fibly be derived from it? The French, with an artful addrefs, have laid by their commerce, and no prizes could be made upon them. We do not wish to extend our national territory by conqueft; and if we did, there is no country which we can poffibly invade.

If we do not engage in a contest, merely to vindicate our injured honour as a nation, what is the object of a war with France? I leave you to point out the fingle advantage, becaufe my imagination cannot comprehend one.

Should we turn our attention to the disadvantages refulting from the measure, they are easily seen, and are very numerous. If you have a war with France, it brings you into an alliance offenfive and defenfive with a finking nation, againft one which you cannot injure, and which at prefent is fupported by powerful alliances, and crowned with unexampled victories.

You cannot proceed one month in a war, without having recourfe to a paper-money currency. You cannot deal in that way without deftroying public and private credit, by emitting large fums, which will be under the cankering procefs of depreciation whilft they are in the prefs. Your funding fyftem, your banks, and all the machinery now depending upon artificial fchemes to weave an overflowing medium, will go down together. England cannot lend you money, because fhe has none to lend that nation is already bankrupt. Should you get an army on foot, and a navy at fea, you will find it very difficult to difband the one, or haul up the other: the expense of these will render the United States entirely fick of being an independent nation.

into a war.

Thefe are confequences which cannot fail to take place, if you urge us There are others which are poffible, if not probable. If they are only poffible, we ought not to hazard them without an object worthy of risk.

When we are, by imprudent meafures, adopted merely to please a party, thrown into a war with France, have we any affurances from the court of London, that no peace fhall be made without our concurrence? There is no treaty to that effect; and therefore, we have no claim upon that crown for such an act of friendfhip. But if fuch a treaty did exist, what fecurity have we that Great Britain would not treat us in the fame manner as the emperor of Germany, and king of Pruffia treated her? Or, if the French should finally be fuccefsful against us, allied with England, why should not that nation hold us to the payment of the expenfes of the war, as fhe has held Italy, Venice, Sardinia, and other powers, who have foolishly yielded to party intrigue, and the addrefs of the belligerent powers? These confequences are rather probable, than barely poffible.

But there are other confequences, which are at least poffible. When we have an army on foot, fhould a party, under the countenance of the British intereft, attempt to change our government from the principles of a popular conftitution, to one of a more permanent executive power, I leave you to calculate upon the bloody confequences of fuch an attempt. I have not ventured to fuggeft it as a poffible confequence, that the United States might, as fome amongst us wifh, become again the provinces of the British crown, and remain for fome years the fervile props of a finking empire.

You may ask, what is to be done in the prefent emergency? You may fay, that the French republic intended, under the embaffy of Genet, to involve us in the European war; and is now making illegal and unprovoked depredations on our commercial intereft. This I admit. It is very clear, that when Genet came to America, he intended, and no doubt under inftructions for that purpose, to engage us in fuch measures as

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would amount to a war against the crown of England; and that his conduct on that occafion was wrong and irregular. But in answer to this, it may be observed, that it is no uncommon thing for a nation at war to attempt to obtain the aid and alliance of other powers. We ourfelves played the fame game, when we engaged the French, the Spaniards, and the Dutch, against the same nation. Genet was removed for his imprudent conduct, and that controverfy is long fince over.

The French have for three or four years paft made deftructive attacks on our merchant fhips; but this is not done with an avowed design to make war upon us, but under a pretence, that we have, by a treaty with Great Britain, violated a treaty between them and us. There is a violent party in the United States, who, on public occafions, defcribe this treatment in the most odious point of light. If this is done to maintain proper ideas of our own national importance, it is very well; but if it is done with a view of raifing the refentment of the people to a war, without calculating upon any valuable advantages from it, the conduct is very reprehenfible.

A great number of the gazettes in America are engaged in urging the people into a war with the French republic. The arguments, however variegated they may appear, whatever numerous forms they may affume, are all founded upon two reafons only. The one is, that they capture our fhips. The other, that they manage their own government in a cruel, tyrannical, and bloody manner. The first reafon has been obferved upon already; and the fecond contains no argument to provoke us to a war. What have we to do with the internal police of other nations? We condemn, the French for exciting other nations to become

republicans; and we certainly ought

not to proceed in the path we condemn. They have decapitated their

monarch, and banished the members of their directory and convention without trial; but what is that to us? The English government shoot the poor Irishmen down as game, upon a fufpicion of their being infurgents; they banished Muir and Palmer for political opinions. The Spanish nation is under the tyranny of Priefts. Portugal, and all Eu rope is in a state of abject flavery. But what are these things to the United States? We are not to gird on the fword as public champions for the rights of mankind.

Should the envoys of the United States return from France without effecting any thing by their embaffy, and yet that nation fhould ceafe their depredations on our commerce, there can be no proper and adequate grounds for a war. Should their depredations be continued, it may then be a very ferious queftion, whether we shall endure the injury without refentment, or whether we fhall plunge ourselves into a war in order to vindicate our national honour.

The war in Europe cannot continue much longer. There are great and conclufive reasons against it, and it moft certainly would be madness in our nation to become a party in it at the prefent moment.

These are not hafty fentiments; nor do they proceed from party views, or foreign influence. They have been long in my mind; but I did not before feel a neceffity of giving them to the public. I do it now with a real refpect to you, and a devoted regard to our national government, on which I do not think but with rapture and delight.

Boston, Feb. 1798.

GROTIUS.

An Impartial Examination into the Origin of Neutral Spoliations. No. I.

A N anxious defire for the continuance of peace, upon honourable terms, appears to have actuated

a large part of this country from the beginning of the ftruggles in Europe. A very great folicitude upon that fubject induced the writer of the following columns, in the Spring of 1797, to inveftigate, with care and impartiality, the question stated in an official report of the 27th of February, laft, concerning the nation, which really originated the dreadful spoliations, that have cruelly injured our merchants. Good ends could only be promoted at that time by a guarded use of the facts and reflections, which the paper contains. Its publication then appeared highly inexpedient. But now, that the breach between us and France is fo wide, and the fate of the negotiation probably is decided; and now, that we are about to confider the critical meafure of permitting our merchant fhips to arm; it is hoped, that the publication of the paper may have a falutary tendency. The hiftorical facts are recommended to the candid confideration of all lovers of peace and juftice, who would not confent to see our country engaged in a war on the fide of the first and greatest aggreffor, against the last and leaft.

cree of the convention of the 9th May, 1793). These are the words, in which that charge has been brought against the French government, by the writer of a series of papers in the Gazette of the United States, entitled, "The Warning," and fign ed" AMERICUS." Thofe papers are manifeftly written by a perfon very minutely informed concerning the tranfactions of our government, and have been generally fo confidered. It is propofed to fhow, he is greatly mistaken, and that he has but flightly viewed the furface of the fubject.

IT has been afferted, and, by many, believed," that the government of France has an indisputable title "to the culpable pre-eminence of baving taken the lead in the violation of neutral rights; the first instance, on the part of the British government (referring to the order "of the 8th of June, 1793) being "said to be nearly a month posterior to the commencement of the evil "by France," (referring to the de

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NOTE.

* See page 50.

It is an important matter of obfervation, that a fimilar way of thinking feems to have existed even in the executive branch of the government, immediately before the publication of "The Warning," referred to above; for, in a report of the 27th February, 1797, page 7, it is obferved, that "It may be proper to remark bere, that this decree of the convention" [that of the 9th May, 1795, mentioned in the next preceding fentence] "directing the capture of neutral vessels laden with provisions and destined for enemy ports, preceded by one month the order of the British government," &c. [referring to that of June 8th, 1793.] It is true, that there is no direct affertion by the reporter, that either that British act, or that French act, is the leading act of violation committed by England and France upon the neutral commerce; but the paffage unavoidably carries the idea to the reader, and has occafioned fome, who have not well examined the subject, to believe, that the report exhibits a proof, that "France" [in the language of Americus] " has really taken the lead "in the violation of neutral rights."

It is always highly important to take a juft view of the conduct of nations, which are competitors for our friendship and trade, and particularly when we are promulgating an official notice of the deportment of one of them, which is in a state

of actual disagreement with us. Let us, therefore, examine the evidences we poffefs, with ferioufnefs, decency, and that candor, which the fubject demands.

There is among the records of the department of state, clear and positive evidence, that England had deliberately matured and consummated the fyftem of violating the neutral commerce above a month before the French decree of the 9th of May, 1793. Our late minister in London, mr. Pinckney, communicated to our fecretary of ftate, in his letter of the 5th July, 1793, that lord Grenville had explicitly and unreservedly avowed, that the captures of neutral veffels, as directed by the Britifh order of the 8th June, 1793, to that end, were fully understood by both Russia and Great Britain, to be within the intention of the convention between them, which was figned by those two governments at London, on the 25th day of March, 1793*. From the extraordinary nature of that convention between Ruffia and Great Britain, from the diftance between Petersburgh and London, and from the feafon of the year, it cannot be doubted, that this important contract, which was mutually figned on the 25th of March, 1793, must have been originated in the fummer of 1792, by the emprefs and the British king. In all the correfpondence between our fecretary of state and mr. Pinckney, and in the conferences and notes between the British secretary of state and our minister in London, we do not perceive the least suggestion of the influence of the example of the French decree of the 9th of May, 1793. Such a plea could not possibly be made by lord Grenville, who

NOTE.

*The evidences of thefe facts feem to have entirely escaped the notice of the reporter, and of the writer of "The Warning."-The former is greatly to be regretted.

knew and avowed, that Great Britain had bound herself by a folemn compact with Ruffia, to observe the very conduct of which the neutral powers complained. Lord Grenville, and the British minister here (mr. Hammond) have, in their written communications, uniformly maintained, that it was regular and right, under the law of nations. The Britifh government, no doubt, gave their first orders to the commanders of their fhips, as foon as the convention with Ruffia was figned, that is, in March 1793 and it is to be : fumed, that the known detentions of neutral veffels in the British ports, so early as the autumn of 1792, and the captures of neutral veffels, which the French government affign as the juftifying reafons of their act of May 1793, were made in confequence of the negotiation and completion of that convention and of those first orders. The British orders of the

NOTE.

pre

†The French minifter, M. Chauvelin, in London, ftrongly remonftrated, in November 1792, against the detention of neutral vessels in the British ports, laden with grain, contrary to the law of nations, and to the existing treaty of 1786; nay, even as contrary to the laws of England: for the miniftry actually applied for an indemnity to parliament. Thefe facts, followed by the captures of neutral veffels, after the French minister was ordered from London (24th January 1793) and prior both to the Ruffian convention (March 25, 1793) and to the French decree (of May 1793) with the avowed design and meaning of the convention between England and Ruffia, manifest and establish a system, on the part of Great Britain, long premeditated, deliberately begun and continued, and ultimately confirmed by a folemn engagement. with the powerful court of Ruffia, all prior to the French decree of May 1793. The French minifter in London, openly

8th of June are exprefsly called by themfelves," additional instructions." The English fecretary of state infifted on their right to adopt fuch meafures, in his negotiations with our envoy (mr. Jay) and in the formation of the exifting treaty with the United States. It is not perceived, therefore, in what manner the French decree of May, 1793, can have produced this conduct of Great Britain. Certainly France acted a very unwarrantable and imprudent part towards us and the other neutrals, in her decree of May, 1793. But, having an immenfe population to fupport, and with a prodigious band of failors and foldiers to feed, almoft completely fhut in on the land fide by the hoftile Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Spain, expecting no grain from the fwarming hive of Switzerland, and clofely watched by the inimical fleets of Ruffia, Sweden*, Holland, England, Spain, Portugal, and the Italin ftates, her just and founded apprehenfions of a ruinous and distracting famine, appear to have

been quickened by the inftances of capture, fome of which are particularized, and others of which are exprefsly though generally noticed, in the decree of the conventiont. Al though these circumstances are absolutely insufficient to justify France, they afford a degree and kind of extenuation for her following the emprefs of Ruffia and England, which these powers cannot plead for their prior and leading act, and for the captures and detentions prior to and during the pre-existence of their convention. That we confidered the conduct of Great Britain at the time, as, under all circumstances, the most exceptionable, muft appear certain from our fending a special envoy_to London, and not fending one to Paris. This obfervation appears the more natural and reasonable, because we had refident minifters, in 1793, and 1794, at both places; mr. G. Morris in France, and mr. Pinckney in London. The object of this paper is not at all to juftify the spoliations committed by France, nor

remonftrated against the earliest of these measures of the British government, as calculated to produce a famine, and the disordering apprebensions of a famine, on the 7th January, 1793 (ftate papers, page 235). It is very important to remark, that the late bishop of Autun, M. Talleyrand, who is now the minifter of foreign affairs in France, was then in London, as the authorized and confidential director of M. Chauvelin. He was alfo in this country, when the late prefident made his honeft demurs to the provifion article in the British treaty.

* The last king of Sweden was very unfriendly to the revolution in France, till his death.

† It has been already noticed, that M.. Chauvelin, the French minifter, particularly grounded a part of his remonftrances to lord Grenville, upon the tendency of the British mea

sures to produce famine or the fear of it in France. The memorial of the English minifter, lord Auckland, to the Dutch government (April 5, 1793) holds up famine as a calamity about to afflict France, he knowing, that the Ruffian convention had been figned in London 11 days before : and the empress of Ruffia, in July, 1793, informed the court of Sweden, that, in consequence of an arrangement made with his Britannic majefty, fhe had given instructions to the commander of her fleet, "to "ftop and compel all neutral ships, "bound to or freighted for France, "either to sail back or enter some "neutral barbour." Now, it is certain, that the convention of the 25th March was the only arrangement, that was executed between Ruffia and England between that day and July 30, 1793.