later stages of the campaign, evince in | Moore was the transition from the the clearest colours the influence of this paralysed timidity which refused sucdepressing feeling, to which the false cours to the Russians after Eylau, to exaggerations and real disasters of the the invincible tenacity which gave Spaniards afforded at the time too much durable success to Wellington's camconfirmation. Instead, therefore, of paigns. Happy the nation which can casting a shade on the memory of any purchase absolution for past errors by of the gallant officers intrusted with the so trivial a sacrifice-which can span direction of the campaign, let us regard the gulf from disaster to victory with its calamitous issue as the forfeit paid no greater losses than those sustained by the nation for the undue circum- in the Corunna retreat, and to whom spection of former years, which had the path of the necessary suffering, become so universal as to have pene- commencing by the gift of a momentrated the breast and chilled the hopes tous benefit, is terminated by a ray of even of its most intrepid defenders, imperishable glory! and inspired them with that disquietude for their country's safety which they would never have felt for their own. Nations, like individuals, never yet withdrew from the ways of error, but by the path of suffering; the sins of the fathers are still visited upon the children. The retreat of Sir John

lish army; if that be so, Spain is lost. The English army, I hope, will do all which can be expected from its numbers; but the safety of Spain depends upon the union of its inhabitants, their enthusiasm in the cause, and their firm determination to die rather than submit to the French. Nothing short of this will enable them to resist the formidable attack about to be made upon them. If they will adhere, our aid can be of the greatest use to them; but if not, we shall soon be outnumbered were our forces quadrupled. I am, therefore, much more anxious to see exertion and energy in the government, and enthusiasm in their armies, than to have my force augmented. The moment is a critical one-my own situaation is peculiarly so-I have never seen it otherwise; but I have pushed into Spain at all hazards. This was the order of my government, and it was the will of the people of England. I shall endeavour to do my best, hoping that all the bad that may happen will not happen, but that with a share of bad we shall also have a portion of good fortune."-"Every effort," he says, writing to Lord Castlereagh on the 24th of November, "shall be exerted on my part, and that of the officers with me, to unite the army; but your Lordship must be prepared to hear that we have failed: for, situated as we are, success cannot be commanded by any efforts we can make if the enemy are prepared to oppose us. To add to all his other grounds of despondency, he considered Portugal as utterly indefensible by any force England could send thither. "If the French succeed in Spain, it will be in vain," he says, in another letter to Lord Castlereagh, "to attempt to resist them in Portugal. The Portuguese are without a military force, and, from the experience of their conduct under Sir Arthur

"

71. The peculiar character of the British and French troops had already clearly manifested itself in the course of this brief but active campaign. In every regular engagement from first to last, the English had proved successful; they had triumphed equally over the conscripts of Junot and the ImWellesley, no dependence is to be placed on any aid they can give. The British must, in that event, I conceive, immediately take steps to evacuate the country. Lisbon is the only port, and therefore the only place whence the army with its stores can embark. Elvas and Almeida are the only fortresses on the frontiers. The first is, I am told, a respectable work. Almeida is defective, and could not hold out beyond ten days against a regular attack. I have ordered a depot of provisions for a short consumption to be formed there, in case this army should be obliged to fall back; perhaps the same should be done at Elvas. In this case, we might retard the progress of the enemy while the stores were embarking, and arrangements were made for taking off the the army. Beyond this, the defence of Lisbon or of Portugal should not be thought of."CHAMBERS' Scottish Biography, iv. 32, 33. Contrast this with the memorandum of Wellington a few months after, on 9th March 1809, in which he expressed a decided opinion, that "Portugal might be successfully defended even against any force the French could bring against it, and that the maintenance of that position by the British would be the greatest support to the common cause in Spain," and observe the difference between an able, but not original mind, which receives its impressions from the current doctrines of the day, and those great intellects which, taking counsel only of their own inspiration, at once break off from general opinion, and for good or for evil determine the fate of nations.-See WELLINGTON's Memorandum on the defence of Portugal, 9th March 1809; GURWOOD, iv. 261, quoted infra, Chap. LXII. § 19, note; and his Despatches to LORD CASTLEREAGH, 2d April 1810; GURWOOD vi. 5.

perial Guard of Bessières; the heroes | French centre, and drove back Louis of Austerlitz and Friedland had quailed XV. from his station, after having sucand sunk beneath their steel. Con- cessively routed every battalion but sidering how inexperienced almost all two in his army; and we have the authe English regiments were, and that thority of the French historians for most of the troops engaged at Roliça, the assertion that, if they had been at Vimeira, and Corunna, there saw a all supported by the Austrians and shot fired for the first time in anger, Dutch,* they must have gained a glothese successes were extremely re- rious victory. So clearly is this supemarkable, achieved as they were, some- riority of the English in land, not less times over veteran troops of the enemy, than on sea battles, established by the always over those who had the dis- unbroken events of five centuries, that cipline and experience gained by fifteen it is admitted by the ablest and most years of victory to direct their organi- impassioned French historians, whose sation and animate their spirits. They rancour against this country is most point evidently to what subsequent inveterate, though they profess themexperience so clearly verified, a greater selves unable to give any account of it.t degree of courage at the decisive moment, arising either from some inherent peculiarity of race, or the animating influence of a free constitution and a long course of historic glory. All the great defeats of France at land have come from England. Tenchebray, Cressy, Poitiers, Verneuil, Azincour, Blenheim, Ramilies, Oudenarde, Minden, Quebec, Dettingen, Alexandria, Talavera, Salamanca, Vittoria, Waterloo, were all won by the surpassing valour of British soldiers, often against overwhelming odds of their Continental rivals. Even at Fontenoy, the only great victory since the battle of Hastings which the French have gained over the English, the British were entirely successful: "the terrible English column" penetrated through the

"The English advanced with unwavering firmness. As the ground narrowed, their battalions were forced to close ranks; and thus naturally formed that terrible column, the power of which the Duke of Cumberland so well appreciated. In fact, it marched forward, scattering death on all sides. Nothing could make any impression on this terrible mass of men. The French regiments in vain dashed against it. The French Guards were the first corps whom the English encountered. Before the firing began, an English officer rode out of the ranks, and taking off his hat, said-Gentlemen of France, fire.' A French officer likewise advanced, and replied-'The French do not fire first.' The English then fired, and with such precision, that the first line of the Guards was swept away. This ill-timed courtesy cost the lives of eighteen officers. The column still advanced slowly, but with unshakable firmness. It had penetrated six hundred yards beyond the front of the French army. The battle seemed lost, and

72. But in other respects the superiority of the enemy was manifest, and all the good effects of achieved victory were liable to be lost by the English army, from the want of due discipline and docility in the troops, or from remissness and inexperience on the part of the officers. Place them in a fair field in front of the enemy, and both would honourably discharge their duty: but expose them to the fatigues of a campaign; subject them to the frozen snow or the dripping bivouac; require them to recede before the enemy, and bear the galling reproaches of a pursuer or ally, in expectation of the time when the proper season for action should arrive, and it was evident that they had still much to learn in the military art. Above all, intoxication, those around the King already began to talk of the necessity of his retreating. All was lost if the King had quitted the field of battle. Four pieces of cannon, kept in reserve for his protection, were brought forward and formed as a battery at forty paces from the English column. They fired grape in rapid rounds: immense gaps were opened in the compact mass; all the King's household cav. alry prepared to dash forward. The Dauphin drew his sword and shouted, March, Frenchmen! Where is the honour of France ? The cavalry poured in on all sides through the gaps that the guns had made. sword aided the fire in this work of destruction, and speedily this terrible column was broken into fragments, scattered over the plain, and finally sought safety in flight."-DE TOCQUEVILLE, Histoire de Louis XV., i. 526, 527. Such were the exploits of England in the only pitched battle since that of Hastings which they have lost in Europe.

† MICHELET, Histoire de France, iv. 137.

The

the inherent national vice, too often loosened the bonds of discipline, and exposed the army to the most serious disasters. These disorders explain the calamities of Sir John Moore's retreat, and go far to excuse his gloomy presentiments as to the ultimate issue of the campaign. In sobriety, durable activity, perseverance under fatigue, care of their horses, versatility of talent, and cheerfulness in disaster, the French were evidently and painfully the superiors of their undaunted rivals; the British army could never, in the same time and with the same

order, have made Napoleon's march from Madrid to Astorga. Such were the different excellences of the two armies who were destined, in six successive campaigns, to emulate each other's virtues, and shun each other's defects; and such the aspect of the war when Great Britain, throwing off the unworthy timidity of former years, first descended as a principal into the fight, and Wellington, alternately the Fabius and Marcellus of the contest, prepared, in the fields rendered illustrious by a former Scipio, the triumphs of a second Zama.

CHAPTER LVI.

CAMPAIGN OF ABENSBERG, LANDSHUT, AND ECHMÜHL.

1. As the history of Europe, during | there made, externally and internally, the eventful years which succeeded to achieve success, the foundation was the French Revolution, contains, in necessarily laid for disappointment and the domestic transactions of every change within, exhaustion and ultistate possessing the shadow even of mate disaster without. Austria, less free institutions, a perpetual recurrence powerfully agitated in the outset, was of the strife between the aristocratic directed by principles calculated to be and democratic principles; so the mili- more uniform in their operation, and tary annals of the same period illus- more effective in the end. Recurring trate the effect of these opposite powers to the aid of popular enthusiasm only on the course of external events, and when driven to it by necessity, and the issue of warlike operations. In the guided throughout by aristocratic foreresults of military operations, not less sight, she did not so soon wear out than the consequences of social con- the mighty fire which shakes the vulsion, we perceive the influence of world. Like a skilful combatant, she the same antagonist principles: the gave ground and yielded, till the long-continued successes of the one, strength of her antagonist had exnot less than the persevering firmness hausted itself by exertion; and thus of the other, illustrate the action of succeeded at last, not only in appearthose great contending powers which in ing with undiminished strength on the every age have divided between them theatre of combat, but rousing round the government of mankind. France, her standard the still unexhausted buoyant with the energy, and radiant vigour of popular excitation. with the enthusiasm of a revolution, 2. Since the gallant but unsuccesswas for long triumphant; but the ful attempt made by the Imperial govfever of passion is transient, the sug-ernment in 1805, the cabinet of Vienna gestions of interest are permanent in had adhered with cautious prudence their effects; and in the vehement ex- to a system of neutrality. Even the ertions which the democratic principle extraordinary temptation afforded by

the disasters of the Polish campaign, | portion of cavalry and artillery, so as and the opportunity then arising, of to render it a little army complete in striking a decisive blow when the forces itself-that admirable system, which of the East and the West were engaged Napoleon had adopted from the anin doubtful hostility on the banks of the cient conquerors of the world-was inAlle, had not been able to rouse it to troduced into the Imperial service. At immediate exertion. Austria armed, the same time the younger and more indeed, and assumed a menacing atti- ardent officers, with the Archduke tude, but not a sword was drawn. And John at their head, eagerly supported the impolitic secession of England from still more energetic steps; formed the theatre of Continental strife at plans of national defence and internal that period, joined to the rapid termi- communication; warmly recommended nation of the contest by the disaster the adoption of measures calculated of Friedland, put an entire stop to any to rouse the national enthusiasm in projects of hostility which a decided the public defence; and already convictory in that quarter by the Musco- templated those heroic sacrifices in the vite arms, or even the transfer of the event of another invasion, which afterwar into the interior of Russia, might wards, under Wellington in Portugal, probably have induced them to enter and Alexander in Russia, led to such tain. But during this interval the memorable results. government was not idle. Under the 3. It was the presence of the Grand able guidance of the Archduke Charles, Army of France, two hundred thouthe war department assumed an ex- sand strong, in the north and west of traordinary degree of activity; the Germany, which long overawed the vast chasms which the campaigns of Imperial government, and prevented Ulm and Austerlitz had occasioned in the adoption of any steps which could the ranks were filled up by voluntary give umbrage to Napoleon. But with recruiting, or the prisoners who at the transfer of a large part of that imlength were restored by the French mense force to the Peninsula, after government; and, with a patriotism the breaking out of the war there, and wisdom worthy of the highest this oppressive load was materially diadmiration, the treasury, at the very minished. The able statesman whotime when the state was overburdened directed the Imperial councils, immewith the enormous contribution of diately perceived that a powerful difour millions sterling, imposed by the version was now likely to be made in victorious French troops, purchased the quarter where the French Empefrom their retiring armies the greater ror least expected it, and where he part of the immense park of two thou- was most desirous of obtaining solid sand pieces of cannon, which they were support. They readily anticipated that removing from the arsenal of Vienna. England would not be slow in availing During the whole of 1806 and 1807, herself of this unexpected revolution the efforts of the war department were of fortune in her favour, and in deincessant to restore, without any os- scending in strength upon that theatre tentatious display, the horses of the of warfare where the sea would prove cavalry and artillery, and replenish the the best possible base for military arsenals and magazines, which had been operations, and the scanty internal renearly emptied by the consumption or sources of the country would render spoliation of the last campaign. But it impossible to keep the armies of the attention of the Archduke was, in France together for any length of time an especial manner, drawn to the re- in sufficient strength for their expulmodelling of the infantry, the real sion. In order to be in a situation to basis of all powerful military estab-improve any chances which might lishments. The French organisation thus arise in their favour, the cabinet into corps d'armée, under the command of Vienna no sooner heard of the of marshals, and divisions under them breaking out of the Spanish contest, of generals, each with a certain pro- than they issued a decree by which a