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1807.

duties in Russia in security; dealing thus with the CHAP. greatest potentate in Europe, at the very moment when he was perilling his very crown in our cause, as well as his own, in the same manner as a Jewish pawnbroker does with a suspicious applicant for relief? The battle of Eylau should have been the signal for the contracting the closest alliance with the Russian Government; the instant advance of loans. to any amount; the marching of sixty thousand English soldiers to the nearest points of embarkation. This was the crisis of the war: the imprudent confidence of Napoleon had drawn him into a situation full of peril; for the first time in his life he had been overmatched in a pitched battle, and hostile nations, besetting three hundred leagues of communication in his rear, were ready to intercept his retreat. No effort on the part of England could have been too great in order to turn to the best account so extraordinary a combination of favourable circumstances; no demonstration of confidence too unreserved to an ally capable of such sacrifices. Can there be a doubt that such a vigorous demonstration would at once have terminated the hesitations of Austria, revived the spirit of Prussia, and by throwing a hundred thousand men on each flank of his line of communication, driven the French Emperor to a ruinous retreat? Is it surprising that when, instead of such co-operation, Alexander, after the sacrifices he had made, met with nothing but refusals in his applications for assistance, and saw the land force of England wasted on useless distant expeditions, when every bayonet and sabre was of value on the banks of the Alle, he should have conceived a distrust of the English alliance, and formed the resolution of extricating himself as soon as possible from the ha

CHAP. Zardous conflict in which he was now exclusively

XLV.

1807.

Kepeated

tions which

England during the

Polish war.

engaged?*

"In the Foreign office," said Mr Canning, when Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1807," are to be found not one but twenty letters from the and ineffec- Marquis of Douglas, Ambassador to the Whigs at St Petersburg, intitual applica- mating, in the strongest terms, that unless effectual aid was sent to the Alexander Emperor of Russia he would abandon the contest." Ample proofs of had made this exists in the correspondence relating to that subject which was laid for aid from before Parliament. On 28th November, 1806, the Marquis wrote to Lord Howick, afterwards Earl Grey, from St Petersburg,-" General Budberg lately told me that his Imperial Majesty had expressly directed him to urge the expediency of partial expeditions on the coast of France and Holland, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the enemy, and impeding the march of the French reserves. The extraordinary expenses arising from the disasters of Prussia have rendered a loan of six millions sterling indispensable, which his imperial Majesty is exceedingly desirous should be negotiated in England." On 18th December, 1806, he again wrote,—" At court this morning his Imperial Majesty again urged, in the strongest terms, the expedience of a diversion on the enemy in the north of Europe by a powerful expedition to the coasts of France or Holland." On 2d January, 1807,-" I have again heard the strongest complaints that the whole of the enemy's forces are directed against Russia, at a moment when Great Britain does not show any disposition to diminish the danger by a diversion against France and Holland." On January 14th,-" I must not conceal from your Lordships that the silence of his Majesty's Government respecting a military diversion on the coast of France has not produced a favourable impression either on the ministry or people of this country." On January, 26th,"Baron Budberg has again complained of the situation in which Russia has now been placed, having been left alone against France, without either support on one side or diversion on the other." On February 4th, "During this interview, General Budberg seized every opportunity of complaining that the Russians were left without any military assistance on the part of Great Britain." On February 15th,-" I cannot suffi ciently express the extreme anxiety felt here that some expedition should be undertaken by Great Britain to divert the general concentration of the enemy's forces on the banks of the Vistula." Notwithstanding these and numberless similar remonstrances, and urgent calls for aid, the British Government did nothing; they declined to guarantee the loan of six millions which was indispensable to the equipment of the Russian militia and reserves; they sent neither succours in men, money, nor arms, grounding their refusal on the necessity of husbanding their resources for a protracted contest, or a struggle on their own shores. On Jan. 13, Lord Howick wrote," In looking forward to a protracted contest, for which the successes and inveterate hostility of the enemy must oblige this country to provide, his Majesty feels it to be his duty to pre

XLV.

nelles expe

To these general censures on the foreign policy of CHAP. England at this juncture, an exception must be made. in the case of the expedition to the Dardanelles. It was 1807. ably conceived, and vigorously entered upon. The The Dardastroke there aimed by England was truly at the heart dition is an of her adversary; the fire of Duckworth's broadsides exception to the general was concentric with that of the batteries of Eylau; inexpedience if successful, they would have added forty thousand foreign men to the Russian standards. This object was so policy. important that it completely vindicates the expedition; the only thing to be regretted is, that the force put at the disposal of the British Admiral was not such as to have rendered victory a matter of certainty.

serve as much as possible the resources to be derived from the affections of his people." It is difficult to find in history an example of a more ill-judged and discreditable parsimony; "husbanding," as Mr Canning afterwards said, "your muscles till you lose the use of them."

The infatuation of this conduct appears in still more striking colours, when the vast amount of the disposable force then lying dormant in the British Islands is taken into account. Notwithstanding the useless or pernicious expeditions to Buenos Ayres and Alexandria, England had still a disposable regular force of eighty thousand men in the Brttish Islands. Her military force, Jan. 1807, was as follows :

Volunteers.

of their

Infantry, 254,544

But of this immense force, lying within a day's sail of France and Holland, and including eighty thousand regulars, certainly seventy or eighty thousand might without difficulty have been sent to the Continent. In fact, in 1809, England had above seventy thousand regular soldiers at one time in Spain and Holland. Little more than half this force conquered Napoleon at Waterloo. Thrown into the scale in March or April, 1807, it would at once have decided the contest.-See Parl. Paper, July 18, 1807. Parl. Deb. ix. 111. Appendix.

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1807.

CHAP. As it was, however, it was adequate to the object; and this bold and well conceived enterprise would certainly have been crowned with deserved success, but for the extraordinary talents and energy of General Sebastiani, and the unfortunate illness of Mr Arbuthnot, which threw the conduct of the negotiation into the hands of the British Admiral, who, however gallant in action, was no match for his adversary in that species of contest, and wasted in fruitless efforts for an accommodation those precious moments which should have been devoted to the most vigorous warlike demonstrations.

After all, the unsuccessful issue of these expediThese de- tions, and the severe mortification which their failure feats were occasioned to the British people, had a favourable beneficial effect on the future stages of the contest. It is by

ultimately

experience only that truth is brought home to the masses of mankind. Mr Pitt's external policy had been distracted by the number and eccentric character of his maritime expeditions; but they were important in some degree, as wresting their colonial possessions from the enemy, and overshadowed by the grandeur and extent of his continental confederacies. Now, however, the same system was pursued when hardly any colonies remained to be conquered, and continental combination was abandoned at the very time when sound policy counselled the vigorous and simultaneous direction of all the national and European resources to the heart of the enemy's power. The absurdity and impolicy of this system, glaring as they were, might have long failed in bringing it into general discredit; but this was at once effected by the disasters and disgrace with which its last exertions were attended. The opinion, in consequence, became universal, that it was impolitic as well as

XLV.

unworthy of its resources for so great a nation to CHAP, waste its strength in subordinate and detached operations: England, it was felt, must be brought to wrestle hand to hand with France before the struggle could be brought to a successful issue: the conquerors of Alexandria and Maida had no reason to fear a more extended conflict with land forces; greater and more glorious fields of fame were passionately desired, and that general longing after military glory was felt which prepared the nation to support the burdens of the Peninsular war, and share in the glories of Wellington's campaigns.