pofing the faithlefs accounts and wanton fabrications of the French; and the grofs errors and wilful mifrepresentations of different writers; among others, of General Dumas, the author of the Précis des Evenemens Militaires (now belonging to the French Staff) whofe publication has acquired much more credit than it deferves. As the remarkable action of the 19th of September, which may be truly faid to have decided the fate of the Expedition, has been an object of more general difcuffion in Europe than any other, and has been the ground of more recrimination between the Ruffians and the English, we shall felect the author's account of it, as being peculiarly interesting in itself, and as affording a fair fpecimen of the attention which he has paid to every part of the fubject.

"It had been ordered that the attack fhould begin on all fides at break of day, but nearly two hours before that time the Ruffian Major General Southoff with his chaffeurs and a battalion of grena diers, which formed the advanced guard, paffed the canal in front of Petten, and advanced towards Camperduyn. Whether he thought it indifpenfably neceffary to fupport General Southoff, or that he partook of his impatience and that of his troops, General Herman an hour after caufed the canal to be paffed by the first line of his corps, and marched to the attack of the enemies' entrenchments upon the Slaperdike. Although it was not yet light, the firft Ruffian battalion advanced with the greatest boldness in column of divifions, and car ried a traverfe which the enemy had conftructed on the dike. The latter ftill occupied a fmall work on the extremity of the dike which covered in part the entrance of the village of Groet, where they had a piece of cannon. . The grenadiers, followed by the remainder of the firft line, pushed on without ftopping to the end of the dike, and with the fame impetuofity carried the work and the piece of cannon. The French furprifed by the vivacity of this attack oppofed in front a flight refiftance, and fell back towards their right. The Ruffians fuffered little from their fire, but much from their own; the obfcurity being fuch that nothing could be distinguished. The chaffeurs of the advanced guard, feveral of whom found great difficulty in extricating themfelves from the marshy ground, which lies between the fea dike and the Slaperdike, alfo directed their fire towards the ground which was already occupied by their first line. The foldiers clamoroufly called for the fupport of their artillery, al though it was impoffible to direct its fire upon any distinct object, and it naturally did more harm than good. Part of the Ruffians upon quitting the Slaperdike, proceeded in a very clofe column, nd with very little order upon the road under the Sand-hills, which leads through the village of Groet, while the reft filed to the right among the fand-hills of which they never covered the whole extent, because the advanced guard, which was to march along the ftrand, in the dark confounded itfelf with the first line, with which it continued mixed

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the whole day. The firft of thefe corps took no precaution stofecure its left flank, nor the fecond its right flank. That which marched along the road, advanced rapidly, but in great confufion and without forming or preferving any order: it feon reached Groet, carried that village eafily, and continued its progrefs. The French troops, which were in the village, not having time to fall back quick enough to join those who were attacked in front, probably apprehenfive of being cut off, had thrown themselves upon the left flank, where without being further noticed by the Ruffians, they difperfed as tirailleurs in the enclofures, the hedges, and the ditches; and the latter fuffered feverely both from their fire and from that of their own friends in the Sandhills, who, although in fact rather behind them, nevertheless directed their fire in part to the left.

"Unfortunately, immediately after the attack of the village of Groet, where his horfe had been wounded, General Herman with the greatest part of his staff had gone into the Sand-hills; and no officer who was particularly entrusted with the direction of its movements remained with the column, which followed the road, crouded by the troops, which, fatigued with marching in the Sand-hills, left them whenever a natural interval or a path enabled them to feek for more eafy ground. As foon as the village of Groet was taken, LieutenantGeneral Herman had ordered the fecond line to advance under the orders of Major-General Arbeneff; but this line in oppofition to his orders, either from its own impatience or the nature of the ground, inftead of forming a referve to fupport the firft, foon mixed with it, and completed the confufion. The British brigade of Major-General Manners, with the 7th regiment of dragoons and the horse artillery, which according to the orders of General Herman were to follow this fecond line, were much retarded by the march of the Imperial troops, which from marching in column neceffarily employed much time in filing off, and occupied almoft the whole extent of the road. When

at laft that brigade was enabled to quit the Slaperdike, it directed it. felf to the left, and was foon engaged with that part of the enemy's corps, which had remained upon the flank of the Ruffian column. Major-General Manners repulfed them; and as they retreated to Schoreldam, he was induced to take the fame direction.

"During this time the Ruffians pushing on without hesitation, arrived at the village of Schorel, attacked it with the fame bravery they had done that of Groet, carried it with the fame facility, and marched towards Bergen; their ardour not being at all abated, nor their progrefs checked by the fevere lofs which they experienced. About a mile from Bergen begins an avenue of trees, which continues nearly in the fame direction, until it reaches the Sand-hills above the village where it turns fhort to the left and leads in a straight line to it. A number of houses are fcattered on each fide of this avenue'; and at about 300 paces from Bergen the ground opens confiderably to the left. The French had placed, at about 800 paces from the avenue, a battery of feveral pieces of cannon, which was protected by a line of cavalry mixed with fome infantry. The enclosures here were more

Frequent and woody than at the beginning of the avenue, and were lined on the right and left with tirailleurs; so that when the Ruffians reached this point they found themfelves expofed at once to the fire on their flanks, to that from Bergen in front, and to that of the battery which was likewife directed upon the head of the column-Stopped for a moment by the deftructive effect of this fire, and by the appearance of the French upon their flank, the Ruffians loudly called for their artillery, which there was great difficulty in bringing up, owing to the fandy nature of the ground, the rapidity of the march which had fatigued the horses, and the confufed mafs which obftructed the road. ' The fire of the cannon checked the French who were advancing on their left; and the Ruffians again pushed forward.-At this period of the action General Effen reached the head of the column and immediately ordered the troops to halt and form-two pieces of cannon were placed at the above mentioned opening, and another upon the road leading to Bergen. A battalion was fent into the fields to the left of the road; but the fame precaution was not taken to cover the right; and the remainder of the troops proceeded in their march to Bergen. The column continued to be encreased by a number of men who quitted the Sand-hills, and it was at laft joined by Lieutenant-General Herman, who alfo having hitherto been engaged there, was ignorant of what had been paffing on the left. This brave officer was received with marks of joy by the foldiers who adored him; but nevertheless it was in vain that he ufed every effort to restore order among them: they feemed to be deaf to his voice and no longer to acknowledge his authority; and the fire of the enemy having in the mean time obliged the battalion placed on the left to fall back into the avenue, the confufion became as great as ever. In the interval the head of the column arrived about eight in the morning at Bergen, penetrated into and took poffeffion of it. The troops being then protected by the houfes on the right, and continuing expofed to the fire of the French only in front and on the left, the Ruffian General fucceeded in forming a battalion of fufileers in front of the church almoft oppofite to the canal, and another of grenadiers in a street a little on the right of the church. The reft of the troops were diftributed between the houfes and in the openings of the different avenues leading to the centre of the village. Such were the hafty difpofitions of General Herman to endeavour to Keep the long but narrow extent of ground of which the poffeffion had been fo rapidly gained, until it should be poffible for the brigade of General Manners and for the column of General Dundas to come up to his affiftance.

The march, or rather the rapid and irregular progrefs of the Ruffians, had, as may be imagined, furprised and difconcerted the French. Driven from poft to poft with an impetuofity which did not give them time for recollection, they had fcattered themselves, as has been obferved, on both fides of the road, lefs perhaps from defign than from instinct, and lefs because it was the best than because it was the thing moft eafy to be done. Thus they had fuffered that impetu, ous torrent to pafs before them. Generals Brune and Vandamme fee

ing the left of their pofition pierced in all its depth, and the rear of their centre outflanked, and having reafon to fear that in the end their line might be entirely turned and cut off if they allowed the English time to fupport the Ruffians, had brought up their referve from Alk. maar with all poffible hafte, and had likewife drawn from the Koedike a detachment of the division of General Duinonceau. A part of these troops were directed towards the Sand-hills, and the reft joined thofe near Bergen. As foon as thefe reinforcements were arrived at their deftination the Republicans marched to the attack of the two Ruffian columns. That which was in the Sand-hills, and which till then had not ceased to advance with the fame quickness and the fame confufion as that upon the left, found itfelf turned by a corps of the enemy which marched along the fhore. Being in very little order and having expended its ammunition, it fell back, and the French advanced between it and the column of the left which had crouded into Bergen. The latter column, which, for 20 minutes, had been expofed to the moft violent fire of cannon and mufquetry, now faw itself threatened in the rear, while on the left the enemy was penetrating by the opening into the avenue. To fecure that important point General Herman immediately fent there the battalion of fufileers which he had formed in front of the church; but the Republicans foon furrounded the vil lage under cover of a very fevere fire from their artillery which could not be returned; for out of three pieces of cannon which the Ruffians had, two were without ammunition: the third, which was placed at the entry of the village towards the Kocdike, did not ftop the enemy, who got poffeffion of it and penetrated from that fide into the village: General Herman, who had juft gone from the church-yard to the troops upon the right, was cut off and taken prifoner with a part of his corps after making a moft vigorous refiftance near the caftle of Bergen, from which he endeavoured in vain to effect his retreat across the Sand-hills. Major-General Effen, whom he had left near the church, taking advantage of this circumftance, which occupied the enemy, collected as many of his men as he could and forced his way through the avenue to the Sand-hills, from which the French troops retired at his approach, and upon the ridge of which he fucceeded in fome measure in forming his men. After having halted there for a fhort time he continued his retreat towards Schorel.

"Such was the event of the attack on the right, and the unfortu nate confequence of the inconfiderate and improvident bravery of the Ruffians. As the operations of this column had a great effect upon the fate of this day, and it may even be faid upon that of the whole campaign, and as they have as yet been but imperfectly related, it has been thought proper in this place to give a very complete detail of

them."

The conduct of the Ruffians, under General Effen, in a fubfequent engagement on the 2d of October, was the very reverfe of what it was on the 19th of September, and, in each cafe, it was equally fatal to the caufe, in which they were fent to co-operate.

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The following inftances of moft flagrant attempts to impose on the credulous multitude on the Continent of Europe, by the most impudent falfhoods, both by the Dutch and French Republican Commanders, cannot be too generally known.

"In the relation which General Daendels has given of this action, he fays, that the English yielded with the greateft precipitation to the attack of his grenadiers, when he returned into Oudefcarfpel; that he took there too prifoners and two pieces of cannon belonging to the English, befides retaking his own, &c. &c. All this is abfolutely falfe General Daendels did not recover the village by open force, nor even' attack it. The English evacuated it in confequence of the orders they had received, without a fingle fhot being fired, and without the Dutch even making their appearance. Twenty-eight men too feverely wounded to be tranfported, were obliged to be left in it; all the English cannon were carried off, and thofe taken from the enemy, as has been faid, were thrown into the canals, their carriages and ammunition being deftroyed. The lofs of the column of Sir James Pulteney was 38 men killed, 174 wounded, and 28 miffing, in all 240 including 21 officers. The Dutch General however has not hesitated to fay, that the English left 500 dead upon the field. In other refpects the recital of Daendels is very correct, and on the whole much better drawn up than that which he made of the affair of the 27th of Auguft.

In the report which Gen. Brune made at the times of this action he faid, that the Allies loft more than 3,000 men in killed and wounded, 2,000 prifoners, and 25 pieces of cannon, that General Effen had been severely wounded, and the English General Knox killed. Meaning doubtlefs to give to their flory a greater appearance of truth, he said afterwards, that his loss confifted in 50 killed and "300 wounded.' Luckily he added, this will appear incredible :'all the world was certainly of his mind with regard to this last point. "In the fame report it is stated, the Anglo-Ruffians committed the greatest exceffes in the villages which they occupied during the action; the poor Batavian peafants were massacred and burnt in their houfes with women and children; feveral villages are still on fire, and the English in particular diftinguished themselves by their cruelty. It is the duty of an historian to contradict imputations which are as falfe as they are ferious. Three villages it is true were burnt, Schorel, Schoreldam, and Crabbendam. The firft was fet on fire by howltzers during the action; but if this is a fubject of regret, it certainly is not one of reproach. Schoreldam was fet on fire by the fire of the French during the time the English were in poffeffion of it, and the ac ́cident was disadvantageous to the latter; but at the fame time it would be unjuft to attribute it to the former as a crime. Crabbendam was intentionally burnt by the English in the evening of the 19th, becaufe, as we may be convinced by turning our eyes to the map, this village was much too near to their pofition, and might have covered the approach and greatly favoured the attack of the enemy in this part.

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