then the lessor granted for himself and his heirs that the land should remain to the executors of A. for twenty years;" the lessee for life died; A. demised for twenty years, yielding rent, and died intestate; B. took administration, and brought debt for the rent, and it was held that the action would not lie; for Gawdy and Yelverton conceived that the contingent lease of the twenty years never vested in A., but that if he had made executors they should take by way of purchase, executors being a name of purchase; but Popham and Fenner, agreeing for the matter in law as to the action of debt, conceived that the executors of A. should never take, for the estate ended before the interest commenced or arose to the executors. Moore's report (i) of the terms of the demise corresponds, in effect, though not in exact words, with Yelverton's; and he states that it was adjudged that the action would not lie, because the executors and assigns were to take by purchase the term of twenty years, and the term was never in the intestate himself to grant or dispose of, and the administrator should not take a thing limited in purchase to the executor. Noy's report of the case (k) is but a brief note, and throws no light on the subject. The conflict of opinion among the judges may, perhaps, be ascribed to the circumstance of the demise being presented to the court in different terms. But it is now settled, contrary to the current of ancient authorities (1), that a lease from A. to B. for ninety-nine years if he should so long live, and after his death, if he happen to die within the said term, or other end or determination of the said term, the remainder thereof to C. for and during the residue of the said term, vests in C. as many of the ninety-nine years as are unexpired at B.'s death; for the (i) Mo. 666. (k) Noy, 32. Tr. 43 Eliz. (1) Cecil's case, 3 Dy. 253, b. Green v. Edwards, Cro. Eliz. 216; S. C. Mo. 297; 1 And. 258; 1 Leon. 218. Anon. Mo. 247, pl. 388. 1 Bulstr. 193. Shep. word term in legal signification may mean not only the estate and interest which passes for that time, but also the limits and limitation of time; and as the acceptation of that word in the former sense would frustrate, while in the latter it would promote, the evident intention of the parties, the courts will construe the word liberally, ut res magis valeat quàm pereat, and so continue the term to C. after the death of B. (m). The means provided for remedying the inconveniences occasioned by want of proof of the decease of persons upon whose lives estates depend will be noticed at the end of the next chapter. (m) Wright, or Right, dem. Plowden v. Cartwright, 1 Burr. 282; S, C. 1 Ken. 529. Co. Lit. 45, b. And see Evans v. Vaughan, 4 Barn. & Cres. 261-8; S. C. 6 Dow. & Ry. 349, CHAPTER VI. AS TO LEASES FOR LIVES. ETWEEN leases for years and leases for a life or lives BETWE there are many important points of distinction, which relate as well to the intrinsic nature of the estate or interest itself, as to the mode of its creation and means of determination. The circumstance of a lease for life conferring a freehold is the principal characteristic distinguishing it from a lease for years, by which, as we have seen (a), the lessee takes only a chattel interest. Another point of distinction is, that it cannot be made to commence in futuro, supposing the estate to be granted by a common law lease, and not by an instrument operating under the statute of uses (b), or by way of use under the late act of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106 (c), on account of the necessity of its being accompanied or perfected by livery of seisin (d), respecting which a few remarks will be found towards the conclusion of this chapter. Neither can it be created by parol (e), as some chattel leasehold interests may (ƒ). The right of the lessee or his representatives to the emblements, on the determination of the tenancy, is another feature of distinction between a lease for life and a lease for a term of years absolute. A lease for a life or lives may be granted to one person, or to several persons; and where granted to several, the term may be made to endure for their joint lives, or for the lives and life of the survivors and survivor; or the lessees may be made to take beneficially in succession; or the estate may be held for the life or lives of a stranger or of strangers alone, or as joint cestuis que vie with the lessee or lessees. In fact, the modifications of holding are almost endless. The habendum of a lease for the lessee's life is usually to him and his assigns for and during the term of his natural life; though less formal words may be equally efficacious. Thus, a demise from day to day, or from week to week, or from month to month, or from year to year, during the life of the lessee, accompanied with livery, or, if made since the late statute of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76 (g), without livery, will amount to a good lease for life (h). And, according to Dyer (i), a similar interest passed by a demise for three years, and so from three years to three years during the life of the lessee, if livery were given; but where a lease, unaccompanied with livery, was made by a parson of his rectory to one for three years, and so from three years to three years, and so from three years to three years, during his life, it was held to create an interest for twelve years (k). But this, it is submitted, is altered, as to the livery, by the acts just referred to. If a tenant in fee-simple make a lease to A. for life, without mentioning whose life, or using any words of explanation or qualification, the lessee's will be the life intended, on the principle of construing the grant most strongly against the lessor (1). (g) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76. This act, which provided (sect. 2,) for the conveyance of freeholds by deed without livery of seisin, was repealed in this respect by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 1, as from the 1st of October, 1845; and the latter act provided, (sect. 2,) that after that day, all corporeal tenements and hereditaments, shall, as regards the conveyance of the immediate freehold thereof, be deemed to lie in grant as well as livery. (h) Plowd. 522. And see Plowd. 273. (i) Anon. Dy. 24, a. pl. (151). (k) Wrathbone v. Newbery, 3 Bulstr. 158; S. C. nom. Newberrie v. Rathbone, 1 Rol. 287. Plowd. 273. (1) Co. Lit. 42, a. Smith Doe dem. Jersey, 7 Pri. 453. Doe dem. Pritchard v. Dodd, 5 Barn. & Adol. 689; S. C. 2 Nev. & Man. 838. But if tenant in tail made such a lease before the passing of the act for the abolition of fines and recoveries (m), the lessor's life was the one intended; for a different construction might have worked a wrong by creating a discontinuance (n). It is submitted, however, that such a lease now made by a tenant in tail, in conformity with the provisions of the act referred to (0), would pass an estate for the life of the lessee. Even in the case of a tenant in fee-simple, though a demise, in the granting part of a lease, to one for the term of his natural life, be prima facie for the life of the lessee, yet other parts of the instrument may be received in evidence to indicate the life referred to by the word his. Thus, where A. demised certain premises to B., his executors, administrators, and assigns, habendum to the said B., his executors, administrators, and assigns, for and during the term of his natural life; and the lease contained a covenant by B., at the end of the said term, or other sooner determination of the lease by the death of the said A., or otherwise, to yield up the premises; and a covenant by A. for quiet enjoyment by the lessee, his executors, administrators, and assigns, during the natural life of A., the court held, that the lease must be taken to have been granted for the life of A., and not of the party whose executors and administrators were included with himself in the grant (p). When it is intended that a lease to two or more persons shall determine on the death of either, the grant should be for their joint lives. But where the interest is to continue with the survivor, it is sufficient to grant it to them generally for their lives, without inserting words of survivorship, which, however, are perfectly harmless (q); and, on the death of either, the entire estate will survive to the other (r). But if the lease be (m) 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 74. (n) Co. Lit. 42, a. Discontinuance was in effect abolished by the late statute of limitations, 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27. 8. 39. For the law respecting leases by Tenants in tail, see ante, p. 65. (0) 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 74. (p) Doe dem. Pritchard r. Dodd, 5 Barn. & Adol. 689; S. C. 2 Nev. & Man. 838. (q) 4 Co. 63, b. (r) Brudnell's case, 5 Co. 9, a. Anon. 1 And. 151, case 199. 1 Brownl. & Gold. 30. And see Newman e. Dan |