How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and CollapseCambridge University Press, 23.08.2018 - 257 Seiten This accessible volume shines a light on how autocracy really works by providing basic facts about how post-World War II dictatorships achieve, retain, and lose power. The authors present an evidence-based portrait of key features of the authoritarian landscape with newly collected data about 200 dictatorial regimes. They examine the central political processes that shape the policy choices of dictatorships and how they compel reaction from policy makers in the rest of the world. Importantly, this book explains how some dictators concentrate great power in their own hands at the expense of other members of the dictatorial elite. Dictators who can monopolize decision making in their countries cause much of the erratic, warlike behavior that disturbs the rest of the world. By providing a picture of the central processes common to dictatorships, this book puts the experience of specific countries in perspective, leading to an informed understanding of events and the likely outcome of foreign responses to autocracies. |
Inhalt
Introduction | 1 |
Autocratic Seizures of Power | 25 |
What Do We Know about Coups? | 44 |
The Effect of Elite Factionalism | 61 |
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships? | 129 |
Specialized Institutions | 154 |
Why Dictatorships Fall | 177 |
Conclusion and Policy Implications | 218 |
| 237 | |
| 253 | |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse Barbara Geddes,Joseph Wright,Erica Frantz Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2018 |
How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse Barbara Geddes,Joseph Wright,Erica Frantz Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2018 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
achieved power allies armed forces army authoritarian autocracies autocratic bargaining benefits Chapter citizens clan coded Cold War collegial competitive elections concentrate power concentration of power conflict countries coup attempts credible decisions democracy democratic dictatorial elite dictatorial inner circle distribution economic estimate ethnic ethnic fractionalization expect factionalized foreign Geddes Hugo Chávez increase incumbent inherited party initiate institutions insurgencies internal security Karimov leadership legislatures likelihood loyalist paramilitary Mathieu Kérékou military dictators military officers military rule military seizure military-led regimes Moammar Qaddafi networks officer corps opposition organized oust the dictator ouster overthrow percent personalist dictators politburo political popular uprising post-seizure party creation potential promotions purge reduce regime leaders regime survival regime-change coups replace ruling group ruling party Saddam Hussein Samuel Doe security services seized power seizure groups seizure of power seizure type senior officers share strategy support party Svolik Uzbekistan variables violent
