Great Britian is more particularly directed towards us, because they feel that we have taken upon ourselves to act for them in this árduous and delicate situation, and to exercise on their behalf the most important of all their privileges. They have admitted and recognized the right which we assert, they look to us for the discharge of the duty, the obligation of which we acknowledge. Let us then, as we value the continuance of this harmony and confidence, be particularly careful that we do not overstep the bounds of our authority. That we give no grounds for imputing to us that we have exceeded the limits of the necessity under which we claim to act; and that we have granted powers which it did not belong to us to delegate. Let us also pay a just regard to those sentiments of dutiful and zealous attachment to their Sovereign with which we know that our country is animated. Let no breath of suspicion go forth into the world that we have been wanting to the same feelings; that in such a moment as the present we have deserted our duty to the King, or sacrificed to any considerations the sacred trust which his misfortune has imposed upon us. If unhappily a contrary impression should prevail, what must be its effect upon the minds of a generous and loyal people? I ask not what would be their conduct when the occasion would arise for which we had neglected to provide, but what would be the present security of a system built on such foundations? It is a false and mistaken opinion, that the strength and stability of government are increased by the exercise of powers inconsistent with the principles of justice, or repugnant to the feelings of mankind. The reverse is true-" Nec unquam satis fida potentia ubi nimia est." Sir, I feel the delicacy of this part of the subject, and if I had not also felt its infinite importance, I should have forborne to touch upon it. I trust it will never justly be imputed to me, that I am forward in raising up a spirit among the people to question those measures which have received the sanction of parliament. But we cannot avoid being sensible that the strongest security for their acquiescence in our proceedings, especially under such circumstances as now exist, is an adherence on our part to the principles of justice, and a conscientious discharge of the duties which are incumbent upon us. If therefore I have felt myself bound to sug gest these reflections to the Committee, it is because I feel a jealous concern for the honour and dignity of this House; it is because I feel an anxiety for the preservation of that respect and deference from the people to the decisions of parliament, which is at all times necessary for the prosperity and glory of this country, but which in the present moment I do in my conscience believe to be absolutely essential to the maintenance of our internal and domestic tranquillity. Therefore, Sir, upon all these grounds, on the full consideration of the extent of that necessity by which we are empowered to act of the example of our ancestors whose steps we follow-of our duty to our Sovereign, of whose rights we and we alone are the true guardians and protectors-and of our concern for the interests of millions of our fellow subjects, whose dearest interests are now exclusively committed to our care; I feel myself enabled and called upon to give a decided opinion in favour of a regency limited with respect to power. It remains for me to consider the several restrictions which have been this day proposed. My opinion with respect to these follows so much from the principles which I have already stated, that I should feel it unnecessary to enter into any more particular detail of reasoning concerning them, if I were not desirous on every part of this important subject, to speak my sentiments distinctly and unequivocally. I agree with the resolution which restrains the power of creating peers-and I do it on two separate grounds. First, because I am clear, that during the short period for which we are now providing, no inconvenience whatever can result from the suspension of this branch of the prerogative of the Crown: that there is, for this reason, no necessity for our delegating this power to any other hands; and that we have, therefore, according to the principle on which I have before enlarged, no right to confer it on the Regent. But there is in the second place a more important consideration which applies to this subject. Of all the powers of the Crown this is the most liable to be abused under a delegated and temporary government; and it is also that from the abuse of which the most injurious consequences would arise to the permanent interest of the sovereign. The power to create at discretion a lasting influence on the deliberations of one of the branches of the legislature, is a prerogative of so ceed the limits of our authority, and that even if that were not the case, it would be the duty of parliament to withhold it on grounds of expediency, The limitation which would prevent the Regent from anticipating the King's authority by reversions, and from fettering it by the grant of offices for life, is a part of the same principle which has just been stated; and though in its consequences certainly not of equal importance, is nevertheless in my opinion highly neces sary to be adopted. The propriety of the restraint on the disposal of the real and personal property of the King is admitted on all hands, and is founded on the same principle which would be adopted in the case of any other individual in similar circumstances. high a nature, that nothing but a strong necessity would justify that principle of the constitution, which has placed it in the hands of the Sovereign himself. As exercised by him, it is, however, subject to this restraint, that the mischiefs attendant on its abuse, operate against the peace and security of that government, of which the King is not only in actual possession, but which he is to retain for the whole period of his life, and which he can have no interest to weaken or embarrass. The case of a regent is widely different. If we suppose him unhappily to be misled by the councils of men desirous of availing themselves of a short interval of authority, in order to establish for themselves an influence in the state, paramount to that of their Sovereign, what other mode could be so naturally resorted to for this purpose, as the abuse of this particular branch of the prerogative? How could they hope more effectually to secure the continuance of their own power, than by retaining the means, if not of preventing the King's return to the exercise of his authority, at least of embarrassing and thwarting him in every instance in which he might feel it his duty to counteract their views of per sonal interest or ambition. It may indeed be said, that the same restraint which I have before mentioned, as operating on the exercise of this power by the Sovereign himself, does in some degree apply to it, even in the hands of a regent. And this might be true in the case of a regent whose authority was permanent, or even certain in its duration. But let it be considered, that in the present case, exactly in proportion as the probability of the King's recovery increased, the force of this restraint would gradually be weakened and the temptation to the abuse would grow more powerful. The persons who advised the Regent would then feel it less likely that the consequences of any mis conduct of theirs in this respect would be injurious to the government in their own hands, and they might perhaps imagine that they had an interest in the mischiefs which it would entail on the subsequent The proposition of reducing the King's administration of the Sovereign. The establishment in the present moment consideration therefore of the shortness of would, however, as it appears to me, be the interval for which we now provide, scarcely less repugnant to the feelings serves at once to show, that no necessity of a generous people. The smallest decan exist for giving this power; and to af- gree of reflection upon this subject, must ford a great additional weight to the aprender it impossible that we should reconprehension of danger resulting from it. cile our minds to such a step. It will cerIn the present moment, I can entertain tainly be felt to be inconsistent with the no doubt that the granting it would ex-sentiments which we all entertain towards The only remaining question is that which relates to the fifth of the resolutions opened to us in the beginning of this debate. That the care of his Majesty's person should be entrusted to the experienced virtues, to the anxious and long-tried affection of the Queen, is in my opinion selfevident on every ground of public duty and of private sentiment, in a case where even private sentiment should not be disregarded. As a point intimately and inseparably connected with the discharge of this interesting trust, the care and superintendence of his Majesty's household must be invested in the same hands. The only doubt, indeed, which could arise upon this subject would be, whether under the present circumstances, the existing establishment ought to be maintained; but if maintained, it can be put under no other direction than that to which the care of his Majesty's person is entrusted. that any other authority should be suffered to interfere in points so immediately connected with this duty, and that the domestic uneasiness inseparable from such a system should be allowed to add to the weight of the severest affliction, is, I am sure, an idea too shocking to be entertained by any of those persons whom I address in this place. For our Sovereign, even if we could be assured that he must always remain unconscious of the disregard which he would thus have experienced from the representatives of the British nation. But if we carry our eyes farther, and look to that happy period to which our wishes and our hopes are turned, what a picture must then present itself! Let us, if we can, imagine, what must be his feelings in such a moment as that, when he is told that his parliament has availed itself with eagerness and avidity, even of the shortest interval, to new model the offices attendant on his person, and by a miserable economy, to degrade their Sovereign from those circumstances of splendour which belong to the rank in which he was born, and to the station which he still occupies. -But, Sir, this is not all, though I trust this is infinitely more than sufficient to rouse the feelings of every English heart. We profess in our deliberations here, and we have published it to the country in our resolutions, that we mean to establish a system which is to continue only during the King's indisposition. If we are sincere in this declaration we shall be careful to keep alive among the people at large, the impression of that allegiance which is still due to him, and to him alone. Can we believe that it is consistent with this purpose, to withdraw from him every mark of dignity, every external circumstance by which he is distinguished as an object of respect, and to reduce him in this instance to the same level with every common subject? happily debarred from a personal exercise of these best prerogatives of his station, is it not rather an additional reason for continuing to him the outward forms and ensigns of sovereignty? I trust and believe that the sentiments which his virtues have inspired, are so deeply rooted in the hearts of all his subjects, that no length of time that could elapse, no misfortune that could overwhelm him, no disregard under which he could be suffered to fall, would weaken their attachment, diminish their affection, or repress the ardour of their loyalty. But surely, we shall not feel ourselves at liberty, from these considerations, to neglect the natural and obvious means of preserving in the country a just remembrance of his rights. We must be sensible that every wise motive which before induced us to maintain the splendour and dignity of his exalted rank, has from the circumstances of his actual situation acquired an additional and stronger claim to our attention. Even if our present hopes should be disappointed, and if by the continuance of this calamity we should hereafter find ourselves compelled to resort to a new arrangement in this respect; yet let it never be forgotten, neither at this, nor at any other period of his life, that the duty which we are this day to discharge, is not that of electing a king to reign over us in his stead, but that of creating a delegated trust to administer the government during his indisposition, in his name, and on his behalf. Sir, I have now trespassed upon the attention of the House much longer than I have done at any former time, or than I had intended upon this occasion. The nature of the subject, its extent, its consequences, and the deep impression which it has made upon my mind, must be my apology. The question is one of the most interesting that has at any time been agitated within these walls. It is probably the most important that will ever occur during the course of my life. And sure I am that there will be no moment of it, at which it will not be a satisfaction to me to reflect, that I have discharged this high and sacred duty, faithfully and conscientiously, without respect of persons, or consideration of interest, and looking only to that allegiance which I owe to my Sovereign, and to that concern which is due to the peace, prosperity, and happiness of my country. We know, and it will not be disputed, that the splendour which attends our monarchs in the exercise of their authority is not created for an empty pageant; is not given to gratify an idle vanity, which they would be ashamed to feel; but is esta blished for solid reasons of sound policy. It serves to mark and to define that rank in which the constitution of this country has designed them to stand. It serves to create respect among the people at large, and to impress continually on their minds those sentiments of habitual reverence which are justly due to the higher attributes of royalty. I mean not certainly to compare these external circumstances with the real and substantial dignity of a king -with the power of administering justice in mercy, or with the power of conferring happiness on millions of his fellow-creatures. But if there exists a situation un- Mr. Welbore Ellis said, that no preceder which our Monarch is for a time un-dent had yet been discovered, which [VOL. XXVII.] [3 S] serted the rights of the people. With respect to the restrictions proposed, he was inclined to think, that his Majesty's household should remain as it was, because many of them might now be considered as professionally in their respective employments, and it would be a pity to turn them out. He professed great respect for the Prince of Wales, and begged leave to conclude his speech with what he called a parliamentary prayer-that virtue, as well as the graces, might be the ornament and support of the throne, and that the virtues of the King might descend to the Regent, his future successor! proved that two branches of the legisla- | our liberties, and had magnanimously asture could carry any law into execution, without the concurrence of the third. He maintained, that every step the House had taken in the question of the Regency, was not only irregular, but directly contrary to the spirit of the constitution. He asserted, that no government could prove effectual, which was not invested with the power of conferring honours and of punishing offenders: the first was one of the most exalted prerogatives of the Crown, and the last was committed to the operation of the laws. A weak government was, perhaps, worse than no government at all; for it had not the power of acting with energy and effect. But, said the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we will not trust you with power, because you may abuse it for the sake of argument, he would admit the possibility of its being abused; but what then? Had this House no power to check, to control, to impeach, and to punish any man, or set of men, who dared to trample on the rights of the people, by an abuse of that power which had been committed to them? If this was true, in general, it was still stronger in the case of a regency. The Regent was doubly answerable. He was not only responsible by his ministers, but he was responsible in his own person; for, the maxim that the King can do no wrong, did not extend to the Regent. Mr. Drake said, that he felt himself so much agitated by the eloquent oration of Mr. Sheridan, that it was with the greatest difficulty he could repress the emotions of his soul, when that hon. gentleman sat down. Such was the versatility of the hon. gentleman's oratory, that he could at will civilize barbarity, and symetrize deformity. He confessed that he had caught a spark of his fire, which he said had kindled in his bosom a flame of the most genial and animating nature. But, however much he admired the splendid talents of that hon. gentleman, he could not approve of that party spirit which led him to censure, in terms of so much asperity, the right hon. gentleman, whose administration it had been his pride to support; but though he had been a partisan of Mr. Pitt, he had never spoken disrespectfully of Mr. Fox. It was his duty, no less than his inclination, to support the measures of that man, who had raised his country to a pitch of glory, that was the envy of the universe; he had proved himself the guardian of our morals, as well as of Colonel Fullarton begged leave to trespass upon the attention of the House, whilst he adverted solely to two points which were not in the least connected with either the lords of the bedchamber, or with the examinations of physicians, or with Philip of Macedon, who seemed so intimate an acquaintance of a noble lord, or with the evidence of Dr. Willis; but referred solely to the established principles and practice of the constitution, and, he trusted, would be found of material consequence to the decision of the great question then before the Committee. In the first place, he understood it to be the declared opinion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that all powers and authorities belonging to the Crown, attached as it were to the person of the sovereign; that they remained entire in the King, although he was incapacitated from the personal exercise of them, and that, in contemplation of law, the political capacity of the King continued perfect, and could neither suffer diminution nor defect. If by this technical phraseology was meant, that all the powers and authorities of executive government remained entire in the person of the King, during his incapacity, in such a way, that he should of right exercise the same as soon and as long as he was capable of exercising them personally, and that, while he should not be capable of exercising them personally, they should be exercised in trust for him, no person could be more ready to admit that doctrine than he was. But if, by the contemplation of law, and the political capacity of the King remaining entire, was meant, that the powers and authorities of executive government might remain dormant, unemployed, unproductive to the public service, as long as the King was incapacitated from the personal exercise of them, they were doctrines which, in | for the public service. The right hon. the language of the right hon. gentleman gentleman seemed to conceive, that every on another occasion, deserved to be treat- thing that could possibly be withheld from ed as treason against the state. Would the representative of the sovereign, during any man who pretended to the slightest the King's incapacity, was so much gained respect for the constitution, venture to to the state. For his own part, he condeclare, that the powers and authorities ceived that every portion of the just and of government were to be considered as established exercise of executive authothe mere property of the sovereign? That rity, which was so withheld was so much they were to be considered like the store, lost to the state, for whose benefit every or the wardrobe, or the privy-purse, as portion of authority was held. He had things meant for the personal use, plea- ever understood the king of this country, sure, and convenience of the sovereign, in his legislative capacity, to be soveand that when he was incapable of using reign, and at liberty to act according to them personally, they needed not be used his will; but that in his executive capaat all? Did gentlemen recollect that the city, the King was no more than chief powers of the Crown were vested in the magistrate, invested with certain powers King; not for the personal benefit of the and authorities, specified by the constiKing, but for the benefit of the state? tution, and as much bound by those acts That there were duties and obligations which he and his predecessors had mutually to be performed between the so- ratified, as the meanest subject in his vereign and the subject, duties of an realm.-I have ever understood, added awful magnitude, involving the welfare colonel Fullarton, that the constitution and happiness of the people? How, then, is not safe, unless when the three escould the right hon. gentleman maintain, tates are kept separate, distinct, and that these duties and obligations, in con- entire. That for one or two of the templation of law, could possibly remain three estates to trench on the powers and entire in the person of the King, during privileges of the other, has been consihis incapacity, any other way than this; dered as a sacrilege committed against that when the King was incapacitated the general freedom of the state. That from the personal exercise of them, they such extreme delicacy has been observed must be performed in trust for him; that in this particular, that the two Houses of some person or persons, either by devolu- Parliament do not venture to interfere tion or appointment, must perform the with the executive authority, no, not in duties of the royal station, and exercise the most minute particular, excepting by the functions of authority in trust for the address. That the House of Commons King, during his incapacity; unless the does not even venture on the executive Committee were prepared to declare the act of publishing its own journals, but kingly power either totally or in part use- applies to the executive power to do it for less? Surely, the right hon. gentleman them, and applies by address. If this had too much respect for the principles of statement be neither frivolous nor fallathe constitution, too much respect for cious, the right hon. gentleman will feel it his own character, to maintain that the incumbent on him to prove of two things powers and authorities of executive go- one, either that to invest the Prince of vernment, that the great and godlike attri- Wales with all the executive government butes of majesty were to be considered would prove dangerous to the King, for as a mere appendage, attached to the per- the resumption of his royal power in the son of the royal individual; to sleep when event of his recovering his faculties, or he slept, and only to wake when his fa- else, that it would prove detrimental to culties ceased to lie dormant! It would the public welfare. With regard to the be a profanation of the attributes of ma- first of these grounds of apprehension, the jesty; it would be a profanation of the delicacy and moderation of his royal highrights and welfare of mankind, to admit of ness, so distinguishingly manifested in the such a doctrine.-Colonel Fullarton pro- late trying and distressful scenes, ought to ceeded next to the consideration of the have proved more than a sufficient safesecond point to which he had alluded. guard against the possibility of such an He said, that the Chancellor of the Ex- imputation. With regard to the second chequer had declared it to be the duty of ground of apprehension, on which the the House to grant no more power to the right hon. gentleman rests the justification Regent than appeared absolutely necessary of these limitations, namely, that to invest |