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with fuccefs; that from the love of dominion, inherent in the heart of man, the rulers of the moft powerful nation in the world, whether a committee of fafety, or a directory, will forever aim at an undue empire over other nations; and that this difpofition, inflamed as it was by enthufiafin', if encouraged by a continuation of fuccefs, would be apt to exhibit itself, during the courfe of the French revolution, in exceffes of which there has been no example fince the days of Roman greatnefs.

Every day confirms the juftice of that anticipation. It is now indifpenfible, that the difagreeable and menacing truth fhould be expofed in full day to the people of America; that they should contemplate it ferioufly, and prepare their minds for extremities which nothing fhort of abject fubmiffion may be able to avert. This will ferve them as an armour against the machinations of traiterous men, who may wish to make them inftruments of the ambition of a foreign power, to perfuade them to concur in forging chains for mankind, and to accept, as their reward, the despicable privilege of wearing them a day later than others.

Already in certain circles is heard the debafing doctrine, that France is determined to reduce us to the alternative of war with her enemies or war with herself, and that it is our interest and safety to elect the former. There was a time, when it was believed that a fimilar alternative would be impofed by Great Britain. At this crifis there was but one fentiment. The firmeft friends of moderation and peace, no less than the noifieft partizans of violence and war, refolved to elect war with that power which hould drive us to the election. This refolution was the dictate of morality and honour-of a juft regard to national dignity and independence. If any confideration, in any fituation, fhould degrade us into a different refolution, we, that inftant, shake hands with crime and infamy; we defcend from the high ground of an indepen

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The Warning-No. II. INDEPENDENT of the commands of honor, the coolest calculations of intereft forbid our becoming the inftruments of the ambition of France, by affociating with her in the war. The queftion is no longer the establishment of liberty on the bafis of republican government. This point the enemies of France have ceafed to difpute. The queftion now is, whether the fhall be aggrandized by new acquifitions, and her enemies reduced by difmemberments, to a degree which may render her the miftrefs of Europe, and confequently in a great measure of America. This is truly the remaining subject of contention,

They who underftood the real ftrength and refources of France, before the prefent war, knew that the was intrinfically the moft powerful nation of Europe. The incidents of the war have difplayed this fact in a manner which is the aftonishment of the world. If France can finally realize her prefent plan of aggrandizement, fhe will attain to a degree of greatnefs and power, which, if not counteracted by internal disorder, will tend to make her the terror and the fcourge of nations. The fpirit of moderation, in a state of overbearing power, is a phenomenon, which has not yet appeared, and which no wife man will expect ever to fee. It is certain, that a very different fpirit has hitherto marked the career of the new republic; and it is due to truth to add, that the ardent, impetuous, and military genius of the French, affords perhaps lefs profpect of fuch a spirit in them than in any other people.

"Twere therefore contrary to our true intereft, to affift in building up this coloffus to the enormous fize at which the aims. "Twere a policy as fhort-fighted as mean, to feek fafety in a fubferviency to her views as the price of her clemency. This at beft would be but a temporary refpite from the rod if, indeed, that can be called a refpite, which is of itfelf the facrifice of a real to a nominal independence.

These reflections are not defigned to roufe a fpirit of hoftility against France, or to inculcate the idea that we ought of choice to participate in the war against her. They are intended merely to fortify the motives of honor, which forbid our stooping to be compelled, either to fubmit without refiftance to a virtual war on her part, or to avert her blows by engaging in the war on her fide.

When it was the opinion, that France was defending the caufe of liberty, it was a decifive argument againft embarking with her in the conteft, that it would expofe us to hazards and evils infinitely difproportioned to the affiftance we could render. Now that the queftion plainly is, whether France fhall give the law to mankind, the addition of our oppofition to her plan, could have too little influence upon the event to justify our willingly encountering the certain dangers and mifchiefs of the enterprife. 'Tis our true policy to remain at peace, if we can; to negotiate our fubjects of complaint as long as they shall be at all negotiable; to defer a refort to arms till the last effort of negotiation fhall have demonftrated, that there is no alternative, but the furrender of our fovereignty, or the defence of it-that the only option is between infamy or war. But if unhappily this period fhall ever arrive, it will impofe a facred and indifpenfible duty-to meet the conteft with firmnefs, and, relying on a juft providence, confidently to commit the iffue to the God of battles.

While it is a confolation to know, that our government, on this as on

other trying occafions, will act with perfect prudence, and will do every thing that honor permits to preserve peace; yet it is not to be forgotten that there is a point at which forbearance muft ftop-beyond which moderation were bafenefs-where we muft halt and make a stand for our rights, or ceafe to pretend to any.

When the indifcriminate feizure of our veffels by British cruizers under the order of the fixth of November, 1793, had brought our affairs with Great Britain to a crifis, which led to the measure of fending a fpecial envoy to that country to obtain relief and reparation, it was well underftood, that the iffue of that miffion was to determine the question of peace or war between the two nations. In like manner, it is to be expected, that our executive will make a folemn and final appeal to the juftice and intereft of France, will infift in mild but explicit terms, on the renunciation of the pretenfion to intercept the lawful commerce of neutrals with the enemies of France, and the inftitution of fome equitable mode of afcertaining and retributing the loffes which the exercise of it has inflicted upon our merchants. If the experiment fhall fail, there will be nothing left, but to repel aggreffion, and defend our commerce and independence. The refolution to do this will then be impofed on the government by a painful but irrefiftable neceffity; and it were an outrage to the American name and character to doubt, that the people of the United States will approve the refolution, and will fupport it with a conftancy worthy of the juftice of their caufe, and of the glory they have heretofore deserved and acquired.

No: let this never be doubted! The fervile minions of France---thofe who have no fenfibility to injury, but when it comes from Great Britain, who are unconscious of any rights to be protected againft France, who, at a moment when the public fafety more than ever demands à ftrict union between the people and their

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government, traiteroufly labour to detach them from it, and to turn against the government for pretended faults, the refentment which the real oppreffions of France ought to infpirethese wretched men will discover in the end, that they are as infignificant as they are unprincipled. They will find, that they have vainly flattered themfelves with the co-operation of the great body of thofe men with whom the fpirit of party has hitherto affociated them. In fuch an extremity, the adventitious difcriminations of party will be loft in the patriotifm and pride of the American character. Good citizens, of every political denomination, will remember that they are Americans that when their country is in danger, the merit or demerit of particular meafures is no longer a queftion that it is the duty of all to unite their efforts to guard the national rights, to avert national humiliation, and to withstand the impofition of a foreign yoke. The true and genuine fpirit of 1776, not the vile counterfeits of it, which fo often difguft our eyes and our ears, will warm every truly American heart, and light up in it a noble emulation to maintain inviolate the rights, and unfullied the honor of the American nation. It will be proved, to the confufion of all falfe patriots, that we did not break the fetters of one foreign tyranny to put on thofe of another. It will be again proved to the world, that we understand our rights and have the courage to defend them.

But there is ftill ground to hope, that we shall not be driven to this difagreeable extremity. The more deliberate calculations of France will probably rescue us from the prefent embarraffment. If the perfeveres in her plan, she must inevitably add all the neutral powers to the number of her enemies. How will this fulfil the purpose of deftroying the commerce of Great Britain? The commerce of thofe powers with France will then entirely ceafe, and be turned more extenfively into the channels of Great Britain, protected by her navy, with

the co-operation of the maritime force of thofe powers. The refult will be the reverfe of what is projected by the measure. The commerce and revenue of Britain will in all likelihood be augmented rather than diminished; and her arms will receive an important reinforcement.

Violent and unjuft measures commonly defeat their own purpose. The plan of ftarving France was of this defcription, and operated against the views of its projectors. The plan now adopted by France, of cutting off the trade of neutrals with her enemies, alike violent and unjuft, will no doubt end in fimilar difappointment. Let us hope that it will be abandoned, and that ultimate rupture will be avoided; but let us alfo contemplate the poffibility of the contrary, and prepare our minds feriously for the unwelcome event.

AMERICUS.

February, 7, 1797.

The Warning-No. III. THE Paris accounts inform us, that France has lately exercised towards Genoa, an act of atrocious oppreffion, which is an additional and a ftriking indication of the domineering and predatory fpirit by which the is governed. This little republic, whofe territory fcarcely extends beyond the walls of her metropolis, has been compelled, it seems, to ranfom herself from the talons of France, by a contribution of nearly a million of dollars; a large fum for her contracted refources. For this boon," the French government engages on its part to renounce all claims upon Genoa, to forget what has paffed during the fent war, and to forbear any future demands." It would appear from this, that France, to colour the odious exaction, befides the pretence of mifconduct towards her in the prefent war, has not difdained to refort to the ftale and pitiful device of reviving fome antiquated claim upon the country itself. In vain, did the fignal hazards encountered by Genoa to preferve her neutrality, in defiance of the

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hoft of enemies originally leagued against France-in vain did the character and title of republic, plead for a more generous treatment: the attractions of plunder predominated. The fpirit of rapine, callous to the touch of juffice, blind to the evidence of truth, deaf to the voice of entreaty, had marked out and devoted the victim. There was no alternative, but to compound or perifh.

If it be even fuppofed, though this has never appeared, that at fome period of the war, Genoa may be chargeable with acts of queftionable propriety in relation to France, it is manifeft, that it ought to be attributed to the neceffity of a fituation which must have obliged her to temporize. A very fmall and feeble ftate, in the midst of so many great conflicting powers, parts of her territories occupied by armies which the was unable to oppofe; it were a miracle, indeed, if her conduct in every particular will bear the teft of rigorous fcrutiny. But if at any time the preffure of circumstances may have occafioned fome flight deviation, there is nevertheless full evidence of a conftant folicitude on the part of Genoa to maintain, to the utmoft of her ability, a fincere neutrality. It is impoffible to forget the glorious ftand, which the at one time made againft the imperious efforts of Great Britain, to force her from her neutral pofition. The magnanimous and exemplary fortitude, which the difplayed on that occafion, excited in this country univerfal admiration, and must have made a deep impreffion. 'Tis only to recollect that inftance, to be fatisfied, that the treatment which fhe has juft experienced from France, merits the indignant execration of mankind. Unfortunate Genoa! how little didft thou imagine, that thou wert deftined fo foon to be compelled to purchafe thy fafety from the crufhing weight of that hand which ought to have been the first to rife in thy defence!

How fruitful at the fame time of inftruction to us is this painful exam

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ple! The moft infatuated partifans of France cannot but fee in it an unequivocal proof of the rapacious and vindictive policy which dictates her measures. All men muft fee in it, that the flagrant injuries which we are now fuffering from her, proceed from a general plan of domination and plunder; from a difpofition to proftrate nations at her feet; to trample upon their necks; to ravish from them whatever her avidity or convenience may think fit to dedicate to her own ufe.

The laft intelligence from France feems to difpel the doubt, whether the depredations in the Weft Indies may not have refulted from mifapprehenfion or abufe of the orders of the French government. It is now underftood to be a fact, that the cruifers of France every where are authorised to capture and bring in all veffels bound to the ports of her enemies.

This plan is pregnant with the worft evils, which are to be dreaded from the declared and unqualified hoftility of any foreign power. If France, after being properly called upon to renounce it, fhall perfevere in the measure, there cannot be a queftion but that open war will be preferable to fuch a state. By whatever name treachery or pufillanimity may attempt to difguife it, 'tis in fact war, war of the worst kind, wAR ON ONE SIDE. If we can be induced to fubmit to it, longer than is neceffary, to afcertain that it cannot be averted by negociation, we are undone as a people. Whether our determination shall be to lock up our trade by embargoes, or to permit our commerce to continue to float an unprotected prey to French cruifers, our degradation and ruin will be equally complete. The deftruction of our navigation and commerce, the annihilation of our mercantile capital, the difperfion and lofs of our feamen, obliged to emigrate for fubfiftence, the extinction of our revenue, the fall of public credit, the ftagnation of every species of industry, the general impoverishment of our citizens; thefe will be minor

evils in the dreadful catalogue. Some years of fecurity and exertion might repair them. But the humiliation of the American mind would be a lafting and a mortal difeafe in our focial habit. Mental debasement is the greatest misfortune that can befal a people. The moft pernicious of conqueits which a ftate can experience, is a conqueft over that juft and elevated fenfe of its own rights, which infpires a due fenfibility to infult and injury, over that virtuous and generous pride of character, which prefers any peril or facrifice, to a final fubmiffion to oppreffion, and which regards national ignominy as the greatest of national calamities.

The records of hiftory contain numerous proofs of this truth. But an appeal to them is unneceffary. Holland and Italy prefent to our immediate obfervation examples as decifive as they are deplorable. The former, within the last ten years, has undergone two revolutions by the intervention of foreign powers, without even a ferious ftruggle. Mutilated of precious portions of its territory at home by pretended benefactors, but real difpoilers, its dominions abroad flide into the poffeffion of its enemies rather as derelicts than as the acquifitians of victory. Its fleets furrender without a blow. Important only by the fpoils which it offers no lefs to its friends than to its enemies-every fymptom in its affairs is portentous of

national annihilation.

With regard to Italy, 'tis fufficient to fay, that she is debafed enough not even to dare to take part in a conteft, on which, at this moment, her destiny is fufpended.

Moderation in every nation is a virtue. In weak or young nations, it is often wife to take every chance by patience and addrefs to divert hoftility, and in this view to hold parley with infult and injury: but to capitulate with oppreffion, or rather to furrender to it at difcretion, is in any nation, that has any power of refiftance, at all times, as foolish as it is contemptible. The honour of a nation

is its life. Deliberately to abandon it, is to commit an act of political suicide. There is treafon in the fentiment, avowed in the language of fome, and betrayed by the conduct of others, that we ought to bear any thing from France, rather than go to war with her. The nation, which can prefer difgrace to danger, is prepared for a mafter, and deferves one. AMERICUS.

February 21, 1797.

The Warning.-No. IV.

THE emiffaries of France, when driven from every other expedient for extenuating her depredations, have a laft refuge in the example of Great Britain. The treatment wich we now receive from France (fay they) is not worfe than that which we have received from Great Britain. If this apology were founded in fact, it would ftill be a miferable fubterfuge. For what excufe is it to France, or what confolation to us, that fhe, our boasted friend and benefactress, treats us only not worse than a power which is ftigmatifed as an envious rival, and an implacable foe?

The conduct of Great Britain, appealed to in juftification of France, was admitted by all to be inexcufable. The Gallic faction thought it fo extreme, as to call for immediate reprifals. The real patriots differed from them only in thinking, that an armed negociation, to end in reprifals, if unattended with fuccefs, was preferable to immediate hoftility. How dare the men, who, at that period, were the clamorous champions of our national dignity, how dare they (I afk) now to ftand forth the preachers, not of moderation (for in the propriety of this all unite) but of tame fubmiffion-of a fervility, abject enough to love and cherish the hand which defpoils us, to kifs the rod which ftings us with unprovoked lafhes? What logic, what magic, can render innocent or venial in France, that which was fo criminal and odious in Great Britain.

The pretext (we know) of France,

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