representative in the Commons House of Parliament (x). In addition to which, his estate, through the channels of alienation, settlement, mortgage, and testamentary disposition, may be made subservient to most of the various purposes suggested by interest, necessity, or caprice.

These remarks are applicable only to leases for terms of years.

Leases for lives seem to have originated under the system of the feudal tenures before feuds became hereditary. They conferred a freehold interest, with its concomitant privileges; and in their creation were attended with the solemnities afterwards adapted to the case of a fee-simple. They still retain in legal estimation their superiority as an estate over leases for years; and, until lately (y), unless a mode of assurance operating under the statute of uses, or a common law lease and release, were resorted to, or a reversion or remainder were leased for an estate of freehold, a feoffment with livery of seisin was essential to their creation, and, with the same qualifications, to their transfer also.

In attempting to explain the law connected with the subject of these volumes, I shall, after noticing,

I, The definition and general nature of a lease; and briefly adverting to,

II, The different properties of a demisable nature; proceed to consider in order,

III, The contracting parties, and the nature of their contract showing herein the distinction between an actual lease, and an agreement only for a lease;

IV, The term of the lease;

V, The instrument of demise; its essential and formal parts;

(x) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 48, s. 2.

(1) See 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 2; and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 2.

VI, The duration of the liability of the parties under their covenants; and the effect of the transmis

sion by act of law, or alienation by act of the party, of the reversion, or the lease;

VII, The determination of the lease, as well before its regular expiration, as by effluxion of time; and, after,

VIII, Offering a few remarks respecting the preparation; custody; stamping; and registration of leases; and also respecting indorsements;

Finally, add a variety of forms and precedents, which may be referred to as practical illustrations of the law contained in the body of the work, and be rendered available by the draftsman to facilitate the despatch of actual business.

Part the First.

OF THE DEFINITION AND GENERAL NATURE OF A LEASE.

A

LEASE at the common law is a grant (a) or assurance of a present or future interest, for life, for years, or at will, in lands or other property of a demisable nature, a reversion being left in the party from whom the grant or assurance proceeds (b). A pecuniary rent, or other recompense, though not essential to the contract (c), is usually reserved, payable yearly, or at other stated times, during the term. The party granting the lease is called the lessor; he to whom it is granted, the lessee. If the instrument be executed by the lessee only, it is not a lease (d).

In this definition I have referred to a reversion being left in the lessor as one of the essential conditions of a lease; but this position requires further observation.

An opinion has very generally prevailed that the existence of a reversion is one of the chief characteristics of a lease; and, what amounts to the same thing in different terms, that a transfer of the whole of a lessor's estate in the hereditaments demised operates as an assignment, to the exclusion of a reversion; in proof of which we may refer not only to

(a) The word grant is here used in its comprehensive or popular sense, and not according to its strict technical import.

(b) See as to the necessity for a re

version, infra.

(c) Knight's case, 5 Co. 55, a., 1st resolution.

(d) Doe dem. Marlow v. Wiggins, 4 Q. B. 367; S. C. 3 Ga & Dav. 504.

express judicial decisions (e) but to the pages also of various text writers (f) who have had occasion to notice the subject. Within the last five-and-twenty years, however, the point has undergone so much discussion, and so irreconcileable are the cases relating to it, that they call for examination with some degree of particularity. And the best plan, perhaps, will be to notice them in chronological order, reserving till the conclusion such remarks as they may seem to require.

In the case of Hicks v. Downing (g), the distinction between an assignment and an underlease was clearly taken; and it was resolved, that if lessee for years of a house assigned over all his term, and the house were burnt by the negligence of the assignee, no action lay for the assignor against the assignee for this; for the assignor had no residuary interest in the house. So, if lessee for three years assigned his term for four years, or demised the house for four years, he did not by this gain any tortious reversion, and it did but amount to an assignment of his interest. Other early cases are to the same effect (h).

Poultney v. Holmes (i) appears to be the first case in which a contrary doctrine was broached. The defendant having a term for years, whereof one year and three quarters were to come, agreed with the plaintiff that he should have the premises for the remainder of the term, paying to the defendant the same rent as was reserved upon the original lease. The plaintiff took possession, and brought trespass against the defendant for re-entry. It was objected, that this amounted to an assignment of the lease, and, not

(e) See the cases in this and the following pages.

(f) Lit. s. 215. Shep. Touch. 266. 2 Bla. Com. 317. Woodf. Landl. & Ten. 53, 3rd ed. by Harrison. 2 Prest. Conv. 125. Flintoff on Real Property, vol. 2, p. 579. Jarm. Prec. by Sweet, vol. 4, p. 517; vol. 5, p. 430. Watk. Conv. Book 2, chap. 4 & 9. 4 Bac. Ab. ed. by Gwil. & Dodd, vol. 4, p. 632. margl. note . Davids. Prec. vol. 1, p. 407.

(9) Hicks v. Downing, alias Smith v. Baker, 1 Ld. Raym. 99; S. C. nom.

Hicks v. Downling, 1 Salk. 13.

(h) Wheeler v. Baker, 3 Salk. 10. Floyd v. Langfield, Freem. C. P. 218; S. C., nom. Loyd v. Langford, 2 Mod. 174. Jenison v. Lord Lexington, 1 P. Wms. 555; S. C. 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 430, pl. 10. Anon., Mo. 93, pl. 230; and see Crusoe dem. Blencowe v. Bugby, 2 Wils. 234; S. C. 2 W. Blac. 766, Holford v. Hatch, 1 Dougl. 183. Kinnersley v. Orpe, 1 Dougl. 56. Earl of Derby v. Taylor, 1 East, 502.

() Poultney v. Holmes, 1 Stra. 405.