rule of law which declares that truth is a libel. As our readers well know, in criminal proceedings the truth of a libel cannot be taken into consideration at all, although in civil cases the allegation of truth may be brought forward, and if proved, is conclusive. The observations of the Solicitor

WE are glad that a Select Committee has been appointed to consider the state of the present Law of Libel, as we are satisfied that it demands all the attention and inves-General on this point are worthy of attentigation which a body of this kind is best qualified to give. We shall now mention the principal points which deserve their consideration, most of which were stated in the able speech of the Solicitor General, on moving for the Committee; and it will be readily admitted by all, that a system more faulty and incongruous than the present can hardly exist.

There can be no doubt, that under the present state of the law, the rule that has been lately enforced, that a newsvender is liable to an action of libel for the bare sale of a newspaper containing libellous matter, is the true one, as the sale amounts to a publication; but the manifest hardship and injustice of this state of the law must, we think, be apparent to all. The remedy proposed for this grievance, which would also apply to some others, is to enact that the simple act of publishing, or assisting in the publication, shall not constitute an offence; but that it should be further necessary that the prosecutor should bring some proof of knowledge of the libel home to the accused; in short, that malice should not, as at present, be implied, but should be proved against the person to be convicted.

tion. "It was," he said, "difficult to go to the extent that every man had a right to publish any thing of any body, provided only it were true. It had been suggested that some such rule as this should be established; that if the publication charged as libellous should be proved to be true, that should be an answer to the implied malice. As the law at present stood, a libel carried with it an implication of malice. It was vain for a defendant to prove the truth of the publication, and that he never entertained a suspicion of its containing libellous matter. If a man maliciously published that which was not true of another person, it was fit that he should be punished for so doing. In many cases it might not be right to publish matter which was true; but it never could be justifiable to publish what was not true. Some such rule as that which he had adverted to might possibly be adopted, and it was a point worthy of inquiry. At present he was inclined to think, that if a jury should find that a defendant has published a libel innocently-that was to say, for a good purpose, or without express malice-the evidence of the truth of the publication should protect him from the Another grievance is undoubtedly the implied malice. In proceeding by simple unsettled state of the law as to what con-action, the consequences resulting from the stitutes a libel-a point which books have been composed to settle, and which certainly some learned Judges have reduced to absurdity. Lord Erskine used to say of the state of the law in his time respecting the taking a debt out of the Statute of Limitations, that the only way was for the debtor to knock the creditor down if he were asked for payment, and wished that the statute should not be defeated; and certainly the law of libel is in a similar state of absurdity. If all the opinions given from the Bench on the subject were to be taken as law, the most harmless piece of raillery might be punished as libellous matter; and a sufficient number of instances have occurred to render the whole subject ridiculous. Some endeavour should therefore be made to define the nature and limits of a libel in

law.

The next point to which the attention of the Committee should be directed is, that

present law were really absurd. If the defendant should succeed in proving the libel to be true, no matter how injurious or cruel it might be, or how malicious soever the motives might be which prompted its publication, the person libelled could obtain no redress." It will be seen, therefore, that the present law is altogether defective in

hardship of this rule, in a case just reported. a A very recent instance has occurred of the A libel stated that there was a riot at C., and that a person fired a pistol at an assemblage of persons; and upon this, imputed neglect of duty to the magistrates; and it was held by Patteson, J., on a trial for a criminal informa tion for this libel on the magistrates, that the defendant's counsel, with a view of shewing that the libel did not exceed the bounds of free discussion, could not go into evidence to prove that there was in fact a riot, and that a pistol was in fact fired at the people. Rex v. Brig stock, 6 Car. & Pay. 185.

On the Law of Libel.-Practical Points of General Interest, No. LVIII.

this point: on the one hand the truth of the libel is often a justification where it should not be so; on the other, it strictly cannot in many cases be entertained, when it would completely justify the defendant. The state of the law, therefore, in these respects, is obviously defective.

Another point which has frequently come before public attention, is the power of the law officers of the Crown to file ex officio informations. In Ireland, it is the practice for the Attorney General to call the parties before him previously to filing an information, which affords an opportunity for explanation of the circumstances under which the publication has taken place. It may perhaps be advisable to put the practice in England in this respect on a similar footing.

But perhaps the question the most frequently discussed in the present state of the law of libel is, how far the jury should be the judges of the law as well as the facts in cases of libel. By Mr. Fox's celebrated act, 32 G. 3. c. 60, it was declared, that the jury should be judges as well of the law as the fact; but it has been recently held by the Court of Common Pleas, that this act does not extend to civil cases; and that the jury are to determine the fact of publication, and the application of the innuendoes, and the Court the question whether the matter be or be not libellous. This subject, therefore,

also demands the attention of the Committee, and a declaratory enactment thereon.

The severe act passed on this subject in a time of great public confusion, 60 G. 3. c. 9, will also deserve consideration.

These points, and the others connected with the subject, being deliberated upon, we trust that an act may be framed which may relieve the present state of the law from the odium and difficulty which now arise from its vagueness, and the impossibility through its means of obtaining the ends of justice.

PRACTICAL POINTS OF GENERAL
INTEREST.
No. LVIII.

EXCURSIONS BY STEAM BOATS.

As the Easter holydays are at hand, the following case may be useful to some of our readers :

435

Assault, with several special pleas of justification. That one of the defendants was possessed of a certain steam vessel, into which the plaintiff intruded, and he gently laid hands on him to remove him, and the other defendant assisted. Replication of excess as to the justification, which was pleaded to the third count, which alleged a tearing of the plaintiff's clothes; and de injuria to the other special pleas. From the evidence on the part of the plaintiff it appeared, that he was desirous of going to Richmond with a friend; and being too late for the regular steam boat, they hired a wherry, and when they had got as far as Whitehall, they saw the Queen Adelaide steamer, and inquired where it was going. The captain replied, "to Richmond." The plaintiff said, "that is the very thing we want." They were going on board, when the captain said, "Do you belong to the party?" The plaintiff said, " Party? what party? we are by ourselves." The captain said, "Very weli, you may come on board-the fare is 1s. 6d. a-piece." The plaintiff and his friend then went on board and walked about, and soon after observed servants coming with provisions in baskets, which led them to think that the boat was engaged for a private party. The plaintiff was looking towards the shore, when a gentleman who had been giving directions, and appeared to be one of the managers, came up to the plaintiff's friend and said, "I hope you gentlemen have not left any of your party behind." To No, Sir, we have not which the reply was, left any of our party behind; I am sorry we are bere; I fear we are intruders: we were not aware, when we came on board, that it was a private party." The gentleman made answer, "You are not at all intruding." The steam boat then went on, and nothing particular occurred till it arrived near Putney Bridge, when the defendant Lewis and another person said in a loud tone, There are strangers on board," and advanced towards the plaintiff and his friend, and asked them if they belonged to the party. They said, No, but they had explained to a gentleman who appeared to be a manager. Angry words passed between the parties. The plaintiff and his friend were several times told, that they had no business there, and that if they did not go, they would be compelled by force to leave; and eventually a wherry was called, and they were forced into it by the defendants and others. The plaintiff seated himself and refused to move, and in the act of forcing him away, it appeared that his clothes were much torn.

Alderson, J. (in summing up), said-The first question for your consideration is, whether the defendants have justified the assault which has been proved. The way in which they justify is, that the defendant Lewis was possessed of a certain steam vessel, and that the plaintiff was unlawfully there, and, being requested, refused to leave, whereupon Lewis removed him, and the other defendant assisted him in so doing. You need not consider whe

b Walker v. Ridgway, E. T. 1827. Levy v. ther they used too much violence, as the plainMylne, E. T. 1827.

tiff has not taken issue upon that point. In

point of law, I inform you that Lewis was not justified as in possession of the vessel, and therefore you will find your verdict for the plaintiff. But you must in considering the damages, take all the circumstances into your consideration; and if you think that the defendants were in substance justified, then you should find your verdict for a farthing damages. But, if you think that they were not in substance justified, then you will give such damages as you think the plaintiff is entitled to. His Lordship read over the evidence, and left the conflicting testimony to be decided on by the jury, who found a verdict for the plaintiff-Damages 101.

Dean v. Hogg, 6 C. & P. 54.

NEW BILLS IN PARLIAMENT.

GENERAL REGISTER OF DEEDS.

The following is an analysis of the new Bill for establishing a General Register for all Deeds and Instruments, affecting Real Property in England and Wales.”

Registry Office.

1. A General Registry Office to be established.

2. The Lords of the Treasury to provide proper buildings.

Registrar and other Officers.

3. His Majesty may appoint a Registrar and Assistant Registrars.

4. The Lords of the Treasury to appoint subordinate officers.

5. And make regulations as to the duties of

the several officers.

6. The Registrar General to be a Barrister and Conveyancer of ten years' standing, and the Assistant Registrar three years.

7. The Registrar and Assistant to hold office during good behaviour. The clerks may be removed by the Lords of the Treasury.

8. The Registrar General, and other officers, to give security for the due performance of their duties.

Districts.

and assurances, affecting lands within such district, to be indexed in the General Index, under heads designated by numbers.

Second. Where the grantor does not derive title under any registered assurance, the assurance is to be indexed under a new head.

Third. Where the grantor does derive title under a registered assurance, the assurance is to be indexed under the same head as the assurance under which the title is derived.

Fourth. Power enabling lands previously held under different titles, to be brought together on the Index; and enabling lands previously indexed under the same head, to be separated on the Index.

Fifth. No assurance to be indexed under more than one head.

Sixth. An Alphabetical Index, to be called "The Index to the Roots of Titles," to be kept for each district. And where the grantor does not derive title under any registered assurance, an entry of the grantor's name to be made in such Index, with a reference to the head under which the assurance is indexed.

Seventh. Particulars to be expressed on entering an assurance.

Eighth. The grantor of an equity of redemption is not to be considered as deriving his title under the mortgage deed.

What Instruments may be registered. 12. Decrees in equity, creating, transferring, or, determining interests in land, and also decrees in equity, by which any such decree shall assurances. be varied or reversed, are to be considered

13. Every private act of Parliament affecting lands, to be an assurance.

14. Where by a public act any lands are vested upon the payment of money, &c., a memorandum of the payment, or other act, may be registered.

15. Equitable mortgages, by deposit of deeds, may be registered by depositing a memorandum.

16. Liens, by reason of non-payment of purchase money, may be registered, by depositing a memorandum.

17. The assurance to be considered to have been made by the person whose right, &c. in

9. England and Wales to be divided into the lands shall be bound by the decree, &c. districts for the purposes of the act.

Mode of Registry.

10. Assurances executed after December, 31, 1834, or in case of wills where the testator shall die after Dec. 31, 1834, may be registered by depositing an original, and making the proper entries. The documents deposited to be made up into books or parcels, and numbered.

11. All assurances (except wills, &c.) to be indexed according to the regulations following :

First. An Index, to be called "The General Index," to be kept for each district;

Index of Wills.

18. An Index, to be called "The Index to Wills," to be kept for England and Wales; and where a will is registered, an entry of the testator's name to be made in such Index, and also an entry of the will.

19. Power to require the registration of any will which has been proved.

Loss of Original Document.

20. Where the original document is lost, a copy or extract may be deposited. In case of an extract, the registration to be effectual only so far as the extract agrees with the original.

New Bills in Parliament.

21. Where the document is directed to be deposited at any other office, a copy may be deposited at the Register Office.

Compelling Registration.

22. Power to any person claiming under an assurance, to compel the registration thereof, by application to a Judge.

23. Power to the Judge to whom the application shall be made, to make any order as to costs; and to order an office copy to be furnished at the expense of the applicant.

24. Judgments, statutes, and recognizances may be registered by depositing a memorial, and making the proper entry. Such memorials 41. Other assurances authorized to be reto be made up into books or parcels, and num-gistered, to be void as against purchasers, unbered. less registered.

49. Conveyances to the assignees of bank33. The memorials of judgments, and sta-rupts and insolvents, not to be protected by tutes and recognizances to his Majesty, and the act. of such inquisitions, obligations, specialties, and acceptance of offices as aforesaid, to be made up into books or parcels, and numbered.

52. The act not to affect the jurisdiction of equity in cases of lis pendens. But an assurance executed during the pendency of a suit, to be valid, unless the bill or information shall have been registered before the registration of the assurance.

53. Decrees authorized to be registered, to 36. Particulars to be contained in any such prevail against assurances executed during the memorial. Memorials of bills and informa-pendency of the suit, unless the assurance tions to be made up into books or parcels, and shall be registered before the decree. mumbered. 2E 3