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(B. & C.) No. 2.-Capt. Arthur Sinclair to Commodore John Rodgers. SIR, York River, 29th March, 1816.

I WROTE you on the 22nd Instant, informing you of my having fixed on a Site for a Navy Yard, which held out more advantages than any other on this River, and that it was not free from its disadvantages; namely, the channel being too great a distance from the shore, and the river straight, wide, and bleak; but the channel being very narrow, and the remainder of the river quite shoal for 8 or 10 miles up and down, there is not much sea made from any wind. It would be exposed to ice if there were any afloat, but there has not been a sufficient quantity known in this River, from which danger might be apprehended, for upwards of 30 years; and should it be deemed prudent to guard against it, it will be seen from the accompanying Plat, which is a rough Draft of a minute and critically correct Survey, that it may be easily effected; the rise and fall of the tide not exceeding 3 feet on an average, the current is very trifling, seldom exceeding 2 knots.

This site, as I have before mentioned, is situated in Gloucester County, 9 miles above York, which lays 6 miles from the mouth of the river, making the whole distance from it to Cape Henry about 40 miles.

I have brought the survey a little below York, and find 51⁄2 fathoms the least water there is, at low tide, between the above site and York; below that it is well known there is sufficient depth for any Ship. The channel continues not more than 4 or 500 yards wide for 2 miles, when it gradually increases to a mile in 2 more, running S. 30, E. for that distance. It then makes a small change to S. 55, E. and widens to upwards of a mile between that and York, from which, to the mouth of the river, the course is from S. 70, E. to east, and the channel increasing to upwards of a mile in width. Agreeably to your Letter of Instruction, which requires a survey to be made, so as to embrace the approach from the sea, and the channels now known to afford navigation for Line-of-Battle-Ships, I might stop this survey at York; but believing an accurate Chart of this River to the Bay Channel will be acceptable to the Board of Commissioners, and more particularly so, should they approve of the site I have selected, I shall endeavour to continue to that point, should I find it practicable with the means in my power.

I have found infinite difficulty in making the survey, but more particularly in laying down the channel, having had a great deal of bad weather, frequently driving us 8 or 10 miles from our work to make a Harbour, so that when a good day would offer, we would lose most of it in regaining our station. And not having men enough to man more than I boat, I have found almost insupportable difficulties in taking the soundings, and shifting the Buoys from station to station, being compelled for the want of a second Vessel, to use 4 Buoys, and to make frequent references to the land for base lines to correct the work.

Neat Drafting is not to be performed on board such a boat as this: the want of room and stability precludes the possibility of it. I shall of course have to copy them when I return to Norfolk. I have not as yet been able to find a Draftsman who can draw more neatly than myself; the Engineer I have had, and whom I have now discharged, being a man of science without possessing the talent of neat drawing. I shall endeavour to procure one in Norfolk if possible, but in case of my not succeeding, I can only promise you accuracy, without much neatness. I have the honor to remain, &c.

Commodore John Rodgers.

A. SINCLAIR.

(D. & E.)-Captain Robert T. Spence to Commodore John Rodgers, in relation to the Tangier Islands.

SIR,

26th May, 1816.

THE Islands known by the name of the Tangier Islands have hitherto been very fallaciously represented, especially during the late War, when, from the circumstance of their having been a Rendezvous for British Marauders, and a depository for their stolen Negroes, it became necessary to throw up temporary buildings for shelter and breastworks to secure them from surprise. These sheds were represented as highly commodious, and their works of defence, consisting of embankments of sand partially sodded, to render them less mutable than they otherwise would have been, were magnified, by the exaggerating fancy of the timid, into regular Fortifications, mounting heavy cannon, calculated to protect the Island and to give security to the Shipping anchored in the Sound. It was understood that an abundance of good water was afforded, and their gardens, described to be in a high state of cultivation, were spoken of as furnishing a sufficiency of vegetables, for refreshment and for health. All these partial and illusive accounts were believed by many, who had not the means of being better informed, and by others who were wholly indifferent to the fact. Having, in compliance with an Order from the Board of Commissioners, explored, and from accurate surveys obtained correct Charts of the Islands, I spared no pains to inform myself on such points as my Instructions particularly called my attention to, as,—

1st. The relative situation of these Islands to each other, their distance from each other, and from the Main.

2nd. The length and breadth of each.

3rd. The topography of each.

4th. The channel on all sides, and those leading to each Island, and separating them.

5th. The particular positions occupied by the British during the late War, and the works constructed by them.

6th. How far they are at this time defensible, and what works would render them completely so.

7th. The harbours afforded by these Islands.

8th. Whether they afford good fresh water in abundance.

9th. Whether they afford a good site for a Naval Establishment and Rendezvous in time of War.

10th. The soundings at least 3 miles on all sides, that it may be seen how near a first-rate Ship of War can safely approach them at every point, especially at that point which may be judged the best for a Naval Establishment.

The Charts I have prepared, and transmit to the Board, having been executed with attention, are sufficiently minute to furnish full information upon all these particulars. They afford a kind of graphical report, exhibiting at one view the relative position of the Islands; their distance from each other; their length and breadth; their topography; the particular positions occupied by the British during the late War, and that of the works constructed by them; the harbours afforded by the Islands, as also the soundings on all sides, even beyond the distance prescribed by the Commissioners. It therefore only remains for me to offer a brief general account, and a few remarks on such points, upon which the Charts cannot be alone satisfactory.

The Tangier Islands (if Islands they may be called) situated about 8 miles from the Main, are nothing more than banks of sand, which are here and there interspersed with an upper stratum of soil, owing its original formation to sea-weed and other marine productions, deposited by inundations, to which, in strong easterly winds, the Islands are wholly subject, save here and there a small spot, elevated for the purpose of cultivation, and occupied by the possessor. That section of the Islands on which the British formed their establishments, is a level surface of white sand, the margin of which, though not more than 3 feet in height, is higher than the area it surrounds, in which the British had their hospitals and store-houses, their stolen Negroes, grave-yards, and works of defence, of which there is nothing remaining, save memorials of death, and attestations of the deleterious effect of the water. The strength of their defences may readily be conjectured from the materials of which they were composed, and from their forms, which are in some places entire, while the outlines are distinctly visible. They consisted of semicircular embankments, constructed of stakes driven equidistant into the foundation, interwoven with brush, and filled in with sand; the formation of which gave constant employment to an immense number of Negroes they had collected from different parts of the Chesapeake. On these works, a few small guns were mounted, but of what calibre I could not, with any certainty, ascertain. On abandoning the Island, the whole was conflagrated, and as the brush consumed, the sand returned more or less to its former level. Notwithstanding enough has been explained to establish the futility of attempting an establishment at such a place as the " Tangiers," there still remain other objections more cogent

and less remediable. A want of fresh water is here, during the summer months, severely experienced. Wells formed by the insertion of barrels of extra length, (being from the nature of the ground but few,) afford at particular periods a scanty supply, the saline impregnation of which must produce, with those not accustomed from infancy to its use, that destructive disease which daily robbed His Britannic Majesty of 9 or 10 of his loyal Subjects. This mortality, it was said, had determined the commanding Admiral to abandon, at the ensuing season, a spot not only subject to dangerous inundations, but to which a want of water and other causes had given more the ance of a Hospital, than a Naval Rendezvous.

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Waving, however, these objections, and admit for a moment that it is both defensible and tenable;-would the advantages resulting from an establishment thus situated, prove of such magnitude as a transient view of the subject might at first promise? Cut off in time of War from all communication with Government, and from resources essential to its preservation, could it be productive of benefits proportioned to the expenditure attending its creation? As the day is rapidly approaching, when the entire defence of the entrance of the Chesapeake will render other places within its bosom more eligible for a Naval Rendezvous, an establishment of this description on the Tangiers would then, it is probable, be speedily abandoned for sites in every respect better suited, both in time of Peace or War, for the equipment of our public Vessels, and for other purposes necessarily connected therewith.

While a superior Maritime Force has uninterrupted access to the Chesapeake, an Establishment, either Naval or Military, at the Tangiers, cut off from assistance and supplies, would be wholly insecure, and exposed to inevitable reduction by an Enemy, possessing means of attack commensurate with the object to be effected. With this view of the subject, I have perhaps been too prolix in my comments; if so, I plead the injunction contained in my Instructions, "to make such general and particular remarks as might occur:" this, and my desire to be satisfactory, I offer as iny apology. I have the honor to remain, &c.

Commodore John Rodgers.

ROBERT T. SPENCE.

(Enclosure A. No. 3.)-Colonel Bomford to the Secretary of War. SIR, Washington, 21st November, 1816. IN compliance with your Order and Instructions, I have the honor to submit the following observations on the defence of Chesapeake Bay, together with the enclosed Map and Sketches-the first being the result of various examinations made by Major Kearney and myself -the latter, some outlines of my views on this subject.

Whatever may be the importance of founding permanent Fortifications, to exclude an Enemy from the Waters of the Chesapeake, it does not appear from attentive examination, that the entrance or mouth of

that Bay, (viz. a line from the nearest part of a shoal, called the Middle Ground, to Cape Henry,) affords the most practicable positions, as the violent action of the Atlantic, during gales of wind, and the great depth of water, will render any attempt to establish permanent foundations on that line, extremely slow in the execution, and (if ever effected) of uncertain durability, independently of an expence which the most sanguine would scarcely deem justifiable.

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The next position of importance is Hampton Roads. Fortification on Old Point Comfort, and a Castle on the nearest part of Willoughby's shoal, (called the Rip-rap,) distance 1800 yards, might, with the aid of a well organized Flotilla, not only cover James and Elizabeth Rivers, from the attempts of a superior Naval Enemy, but the latter would also threaten the rear of any Armament that should pass up the Bay. This position would also present the most prompt support to our Marine, whether in reconnoitring an Enemy, (whose movements may be observed from thence to the Atlantic,) while protected by the Batteries, or finding that protection on returning to a Port, scarcely 15 miles from Cape Henry.

In the event of fortifying the Pass between Old Point Comfort and Willoughby's Shoal, several Positions near the margin of Lynnhaven Bay may be advantageously occupied by small insulated Towers of masonry, carrying one 24-pounder each, and at such distances from the shore as will secure them from the effect of grape and case shot; and as this Bay would then be the only place near the mouth of the Chesapeake that a superior Naval Enemy could occupy with effect, the Towers previously recommended would not only annoy, but deprive them of the principal advantages which the Position would otherwise afford. 1 or 2 Towers of the same kind, would also prove important in the vicinity of Cape Charles.

Having thus stated an opinion that Hampton Roads, from its proximity to the Atlantic, combines many superior advantages, and, if fortified, will constitute an important part of the general defences of the Chesapeake, and singly will serve to check the incursions of an Enemy, it will, I presume, be superfluous to particularize the Positions which are more remote from the mouth of the Chesapeake, that may be occupied for local defence, as almost every site of the description is fortified where objects of sufficient importance and the existing Population warrant their establishment.

As the total exclusion of an Enemy from the Waters of the Chesapeake, is an object of great and increasing importance, and the obstacles having been already noted, which will probably prevent the prosecution of such a design in the establishment of permanent and efficient Defences at its entrance, in conformity with the spirit of my Instructions, I subjoin an opinion on a more practicable Position.

By referring to the enclosed Map, and Sections C. D. E. F., it may be observed that the distance and depth of water, between the

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