-st., Clerkenwell, linen-draper, July 22 at 2, Court of Bankruptcy, last ex. J. Bowring. George Booth, Princes-st., Lambeth, limeburner, July 15 at half-past 10, Court of Bankruptcy, last ex. James Greenlees, Friday-st., Cheapside, shawl warehouseman, July 12 at half-past 1, Court of Bankruptcy, last ex.— Wm. Filmer and W. S. Gooding, Osborne-st., Whitechapel, brewers, July 12 at 2, Court of Bankruptcy, last ex.-E. H. Waller and Wm. Waters, Chepstow, Monmouthshire, timber merchants, July 26 at 11, King's Head Hotel, Newport, last -J. P. Clarke and O. Lewis, Crown-court, Threadneedlest., newspaper and advertisement agents, July 28 at 12, Court fin. div. CERTIFICATES to be allowed, Unless Cause shewn to the contrary, on or before July 26. David Howarth, sen., David Howarth, jun., and Robert Howarth, Rochdale, Lancashire, iron founders.-J. A. Cater, Hertford, brewer.—Sam. Garcia, Brydges-st., Covent-garden, shell fishmonger.-Edward Keys, Hanley, Staffordshire, china manufacturer.-Dominick Pope, New York, United States of America, and Fenchurch-st., London, merchant.--Chas. Dod, Riches-court, Lime-st., ship broker.-Edward Smith, Southampton, grocer.-Robert Lundie, Kingston-upon-Hull, wine merchant.-Jas. Salter, Bristol, patten and clog maker.-J. Courtney, Brecon, Brecknockshire, druggist.-John Heaword, Portwood, within Brinnington, Stockport, Chester, cotton heald yarn manufacturer.-Wm. Storey, Sheffield-park, Sheffield, pawnbroker.-Rich. E. Lee, Craven-buildings, Drurylane, printer and publisher.-Thos. John Winter, Tottenhamcourt-road, bill broker and discounter. FIAT ANNUlled. Jas. Monteith, Totness, Devonshire, mercer. SCOTCH SEQUESTRATIONS. merchant.-Donald M'Gregor, Tradeston of Glasgow, innRob. Bowes, Glasgow, joiner.-Geo. Forsyth, Coatbridge, keeper.-Jas. Moncur, Haughend by Dunkeld, distiller.-J. Thomson, Leith, corn merchant.- Campbell and Brown, Edinburgh, tailors. INSOLVENT DEBTORS. Saturday, July 2, 1842. The following Assignees have been appointed. Further Particulars may be learned at the Office, in Portugal-st., Lincoln's-inn-fields, on giving the Ñumber of the Case. Edw. Tomlinson, King-st., Soho, shoemaker, No. 6014 C.; Wm. Grane, new assignee, in the room of John Tomlinson, deceased. The following Prisoners are ordered to be brought before the |